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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
THE CARIBBEAN COURT OF JUSTICE: AN INVESTIGATION OF THE IMPACT
OF ELITES ON ITS CREATION AND PRESENT STRUCTURE AS IT RELATES TO
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
by
Nicole Warmington-Granston
Florida International University, 2014
Miami, Florida
Professor Barry Levitt, Major Professor
The primary focus of this dissertation is to determine the degree to which
political, economic, and socio-cultural elites in Jamaica and Trinidad & Tobago
influenced the development of the Caribbean Court of Justice’s (CCJ) original
jurisdiction. As members of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), both states replaced
their protectionist model with open regionalism at the end of the 1980s. Open regionalism
was adopted to make CARICOM member states internationally competitive. Open
regionalism was also expected to create a stable regional trade environment. To ensure a
stable economic environment, a regional court with original jurisdiction was proposed. A
six member Preparatory Committee on the Caribbean Court of Justice (PREPCOM), on
which Jamaica and Trinidad & Tobago sat, was formed to draft the Agreement
Establishing the Caribbean Court of Justice that would govern how the Court would
interpret the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas (RTC) and enforce judgments.
Through the use of qualitative research methods, namely elite interviews,
document data, and text analysis, and a focus on three levels of analysis, that is, the
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international, regional, and domestic, three major conclusions are drawn. First, changes in
the international economic environment caused Jamaica and Trinidad & Tobago to
support the establishment of a regional court. Second, Jamaica had far greater influence
on the final structure of the CCJ than Trinidad & Tobago. Third, it was found that in both
states the political elite had the greatest influence on the development and structure of the
CCJ. The economic elite followed by the socio-cultural elite were found to have a lesser
impact. These findings are significant because they account for the impact of elites and
elite behavior on institutions in a much-neglected category of states: the developing
world.
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CHAPTER 1:
INTRODUCTION

OVERVIEW
This dissertation seeks to answer two theoretical and analytical questions
regarding what drives the creation of regional supranational judicial institutions. These
include:
1. What are the roles of the political, economic, and socio-cultural/knowledge1 elites
in key member states, and the general publics in those countries, in the creation
and

structuring

of

regional

judicial

institutions?

Do

they

coincide/clash/collaborate?
2. What other factors have led to the creation and development of regional judicial
institutions?
To answer these questions, I turned to established theories. The literature on the
impact of elites and institutions on the scope (institutions/rules) and structure
(organizations) of regional integration has been largely determined by the experience of
the integration process in Europe and general international trade. These theories of
interest include Institutionalism, Neo-Institutionalism, Neo-functionalism, Liberal
Intergovernmentalism, Small State Foreign Policy, the Bargaining and Dependency
models, and the Domino theory of Regionalism.
As the basis for analyzing the Caribbean experience, I propose that hypotheses
about the evolution of Caribbean integration and the development of the CCJ be derived
1

A subset of the socio-cultural elite.

1

from the approaches discussed above. The hypotheses will allow us to assess the
interplay among micro and macro level processes and actors—that is, the systemic, state,
and domestic influences on regional integration.
By extension, the questions the dissertation considers are important for two main
reasons. The first relates to the context in which there was renewed worldwide interest in
regional integration in the 1980s. Like other regions, support for regionalism in the Anglo
Caribbean was scant until the heralding of the globalization age in the 1980s. As such, it
is evident that exogenous factors and their timing have influence over the development of
regional institutions, including that of the CCJ. Previously, in the 1970s, many
governments worked against the development of a strong rules-based system, resulting in
the underuse of existing arbitration mechanisms for settling disputes between CARICOM
states (Hall, 2003b; Jordan 2003, 2004; Pollard, 2003). But these sorts of mechanisms
were emerging throughout other regions, as well as at the international level. By
extension, the proliferation of these mechanisms may have led some member states to
demand changes in CARICOM’s regional institutional design. Thus, the CCJ was “a
product of the drive to create institutions compatible with the new international
environment in which the Community finds itself” (Hall, 2003b, p. 33).
Second, the present dissertation assesses the assertion that there could be no
institutional change without the support of national elites: political elites, sometimes
influenced by economic and “knowledge” elites. However, these elites are not necessarily
unified. There are also other variables that can influence a state’s foreign policy behavior
– factors such as ideology, size, and power.
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In answering the focal questions, the dissertation investigates the impact of elites
and elite behavior on institutions in a much-neglected category of states: the developing
world. Scholarship on integration has, up to now, focused largely on industrialized states,
such as the US, and regions, such as Europe (Armstrong & Bulmer, 1998; Bomberg &
Stubb, 2004; Bulmer, 1998; Mitrany, 1966; Wood & Yeşilada 1996). Studying the
intricacies of group dynamics, institutions, and policymaking in the formation of the CCJ,
however, must take into account the socio-political context of the Caribbean and, by
extension, the developing world. Therefore, the dissertation also challenges the notion of
some integration scholars, like Daniel Elazar (1998), that insular states, such as those
found in the Caribbean, are unable to form stable, effective, and tightly integrated
regional systems.
The focal questions were answered using research methodology and data
collection that delineated historical processes and identified relevant historical details by
aggregating the domestic, regional, and international levels of analysis. These methods
allowed the author to study the interrelationship between micro- and macro-level
processes and actors. Research was restricted to the periods from 1980 to 2006, years
when the CCJ negotiations were most active. Data was collected from elite interviews
and archival material. The process-tracing method was used to analyze qualitative data
from two country case studies – Jamaica and Trinidad & Tobago. By studying change
over time in each country and then comparing across cases, this dissertation utilized both
the “most similar systems” and “most different systems” research design (Neuman,
2003).
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I will now present background on the Caribbean integration and the CCJ, discuss
the expectations on the basis of established theoretical frameworks, and provide the
dissertation’s chapter summary.

HISTORY OF CARIBBEAN INTEGRATION
The Agreement establishing the Caribbean Court of Justice was ratified on
February 14, 2001. The CCJ was not inaugurated, however, until April 16, 2005 after
numerous delays. It was 16 years in the making, starting with the 1989 decision by the
Heads of Government of CARICOM to appoint the West Indian Commission (WIC). The
Commission’s purpose was to provide recommendations – the establishment of a
Caribbean Supreme Court vested with original jurisdiction being one of them – to
increase the efficiency and effectiveness of the Caribbean regional integration process
while achieving the region’s ultimate goal of economic development and survival.
The CCJ was established for four main reasons. First, it was established to correct
the weaknesses found in the original arbitration process among the CARICOM member
states (Jordan, 2003, 2004). Second, it was expected to interpret the Revised Treaty of
Chaguaramas (RTC)2 and enforce judgments and orders in member states as it relates to
the treaty (De la Bastide, 2007; Jones, 2004; Jordan, 2003; Ryan, 2001; Caribbean Court
of Justice [CCJ], 2001; CARICOM Secretariat, 2008). Third, it was expected to support
the RTC’s Caribbean Single Market and Economy (CSME) (Jones, 2004; Jordan, 2003;
Ryan, 2001; CCJ, 2001; CARICOM Secretariat, 2008). Fourth, the CCJ was to be the
2

The RTC is a binding agreement among CARICOM member states to “further intensify economic
integration through a Single Market and Economy, foreign policy coordination and functional cooperation”
(CARICOM Secretariat, 2005, p. 55).
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highest appellate court of CARICOM in matters of both Community law and national
law. It would be possible to appeal the decisions of national courts to the CCJ and
national courts would also be able to refer questions of CARICOM law to the CCJ (Bilal,
2004).
The Caribbean Community (CARICOM) member states seeking to ensure
economic development and survival have voluntarily made collective decisions.
However, CARICOM has not fully realized the enforcement or successful
implementation of collective decision-making in this area (Ryan, 2002). There has been
resistance to the enforcement of some CARICOM decisions by various members and
there had been little success in the implementation of regional initiatives (Hall, 2001). As
a result, some of the region’s leaders sought to establish stronger institutions than then
available to support the enforcement of decisions, balance national and regional interests,
and foster greater interaction among government agencies at different levels and among
private sector actors too.
In the present dissertation, I discuss the primary motivation behind the creation of
the CCJ with regards to its original jurisdiction (the CSME and the RTC). Further, I
suggest the logic of the CCJ’s creation can be traced to the original Treaty of
Chaguaramas. More immediately, changes at the international level—particularly the
processes we have dubbed “globalization”—also led to greater regional integration and,
in the Anglo-Caribbean’s instance, to the formation of supranational political or legal
institutions like the CCJ. These institutional changes reflect the preferences of, and the
competition among, different sets of elite groups.

5

As a region, the Caribbean has been defined according to four main categories
(Girvan 2000a, p. 31-36; Baptiste, 1998, p. 9):1. Geographical – this is the traditional position that defines the Caribbean as a set
of small island states and those mainland countries awash by the Caribbean Sea.
2. Geopolitical – this definition incorporates the above definition and includes
Central American countries not traditionally identified as being part of the
Caribbean.
3. Ethnohistorical – this position defines the Caribbean on the basis of racial and
ethnic traits and shared patterns of colonization and immigration.
4. Transnational – this definition holds that the Caribbean is not bound by territory
but also includes the Caribbean Diaspora.
While these definitions are all credible, the fourth definition will be excluded as
the focus of the study will be on the former British colonies and English-speaking small
island and mainland (Belize and Guyana) developing states in the Caribbean and Latin
America (with Haiti and Suriname) who, form the Caribbean Community and Common
Market (CARICOM).
Regional integration is defined as “a “process” toward or “end product” of social,
political or economic unification among separate national units within geographical
proximity to one another” (Wickham, 1997, p. 240). Regional integration movements are
seen as reactions to external pressures to which national units are forced to respond. As a
result of these pressures national units voluntarily forge formal organizations, such as
CARICOM, that provide a forum for formal and informal supranational decision-making
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thereby enriching mutual trust and co-operation between the member states (Heywood,
1999, pp. 110-111).
The regional integration movement, in general, has experienced pendular swings,
meaning that there have been periods when regionalism was broadly supported and
periods when it was not (Eden & Hermann, 2003). According to Lorraine Eden and
Charles Hermann (2003, p. 4), regionalism was popular during the 1960s and 1970s, then
lost support during the 1980s, then had renewed interest in the 1990s. The pendular swing
of support was a result of changes in perspectives on the benefits of free trade as opposed
to protectionism. The same is true for the Caribbean – though at slightly different time
periods – as regionalism was supported prior to the nationalist period of the 1960s, after
which it lost support until the heralding of the globalization age in the 1980s and
onwards. At each stage regional integration took different forms.
The Caribbean region started out with a political union (the strongest form of
regional integration). A political union, in its strictest sense, is synonymous with
federalism. Federalism is the division of decision-making power between a central body
and several regional units. During the decolonization period, the British Government and
the new and emerging Caribbean leaders attempted federalism, the West Indies
Federation, which was established on April 22, 1958 when the first session of its
parliament was held. It included all the British Colonies in the region with the exception
of British Honduras, British Guiana, and the British Virgin Islands. However, the
Federation was dissolved a mere four years after its establishment.
The aim of the Federation was to nurture political unity and a Caribbean identity.
As stated by a staunch supporter of regional integration, then Prime Minister of Jamaica,

7

Norman Manley, the Federation was “the shortest road to our political ambition of
nationhood in the West Indies” (Mordecai, 1968, p. 42). The Federation was a means to
an end, which included the desire for self-government and the realization of nationalist
aspirations. The failure of the West Indies Federation of 1958-1962 was a result of the
fact that it followed a purely political framework for the harmonization of the member
states. The Federation framers’ narrow view of regional integration excluded strategies
for regional and national development, which adversely affected the Federation’s
sustainability. First, there were no discussions as to the manner in which the Federation
would address regional social issues, and when it was suggested that the richer islands
subsidize the poorer member states, the suggestion led to a backlash from some states and
the eventual secession of Jamaica (Mordecai, 1968, p. 459). Second, the Federation did
not properly promote internal trade; nor did it set up a regional taxation system or bind
member states’ fiscal policies (Mordecai, 1968, p. 460).
Thus, Caribbean regional integration reverted to a free trade area (the weakest
form of regional integration) under the Caribbean Free Trade Area (CARIFTA).
CARIFTA, a region-wide initiative, was used to remove trade barriers between member
states so as to increase trade and improve development among the individual states while
not requiring that all states maintain common external barriers to trade. CARIFTA was
seen as the means of ensuring the economic viability and the sustainability of the
individual states (Boxill, 1997).
Eventually, Caribbean regional integration slowly evolved from a free trade area
to a customs union, then a common market (free movement in certain sectors) and an
incomplete economic union over the following three decades. Established among the 14
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former British colonies in the Caribbean, the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) started
out as a free trade area – CARIFTA – which eventually became a customs union, as it
included a common external tariff. With the signing of the Treaty of Chaguaramas
(1973), CARICOM officially became a common market. In addition to forming a
common market, CARICOM has agreed to cooperation in such areas as health, transport,
culture and education, and the co-ordination of foreign policies among the member states.
1989 saw the CARICOM Conference of the Heads of Government decide to strengthen
economic integration through a proposed Single Market and Economy. They called for
the Treaty of Chaguaramas to be amended. “To this end, nine (9) Protocols were
negotiated which formed the legal basis for the establishment of the CSME [CARICOM
Single Market and Economy]” (CSME Unit, 2004) under the RTC. The RTC also
implied a need for an established regional court with original jurisdiction to interpret and
apply the treaty and act as arbitrator for CSME issues.
Given this background it should be noted that the Caribbean, more specifically the
Anglo-Caribbean3, has toyed with the idea of having a regional court with original
jurisdiction since the early 1950s. The formation of the West Indies Federation (19581962) saw the establishment of a Federal Supreme Court that could enforce constitutional
law and address any question regarding the interpretation of the Federation’s constitution.
In its judgments it had the ability to define the relationship among all players in the
political system and was important in monitoring the “conflicts of laws and
disagreements about relative powers” (Bealey, 1999). Article 80(1a) of the West Indies
(Federation) Constitution stated that the “Federal Supreme Court shall…have original
3

Former and present Caribbean colonies attached to the British Empire.
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jurisdiction in the proceedings between the Federation and a Territory.” Article 81(1)
stipulated that the “Federal Supreme Court shall…have original jurisdiction to determine
any question as to the interpretation of this Constitution.”
The Federal Supreme Court ended with the collapse of the Federation but it left a
lasting positive impression on these matters. It was deemed the most efficient and
effective organization of the West Indies Federation. According to John Mordecai (1968),
The eminent quality of the Court set a new standard for superior courts
throughout the region and when it was dissolved a void was left which every
island still finds hard to fill…the appointment of judges of great distinction, and,
the Rules establishing the Court, had both ensured its eminence before the
[Federal] Government was formally instituted. (p. 390)
As a result, in 1972 there was a renewed call for a Caribbean Court vested with
appellate and original jurisdiction. The Report of the Representative Committee of
OCCBA [Organization of the Commonwealth Caribbean Bar Association] on the
Establishment of a Caribbean Court of Appeal In Substitution for The Judicial Committee
of the Privy Council endorsed such a court. It would replace the English Privy Council as
the final court of appeal while functioning as an “arbitrator in disputes which arise from
various regional Agreements” (Rawlins, 2000, p. 56). Since CARICOM’s formation,
there had been three other calls for a regional court with original jurisdiction. The first
emanated from the Gladstone Report in 1990, another from Sir Roy Marshall in 1991,
and a third came from the West Indian Commission (WIC) Report in 1992 (Jordan, 2003,
2004; Rawlins, 2000).
Beginning in 1989, as CARICOM moved towards establishing an economic
union, its member states created a special, non-permanent commission – the West Indian
Commission – to identify the best ways to establish the enforcement mechanism of
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CARICOM. The Commission, in its 1992 published report, A Time for Action,
recommended the establishment of a CARICOM Commission with executive powers, a
Caribbean Court of Appeal with original jurisdiction, a regional assembly of
parliamentarians, the formulation of a CARICOM Charter of Civil Society, and
expressed its support for the development of a Single Market and Economy (Institute of
Court Management, 2010; West Indian Commission [WIC], 1992). Despite these efforts,
CARICOM did not begin to put these provisions for effective governance into practice
after the WIC report was published (Duncan, 2004).
A decade later, though, the organization did change. After years of consultations,
the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas establishing the CARICOM Single Market and
Economy (which includes the affirmation of the original jurisdiction of the CCJ) and the
Agreement for establishing the Caribbean Court of Justice were signed in 2001.
Additionally, on July 4, 2003, CARICOM members signed The Rose Hall Declaration on
Regional Governance and Integrated Development. The Rose Hall Declaration sought to
again strengthen the regional enforcement mechanism of collective decision-making.
Integration took a step back in August 2005 when the heads of the member states of
CARICOM opted to only implement two of the six goals4 specified in The Rose Hall
Declaration (The Jamaica Gleaner, June 23, 2006). The implemented goals were the
recognition of CARICOM as a “Community of Sovereign States” and the establishment
of the CCJ. Adopting even these two goals began a complex process of strengthening the

4

The Declaration asserts (1) that CARICOM recognize itself as a Community of Sovereign States
(implemented); (2) there should be a CARICOM Commission with executive power; (3) the Assembly of
CARICOM parliamentarians should be strengthened, (4) there is a need to strengthen the Secretariat; (5)
there needs to be the decentralization of decision making; and (6) there should be the establishment of the
Caribbean Court of Justice (implemented).
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enforcement mechanisms of regional decision-making and law. The CCJ, as at April 16,
2005, can sanction states for non-compliance, thus, making states accountable for the
decisions reached within and laws made by CARICOM.
EXPECTATIONS
The CCJ, in its original jurisdiction, is the repercussion of changes in the
international environment such as neoliberal globalization and the passing of the Original
Treaty of Chaguaramas in 1973. The institutions (defined as rules of the political game)
established by the Original Treaty and within individual member states create a path for
the regional institutions’ evolution, which will constrain and motivate regional and
national elite preferences and policy choices (Bulmer, 1993, 1998). Within this context,
however, one suspects that domestic elites—be they economic, political, or knowledge
elites, can influence the shape and development of regional institutions like these.
I hypothesize that the degree to which regional integration deepens depends on
the positions held by these elites, especially economic and political elites. These elites’
preferences are influenced by antecedent institutions, as well as factors such as
organizational resources, international circumstances, trade logistics, and political
ideology. Depending on those preferences, elites will seek to influence specific foreign
policy decision-making processes, in this case, the issue of regional integration.
CHAPTER SUMMARY
The remainder of this dissertation adheres to the following structure. Chapter 2
examines an array of theoretical approaches. The literature review discusses why scholars
cannot study the evolution of Caribbean regional integration through the prism of just one
theory. One’s hypotheses, derived from several different theoretical approaches, are then
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presented. Chapter 3 describes the research design in greater detail and includes an
account of my research experiences and the specific methods used, as well as a
description of data sources and their relevance. Key concepts—institutions, elites, public
opinion, small states, regional integration, globalization, and neoliberalism—are defined
and operationalized. Chapter 4 provides hypothesis testing, analysis and discussion for
the case of Jamaica. It shows the varying effects of international, regional, and national
dynamics on Jamaica’s role in the development of a regional judicial institution, the CCJ.
Chapter 5 conducts a similar analysis for Trinidad & Tobago, and demonstrates the
varying effects of international, regional, and national dynamics on Trinidad & Tobago’s
stance vis-à-vis the development of the CCJ. Chapter 6 – the conclusion – closes with a
summary of what was learned and outlines the possibilities for future research on this
subject.
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CHAPTER 2:
THEORY AND CONCEPTUAL MODEL
INTRODUCTION
This chapter provides literature applicable to the central question being asked, that
is, the influence of various types of elites and other factors on the development of
regional judicial institutions. As such, I reviewed theories that evaluate the impact of
international and domestic factors on foreign policy, and the benefits of and processes
towards regional integration. By extension, there is a synopsis of past applications and
limitations of these theories to the Caribbean reality. Further, the hypotheses are outlined
and the expected theoretical application, which amalgamates various theories, is
discussed in detail.
LITERATURE REVIEW
Foreign Policy. Foreign policy encompasses trade/economic policy, military
policy, social and humanitarian policy, and international political and diplomatic policy,
among others. Foreign policy is simply a state’s strategy for interacting with other states
and non-state actors, such as international non-governmental organizations (INGOs), so
as to fulfil its national self-interest and position itself in the international area (Evans &
Newnham, 1998). The drive towards deepening and strengthening regional integration is
one example of a foreign policy initiative.
Note there have been debates on whether there are differences between large
states and small states, or between the “core” states of the more developed global North
and the “peripheral” states of the less developed global South, in the formulation of
foreign policy (McGowan & Shapiro, 1973; Rosenau, 1966). International relations
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scholars tend to focus on domestic and international influences on the development of
foreign policy in large and/or developed states (Snyder, 1991). Additionally, they have
addressed how large-state foreign policy affects the domestic and foreign policies of
smaller/developing states (Rosenau, 1966; Waltz, 1979). There has been little focus on
the development of small/developing state foreign policy, perhaps, because it was
believed to be overwhelmingly shaped by external influences. Miriam Elman (1995)
explains:
…scholars have suggested that we can account for their behavior by focusing on
the effects of the international system. The reasoning is as follows: since small
states are more preoccupied with survival than are the great powers, the
international system will be the most relevant level of analysis for explaining their
foreign-policy choices. Because weak states are typically faced with external
threats to national survival, foreign policy will reflect an attentiveness to the
constraints of the international environment and foreign-policy goals will be less
constrained by the domestic political process. (p. 175)
For instance, Paul Sutton (1987) argues small/developing states are more reactive
to changes in the international system because of their passivity. Robert Jervis (1978),
Stephen Walt (1987), and Jack Snyder (1991) maintain that national leaders in small
states are more likely to adapt to external constraints than leaders of larger states because
of vulnerability to economic competition, a lack of cushioning for foreign policy
mistakes, their weak positions in the international system, and the effects of
“bandwagoning” with more powerful states. They found that larger/developed states,
given their more powerful positions in the international system, were more apt to have
domestic politics shape their foreign policies.
Studies on the influence of powerful states on the foreign policies of smaller,
dependent states general adopt one of two models: the Bargaining Model or the
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Dependency Model. The Bargaining Model, simply put, “regards the policymaking
process as relatively autonomous though constrained and influenced through a series of
reward and punishment actions by a more powerful state” (Moon 1983, p. 316). In other
words, the relationship between the two states is determined by promises and sanctions
that will reflect the preferences of the larger, more powerful state (Armstrong, 1981;
Richardson, 1976). Effectively, the Bargaining Model proposes that larger, more
powerful states secure cooperation from weaker, dependent states mainly through
rewards and punishments. Neil Richardson (1978) saw a relationship where
…the foreign policy behavior of dependencies is viewed as the partial payment in
exchange for the maintenance of benefits they derive from their economic ties to
the dominant country...Compliant behavior is deferential. It is behavior that
accedes to the wishes of others. This means that its well-springs are external
rather than internal to the actor. The further implication is that, as one actor
complies, a second party can be said to have influenced the first successfully. (pp.
64-70)
In essence, it is a relationship of exchange, though with greater vulnerability on
the part of one state (Richardson and Kegley 1980). According to scholars such as David
Kay (1967), Robert Keohane (1967), Edward Mason (1964), and Andrew Westwood
(1966), the reward/punishment behavior mainly occurs when a large powerful state gains
compliance from and conditions the smaller dependent state through the issuance of
military aid and economic assistance. Bruce Moon (1983) notes that the more rewarded a
dependent state, the more compliant their behavior. Moon (1983, p. 318) also notes that,
ceteris paribus, if states are not responsive to rewards, or rewards are not sufficiently
attractive, then the incentives for compliant behavior are absent.
Anthony Maingot (1990, p. 59) has applied the bargaining model to the United
States’ bilateral negotiations with small Caribbean states. His research lays out the Small
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Island Developing State’s (SIDS) use of rational choice in determining its trade policy
with the US. He states that both sides act with strategic rationality as they seek to
maximize the benefits from their exchange (Keohane, 1986). In other words, policy
makers in both countries take the actions and choices of the other state into consideration
but will ultimately take actions and make choices that reflect their self-interests as much
as possible.5
The Dependency Model, on the other hand, recognizes that the relationships
between powerful states and dependent states reflect processes of decision-making driven
by the social and political structures of states and, in turn, the effects of global patterns of
dependency. In the Dependency Model, the histories of states and the structural
relationships among these states provide the basis for their relationship and for the
compliant behavior of the weaker state specifically. What effectively occurs is the
adoption and internalization of the values of the more powerful state. There is change in
the social and political structure of the weaker state to the point that the elite in the
weaker state develop interests, perceptions and values compatible with those of the elite
of the larger more powerful state (Amin, 1974; Cardoso & Faletto, 1979; Frank, 1968;
Galtung, 1971). The change in structure reduces the need for more direct reward and
compliance mechanisms. To quote Marshall Singer (1972),
…the incorporation of a national elite into an internationalized bourgeoisie
produces decisionmakers who, owing not only to the economic interests they
share with the American elites through economic transactions but also to their
shared values and perspectives, produce policy virtually indistinguishable from
that which would be generated by American elites. (p. 231)

5

This can mean that a SIDS could turn down bilateral trade with the US if it were more beneficial to trade
with their CARICOM neighbors instead. See Maingot, 1994, p. 231.
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The behavior of the larger, more powerful states produces dependencies (Payer,
1974). Dependency-producing transactions such as aid or, especially, foreign investment
establish and maintain an asymmetrical relationship between the powerful and weaker
states as the latter are integrated into the international system.
The study of small state foreign policy behavior, however, has gone beyond the
dependency approach. Kenneth Waltz recognizes there are external constraints on small
states but also asserts that as long as the small states do not pose a security threat, they
“will face fewer external constraints and their behavior will be more likely to reflect
domestic political influences” (Waltz, 1979, pp. 72-73). James Rosenau (1966) points to
several relevant factors in addition to the international system: relationships among
government actors, the role of the bureaucracy, society (culture and public opinion), and
individual decision-makers’ traits. Similarly, Patrick McGowan and Howard Shapiro
(1973) determined that all states, even smaller, weaker ones, will be influenced by
multiple factors at the domestic and international levels.
Much of the recent literature fits into one or more of Rosenau’s factors/levels of
analysis. Miriam Elman (1995) argued that the institutional choices of societal and state
actors have a greater influence on foreign policy than international factors. Scholars have
also pointed to a country’s negotiation style, decision making practices and history as
additional domestic factors (Baillie, 1998). David MacGraw (1994) and Jeanne Hey
(1995) found that the political ideology of the statesmen in government is most
influential in small states’ foreign policies.
The literature on ideology and regional integration policy rests largely on the
cleavage theory of party positions on European integration. The cleavage theory
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maintains that “the positions of political parties reflect divisions in the social structure
and the ideologies that provoke and express those group divisions…political parties are…
organizations with embedded ideologies” (Marks, Wilson, & Ray 2002, p. 586). In
Europe they found that parties on the extreme left and right of the spectrum were strongly
against regional integration while parties located closer to the center were moderately to
strongly in favor of regional integration (Marks & Wilson, 2000; Marks, Wilson & Ray,
2002).
In the case of small states, particularly in the Caribbean, other factors may shape
partisan divides over regional integration. For one thing, political parties in Caribbean
countries may still be mimic or emulate the prominent parties of their former colonial
masters. Anglo-Caribbean scholars such as Jacqueline Braveboy-Wagner (2003), Robert
Buddan (2001) and Fred Constant (2003) found that there are not very wide ideological
divisions within the party systems of CARICOM member states, perhaps, as a result of
their histories as colonies of Britain.6 Many of the region’s most successful political
parties mimic the early British Labour Party, and political culture is built around a
“welfarism” that demands the state provide benefits for the less fortunate (Constant,
2003). Political elites tend to range from social democratic (center left) to moderately
conservative (center right). Hence, the vast ideological differences that divide some
European parties and ideologies on the issue of regional integration are negligible in the
Caribbean.
Beyond this literature, however, there is little scholarly consensus on the impact
of different variables on foreign policy choices in the Caribbean integration process.
6

This excludes Haiti and Suriname.
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Trevor Farrell (1981) discussed the external economic pressures that hindered economic
integration; Norman Girvan (2011) reviewed both internal and external political, cultural,
and economic pressures. However, perhaps the most comprehensive approach comes
from Jacqueline Braveboy-Wagner (2003, 2008). In order of importance, she points first
to the impact of individual leaders and governments (i.e., the preferences of political
elites and individual leaders), followed by the international system, the society at large,
and, finally, the domestic bureaucracy. She posits that the order of importance is a result
of two factors: 1) the Anglo Caribbean state’s small size and limited capacity, which
makes states highly vulnerable to international influences, and 2) the culture and tradition
it inherited from its former colonizers.
For the above reasons, elite preferences matter a great deal. The government
leader and his/her advisors and cabinet; the political and legal elite; the knowledge elite;
and/or the economic elite are all central to forming policies.7 For Braveboy-Wagner,
policy decisions, whether at the local, regional, or international level, are mostly based on
the public leaving power in the hands of the elected government leader and his/her
advisors.
Additionally, while these states are all small and relatively vulnerable within the
international system, even a small state’s relative size and wealth will affect its foreign
policy decision making. Size and wealth will dictate a state’s capacity to hire and train
skilled personnel in its foreign affairs agencies, to work on questions of regional

7

As we will see, the degree of influence of the economic and knowledge elites rest on the capacity of the
state, the political leader’s personal ideology, beliefs and motivations that shape his/her party’s positions
and the leader’s assessment of societal norms, such as insularity, state nationalism.
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integration (Buddan, 2001; Braveboy-Wagner, 2003). These skilled individuals would
also be crucial in implementing the institutional choices decided upon.
Reasons for Regional Integration. Integration has economic, political and social
elements. However, a considerable amount of research on regional integration has
focused solely on the economic aspect, particularly international trade. There are those
who argue regional integration will lead to greater economic openness and convergence
with the international economy, while others argue the rise in regional blocs will result in
increased protectionism and fragmentation, which will hinder gains from international
trade (Mansfield & Milner, 1999). The latter argument has lost support in the last two
decades, as regional integration did not hinder multilateral convergence (Baldwin, 1997,
2004). Whatever the position, international trade is believed to be one impetus for
regional integration.
The earliest argument in support of economic integration comes from the
‘Classical Theory of Customs Unions’ developed by Jacob Viner (1950). He argues that
the development of a customs union leads to trade diversion and/or trade creation, which
may increase or decrease welfare of members states and the rest of the international
economic community depending on a given circumstance. He theorizes that, with a trade
diverting effect, if
all economic resources are fully exploited before and after the formation of a
customs union, this increases the welfare of the member nations because it leads
to greater specialization in production based on comparative advantage. A tradecreating customs union also increases the welfare of nonmembers because some
of the increase in real income (due to greater specialization in production) spills
over into increased imports from the rest of the world. (Salvatore, 2001, p. 329)
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However, he assumed that when a customs union is formed it will more likely cause trade
creation and increase welfare. The Classical Theory of Customs Unions was believed to
be applicable to both small and large states. Yet, it made two unrealistic assumptions:
perfect competition between members and with the wider international economy; an
allocation of resources that would remain unchanged over time (Salvatore, 1999).
The Anglo-Caribbean’s evolution from CARIFTA to CARICOM in 1973 was
stimulated in no small part by similar arguments made in economist William Demas’
(1965), The Economics of Development in Small Countries with Special Reference to the
Caribbean. Demas proposed that economic integration was the best course of action in
prevailing over the shortcomings associated with economic development within small
states. As such, given the close proximity among the Caribbean states, he recommended
that they integrate as a customs union. From there he believed that as economic
integration deepened, the region would develop the legal and political institutions to
support it.
Scholars have relaxed the assumption of perfect competition to include
discussions on product differentiation and economies of scale (Moser, 1997; Schiff &
Winters, 1998). The economic environment has evolved, and scholars have noted that
these exogenous factors can influence the development of regional institutions (Mansfield
& Milner, 1999). Globalization and neoliberalism, they agree, began to shape the
international community in the 1970s and 1980s. Globalization, in the economic context,
is a phenomenon of rapid deepening and widening of trade, finance, and production
integration across national boundaries. Neoliberalism, an approach toward globalization,
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promotes free markets and free trade through processes of liberalization, privatization,
deregulation and limiting the role of the state in economic and social spheres.
Scholars have observed that neoliberal globalization affects large and small states
differently. It offers both advantages and disadvantages to small states; however, the
negative seems to outweigh the positive (Handel man, 2010). Neoliberal globalization
encouraged a new form of regional integration known as ‘open regionalism,’ which
called for “market-led growth and global commercial integration” (Ebenau, 2012). As
such, scholars argue that it is best for small and/or developing states to create a regional
bloc or deepen the economic integration of an existing bloc (Acosta, 2004; de la Reza,
2003). This, they contend, allows for their integration/convergence with the world
economy, where competition from neoliberalism is often cutthroat (Bernal, 2000;
Ohiorhenuan, 2000). Neoliberal globalization brings with it vulnerability and volatility
that forces smaller states to develop coping strategies, the most evident being greater
regional integration (Bernal, 2000; Blake, 2000; Byron, 2000). Put differently, “greater
regional integration can be complementary to the process of global integration in both
seizing the opportunities presented by globalization, and in guarding against and
overcoming the attendant vulnerabilities and challenges” (Carstens, 2006).
For geographically close small states (GCSS), regional integration is seen as
essential in overcoming the expected limitations that individual small states face (vis-àvis globalization and neoliberalism) due to their size and, in the cases at hand, levels of
development. For example, it allows for the achievement of economies of scale (Bernal,
2000). As a consequence of small size, individual states are unable to specialize or
produce goods more cheaply than large states or organizations. However, as a regional

23

unit, GCSS would reduce the cost per unit input as the capacity to produce increases and
allows for lower prices per output and greater profits than if each small state undertook
production on its own (Black, 1997).8
While this is true, ceteris paribus, many GCSSs still need foreign investment
from large states to provide the capital needed to produce goods at these economies of
scale. The Caribbean Community (CARICOM) is a “capital-importing region”
(McDonald, 2005, p. 39; Pollard, 2004, p. 91). This provides the opportunity for large
states, particularly those within the region, to also influence regional integration (Cardoso
& Faletto, 1979; De Santos, 1970).
Regional integration also protects against exogenous shocks that can be damaging
to small state competitiveness. Increased mobility of capital and labor within the region
should increase market elasticity and productivity, which in turn increases the region’s
ability to withstand these shocks (Bernal, 2000; Blake, 1997). In other words, a GCSS
could use regional integration with similar states as a means of facilitating economic
development and economic growth (Demas, 1965). Put differently, “economic
development [in the Third World] is to be achieved by industrialization which in turn is
to be advanced through regional integration” (Axline, 1979, p. 9).
While many scholars are satisfied with examining the economic rationales for
integration, they often ignore the political explanations. One set of political arguments
about regional integration is based in the idea of federalism, which is “concerned with the
creation of supranational institutions to ensure efficiency, and the decentralization of

8

What is more, the development of these new institutions is more likely when there are long-standing
historical patterns of cooperation among small states in the same region. See Ferris & Lincoln, 1981.
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bodies to bring about political democracy” (Boxill, 1997, p. 14). Integration, in this
sense, is a tool for achieving national security, diplomacy, and institution building;
integration, in the form of a political union, makes states less vulnerable than if they were
on their own (Hodges, 1972; Lewis, 2002, p. 22). A union or federation would exercise
mutual self-help when facing diplomatic or military threats to the survival of member
states (Wood & Yeşilada, 1996). The success of a federation is more likely if established
within a set geographical area with states that had similar political systems and common
goals (Wheare, 1963; Riker, 1964; Franck, 1968).
Federalism was traditionally associated with the organization of power within a
nation state, as in the cases of Canada, the United States, India, Germany and Australia,
among others. Today, we can also look to a regional international organization (IO) that
encompasses many nation states: the European Union.9 The changing position on
regionalism, also, reflects the impact of globalization in the economic, social, cultural,
and political spheres. Greater interdependence among member states through economic
integration led to greater political integration (Heywood, 1999). Caribbean scholar
William Demas’ later works took this federalist stance, as he argues that regional
economic integration will not be successful without political unification (Demas, 1974,
1976). Trevor Farrell (1981) and Norman Girvan (2011) likewise concluded, after
reporting their assessments of Caribbean integration, that there was a need for political
unification in the region.

9

Federalism can take the form of a federation or confederation. The previous examples are federations and
the EU is a confederation whereby a group of nation-states “come together to form a common government
for strictly limited purposes, usually foreign affairs and defense” (Elazar 1991, 7).
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The popularity of the federalist argument has waned over the years but the
political arguments for regional integration have not. Proponents maintain that trade links
and economic gains will make war too costly among member states. Indeed, the
predecessors of the EU, the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and the
European Economic Community (EEC) were created to reduce the threat of war in
Western Europe (Wood & Yeşilada, 1996). Additionally, economic integration will
produce greater interaction among participating states’ economic, cultural, and political
institutions, and the elites who lead and staff them (Wood & Yeşilada, 1996). William
Wallace (1994) found that the “most striking phenomenon of formal European
integration has been the interpenetration of national administrations, with ministers and
officials from different governments in close and continuous contact” (p. 4). Some
scholars have even argued that better, more diverse policy making can be an impetus for
regional integration. Mark Gordon (2001) finds that integration has been associated with
diversity, accountability, and innovation. The dispersal of power reduces tyranny, and the
multiplicity of governing bodies reduces the “risk of bad policy or the blockage of the
popular will” (Greenberg & Page, 2005, p. 78).
States will also strategically choose to integrate in order to strengthen their
position on the international stage by increasing their bargaining power and reducing
negotiation costs. Integration creates collaborative decision making mechanisms that
afford states a united front in international negotiations as well as against external threats.
Braveboy-Wagner (2008) and Duke Pollard (2003) see integration benefitting small
states in the above manner. They acknowledged that the formation of CARICOM’s
Caribbean Regional Negotiation Machinery (CRNM), now called the Office of Trade
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Negotiations (OTN) allowed for the effective representation of members at international
forums and the successful negotiation of foreign trade and economic policies, most
notably the various rounds of negotiations for the EU’s aid conventions with African,
Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) countries (the Lomé and Cotonou Conventions), The Free
Trade Areas of the Americas (FTAA) and the EU-CARIFORUM Economic Partnership
Agreement (EPA).
Other political impetuses are the United States’ conversion from multilateralism
to regionalism and the apparent success of European integration. According to Jagdish
Bhagwati, writing in the 1990s,
The main driving force for regionalism today is the conversion of the United
States, hitherto an abstaining party, to Article XXIV…The conversion of the
United States is of significance. As the key defender of multilateralism throughout
the post war years, its decision now to travel the regional route…tilt the balance
of forces at the margin away from multilateralism to regionalism. (1996, p.29)
It should be noted that an embrace by the US of regionalism does not hinder its
support for multilateralism (Baldwin, 1997, 2004). But actions such as the creation of the
North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA) among the US, Canada, and Mexico in 1994
and the subsequent failed negotiations between the US and Latin American and
Caribbean states to establish the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) led to renewed
interest in regionalism in the Caribbean. Since the failure of the FTAA, there has been a
proliferation of negotiations for bilateral and multilateral economic and political
agreements across the region. Also, regional blocs were created in response to the
proposed FTAA—some to shore up bargaining power and ease states into the FTAA (as
with the Association of Caribbean States, ACS), others as an alternative to the FTAA (as
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with the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America, ALBA) (Encyclopaedia
Britannia, 2013; Harris & Azzi, 2009).
Regarding the European influence on other regional blocs, Mario Teló (2007, pp.
xiii-xiv) states that the new wave of regionalism began with Mercado Común del Sur
(MERCUSOR) “[drawing] on the experience of the European Union…to encourage
parallel initiatives in political evolution and economic development and integration
without engaging in a close federal structure to achieve its objectives.” This, he says,
paved the way for other regional integration initiatives across Latin America and the
Caribbean, Africa and Asia. A GCSS’s observation of and/or participation in other
regional organizations may provide it with new ideas and approaches to regional
integration. If these organizations are successful, such success might push these small
states to emulate such organizations and increase regional integration efforts within their
own world areas.
Given these observations, Richard Baldwin (1997, 2004) developed the “Domino
Theory of Regionalism.” He determined that if a region deepens economic integration or
forms a new regional economic bloc, this will induce non-members to join the bloc as
these moves could lead to trade and investment diversion away from non-members. The
creation or deepening of regional integration will induce non-members who trade with
the regional bloc to “engage in greater pro-integration political activity… [The] extra
activity may tilt the balance and cause the country to join the bloc” (Baldwin, 2004, p. 6).
However, if these states are barred from joining the bloc, the excluded countries may
form their own regional bloc. This, then, is the domino effect of creating new economic
blocs.
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Regional Integration Theories. As noted before, regional integration theories are
derived almost entirely from the European experience. These theories have been used to
analyze the evolution of the European Union and by extension the development of a legal
framework (the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and corresponding treaties) to support it.
In recent years, however, there has been a growth of literature discussing and analyzing
developing countries’ experiences with regional integration. Some use a more statecentered approach and others more global or international in scope.
Among state-centered approaches, studies of federalism10 viewed institutions as
“created by purposive people in legislatures and international union” (Stichcombe, 1997,
p. 2). The success of regional integration is dependent on the “need to attain political
consensus in the face of adverse social and economic conflict” (Boxill, 1997, p. 14). In
federalism, the state is the main agent for deepening regional integration.
Neo-institutionalism, on the other hand, does not take the old institutionalist
position that the state is the primary actor. Scholars of the neo-institutionalist school
believe that institutions within and outside of a state can deepen regional integration
(Armstrong & Bulmer, 1998; Bulmer, 1998). They may be institutions in the traditional
sense such as the judiciary, the legislature, or the executive; or they may instead be
conventions, values and norms that determine how actors relate to one another (North,
1997; Bomberg & Stubb, 2004). Therefore, it is the prevailing rules and common
practices of institutions within and between states—not just national governments—that
will determine whether or not there will be regional integration. Thus, neo10

It is argued that federalism is no longer relevant to the study of regional integration. It has, however,
been included because it has been described by some Caribbean scholars as necessary for deepening
regional integration. Much of the discussion on federalism has been addressed in the previous section.
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institutionalism differs from ‘old’ institutionalism, which is focused on describing “the
formal-legal [i.e., the law] and administrative arrangements of [a national] government”
(Bell, 2011) and their effect on the integration process, while ignoring the informal
conventions and norms. With neo-institutionalism, actors, organizations and agencies
within and across states are important in shaping the preferences of governments and thus
shaping integration processes (Wood & Yeşilada, 1996; Bomberg & Stubb, 2004; Bulmer
& Lesquesne, 2005). Additionally, decisions made by governments shape the legal bases
and economic incentives for other actors to become involved in the integration process.
The more internationally-centered institutionalist theories encompass the schools
of Neo-functionalism and Intergovernmentalism. Neo-functionalists support regional
integration on pragmatic grounds, because, “the nation state [did not have the technical
expertise necessary for and] was unable to perform the many tasks of development”
(Boxill, 1997, pp. 15-16). As such, scholars proposed the development of supranational
regional institutions and functional organizations that deal with specific functional needs
relating to social and economic development in areas such as healthcare and unified
safety and transportation regulations (Mitrany, 1966; Wood & Yeşilada 1996). Economic
elites and interest groups compete with one another, but can also cooperate with one
another. Cooperation among economic elites follows the competition because they seek
“economic reform along the line of least resistance” (Hooghe and Marks 2008, 4), which
in turn fosters added institutionalization and governing complexity.
Key to this analysis is the concept of “spill over” (Haas, 1968; Lewis, 2002, p.
23). A spill over is “a situation in which a given action, related to a specific goal, creates
a situation in which the original goal can be assured only by taking further actions, which
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in turn create a further condition and a need for more action and so forth” (Lindberg,
1963, p. 10). In other words, actors in a specific economic sector (within or across
borders) will coordinate on an issue; the pressure to achieve greater benefits among
participants in that sector will then require the involvement of others beyond that sector,
thus resulting in the deepening of economic integration (Haas, 1968; Schmitter, 2004).
This process would further intensify with the propagation of globalization. Neofunctionalists were, therefore, concerned with how integration of some economic
endeavors among states carried over to other related political and socioeconomic
endeavors (Haas, 1968; Haas & Schmitter, 1964). As such, neo-functionalists believed
that economic and socioeconomic integration would eventually create political
integration with the establishment of supranational institutions (Haas, 1968; Boxill, 1997;
Schmitter, 2004). In the Caribbean, scholars that contributed to Ten Years of CARICOM
(1984) followed the neo-functional position. They recognized issues in production
integration and balance of payment crises as barriers to economic integration and
suggested a strengthening of regional administrative arrangements.
Intergovernmentalism, on the other hand, holds that states would never give up
sovereignty to supranational institutions (Milward, 1992; Hoffman, 1995) and that
national governments play the primary role in the integration process because it is these
national governments’ preferences and ‘history making decisions’ (Peterson, 1995) that
dictate whether or not regional integration will be initiated/deepened. According to
Andrew Moravcsik (1993), “governments first define a set of interests, then bargain
among themselves to realize those interests” (p. 481). These interests are economic in
nature and “negotiations take place between states that are asymmetrically
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interdependent, and…common institutions, with varying levels of sovereignty, are
established through the bargaining process” (Munroe, 2006).
In the 1990s, traditional intergovernmentalism gave way to liberal
intergovernmentalism. Developed by Andrew Moravcsik, it attempts to bridge the gap
among neo-institutionalism, intergovernmentalism and liberal theory in order to provide a
more comprehensive study of regional integration. It focuses on the big decisions made
regarding integration, which it believes are made in three phases (Moravcsik, 1993,
1998). The first is national preference formation, which focuses on the source of a state’s
preferences, be it geopolitical or economic. The second phase concentrates on the
efficiency and distributional benefits a state gains after bargaining. Bargaining may result
in either supranational enterprising or asymmetrical interdependence. The third and final
phase focuses on the reasons for/against transferring sovereignty to a regional
organization—the decision to either delegate or pool decision-making in regional
institutions. These reasons include but are not limited to “federalist ideology, a
centralized technocratic management or a more credible commitment” (Moravcsik, 1998,
p. 24).
Thus, neo-functionalists, and, to a lesser extent, intergovernmentalists, stress the
importance of elites for the preference formation of regional integration, which answers
the central question of this study.
Regional Integration, Enforcement Mechanisms, and Judicial Development.
Enforcement “requires a credible threat that sanctions will be imposed if a rule is
violated” (Schiff & Winters, 1998, p. 160). Enforcement within regional organizations is
generally achieved through policy coordination and binding agreements among member
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states. Both empower regional institutions to carry out functions necessary to compel
members to uphold their commitments. Aside from these methods, which varies across
regional blocs, enforcement is achieved via dispute settle mechanisms. These come in
two main forms ad hoc tribunals as found in NAFTA and pre RTC CARICOM and a
regional court as in the cases of the EU’s European Court of Justice (ECJ) and
CARICOM’s CCJ (McDonald, 2005; Schiff & Winters, 1998). Decisions made by ad hoc
tribunals are not binding and it is left to the offending member state to comply (Hansen,
2005; O’Brien, 2010). If compliance is not achieved, the offending member could face
sanctions from its fellow members. The weakness of this mechanism is that member
states may not sanction a member state for fear that they may face similar circumstances
in the future (Hansen, 2005; O’Brien, 2010). Instead, member states may enter
gentleman’s agreement to quickly resolve the dispute, which increases “the need for
hedging and “insurance”” (Schiff & Winters, 1998, p. 169; McDonald, 2005).
Decisions made by the regional court are binding as the court tries and resolves
disputes through judicial procedure that delivers formal judgments. With reference to the
ECJ, it has been theorized that decisions made by a regional court will further shape and
strengthen the integration process at the national and supranational levels (Alter 2009,
2012; Stone Sweet, 2004). Alec Stone Sweet (2004) attributes this to path dependency.
Using modified neo-functionalism, Stone Sweet argues that as each case sets precedence
economic actors will promote the use of the regional court over national courts in order to
meet their self-interest. This effort would expand the court’s authority as “success” in the
court will result in attorneys, judges, and plaintiffs supporting regional law for their own
self-interest and improvement (Stone Sweet, 2004, p. 236). Karen Alter (2009, 2012),
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using historical institutionalism, argues that the ECJ, as a regional court, was designed to
provide compulsory superintendence of member state actions. This attribute would create
a self-binding commitment, which restricts the member state from overriding court
decisions or threatening noncompliance (Alter, 2009, 2012). Thus, the regional court
furthers the integration process by “overcoming legal difficulties arising in the process of
regional integration” (Alter, 2012, p. 151).
Caribbean Scholarship. Caribbean Scholarship over the past forty years has
adopted neo-functionalism, old institutionalism (in the form of the federalist approach),
or the small state foreign policy approach as the bases for their arguments concerning
Caribbean integration. The arguments focused on economic integration, on the
institutions and policies needed for this integration, or the reasons for their success or
failure. Most of the literature does not deal specifically with the CCJ or with the role of
courts in economic integration.
Most scholars focused on the shortcomings of closer integration in the Caribbean.
Writers such as Ian Boxill (1997), Peter Wickham (1993, 1997), and Patsy Lewis (2002)
and even Cynthia Barrow-Giles (2002) have all commented that Caribbean regional
integration has been fragile and unsteady. Ian Boxill (1997, p. 48) characterized the
process as being plagued with “tremendous conflict and instability.” Peter Wickham
(1997) has stated that the Caribbean has experienced both integration and adverse
integration, which he called disintegration. Patsy Lewis (2002, p. 20) claims that
CARICOM has had “mixed success.” The problem with these findings is that they
continued pointing out existing problems, most of which were addressed by earlier
writers. They also ignore non-economic elements of integration.
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The Report from the WIC (1992) was among the first official CARICOM
documents calling for a Caribbean Appellate Court with extended original jurisdiction.
The commissioners argued that a successful movement towards deeper economic
integration was impossible without a legal entity that would ensure a stable and
predictable macroeconomic environment and provide better arbitration mechanisms for
CARICOM member states. Their methodology for arriving at this conclusion rested not
on macroeconomic analysis, but on focus groups and elite interviews.
Since the WIC Report, the majority of the literature on the CCJ has focused on
describing its purpose and/or critiquing its structure and usefulness. Speeches by CCJ
Justice Désirée Bernhard (2006) and former CCJ Chief Justice Michael de la Bastide
(2007), and documents released by former CARICOM legal analyst and former CCJ
Justice David Pollard (2000a, 2000b) provide details on the relationship between the
CSME and CCJ. They also develop legal doctrine on what constitutes original and
appellate jurisdiction, the role the CCJ plays in integration and how the CCJ compares
with the ECJ. The Honorable Adrian Saunders (2010), a CCJ Justice, explains the
original jurisdiction structure and reviews the rulings made by this court to between 2005
and 2010. Peter Jones (2004) and Victor Jordan (2003, 2004) argue the pros and cons of
the CCJ and comment on the different positions held by various elites regarding the court
and its usefulness and effectiveness. Maureen Crane-Scott (2004) and Sheldon McDonald
(2005) discuss the role the CCJ plays in the international political economy.
This literature pays inordinate attention to the appellate jurisdiction section of the
court. Delano Franklyn (2005) and Selwyn Ryan’s (2001) books are devoted to debates
inside and outside of parliament on whether CARICOM member states should join the
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appellate jurisdiction, stay with the Privy Council or develop their individual final courts
of appeal. Hugh Rawlins (2000), who provides some historical details on the
development of the court, relegates the original jurisdiction court to only five pages in
seventy-page document. Simeon McIntosh (2002) likewise centers his discussion on the
appellate court and constitutional reform in the Anglo-Caribbean.
There is presently only one scholarly work that has attempted to analyze the
development of the final structure of the CCJ’s original jurisdiction. It is the most
comprehensive historical account of the preliminary stages of the development of the
CCJ as well as a discussion of the Court’s role regionally and internationally. Duke
Pollard’s (2004) The Caribbean Court of Justice: Closing the Circle of Independence
identifies important Heads of Government and the amendments they respectively made to
the drafts of the Agreement establishing the CCJ and the Rules for the Court. However,
the book does not identify the influence of the various types of elites, save a small group
of political elites (various Attorneys-General and the CARICOM Legal Affairs
Committee). Moreover, he does not differentiate among the different countries’ political
elites. He assumes, for example, that there was consensus among the Attorneys-General
on the amendments and final documents. I, on the other hand, seek to provide some
missing links in that discussion: among them, identifying who contributed what to the
final agreement, what elites mattered, and what their sources of agreement and contention
were.
HYPOTHESES
Given the previous review, I argue creating new institutions to support/deepen
regional economic integration is based on a mix of systemic/international, domestic, and
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individual factors, actors and processes. I suspect that no one factor determines elites’
and, by extension, member states’ support for/opposition to deeper integration, but
rather...
HYPOTHESIS 1: Systemic Level of Analysis11
H1a: Increased global trade intensifies regional economic integration which
results in the demand for the judicial governance of the latter activity.
H1b: Increased regionalization in the Americas and Europe will renew GCSS’
interest in regional trade and supporting regional institutions.
HYPOTHESIS 2: Nation-State Level of Analysis12
H2: The largest and/or wealthiest GCSS will have the greatest influence in the
promotion of/negotiation for regional integration and its institutions.
HYPOTHESIS 3: Domestic Level of Analysis13
H3a: The decision to promote/negotiate for new regional institutions rests with
the political elite.
H3a(i): Left of center political parties will support regional integration and its
institutions more than right of center parties.

11

These hypotheses address neoliberalism, the domino theory of regionalism, small state foreign policy
approach, and the bargaining and dependency models.

12

This hypothesis address neo-functionalism and liberal intergovernmentalism.

13

These hypotheses address liberal intergovernmentalism, the cleavage theory of party positions and small
state foreign policy approach.
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H3b: Elite Public Opinion rather than mass public opinion will influence the
political elite’s decision to promote/negotiate for regional integration and its
institutions.
H3b(i): Better organized economic and knowledge elites have greater influence
on the political decision makers.
THEORETICAL APPLICATION AND EXPECTATION
As stated before, the full explanation of CARICOM’s decision to establish the
CCJ and determine its original jurisdiction will not likely use a single approach. An
individual theory has limitations in explaining the creation, construction and evolution of
regional institutions because it may only capture a small part of the integration process.
Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig (2009) said it best, “that one cannot explain integration
with just one factor, but instead seeks to link together multiple theories and factors into a
single coherent approach appropriate for explaining the trajectory of integration over
time” (p. 68). Hence, the present dissertation draws on not one but many of the theories
discussed above in order to explain the interplay among micro- and macro-level
processes and actors.
I theorize that the establishment of the CCJ was first a consequence of external
factors (neoliberal globalization) and, even earlier, of decisions made by political elites in
1973 with the signing of the Treaty of Chaguaramas. These decisions shaped the
institutionalization of regional economic and social development, and of conflict
resolution in the regional integration process. These decisions also shaped the ensuing
political and economic evolution of the regional elite groups and relations among
member states.
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Once implemented, regional institutions constrained regional and national elites’
future policy choices (Bulmer, 1993, 1998). This specific trajectory will be difficult to
reverse as institutional development is path dependent as a result of the perceived values
of past investments, self-reinforcing rules and practices, positive feedback cycles and
increasing returns (see Pierson, 2000; Pollack, 1996, 1997). Past investments are the
time, energy and resources used to create institutions. As time passes, these investments
may yield increasing returns. Increasing returns contribute to positive feedback because
the more the institutional rules are followed the more they will create “incentives for the
actors to stick with and not abandon existing institutions, adapting them only
incrementally to changing political environments” (Pollack, 2004, p. 140).
Simultaneously, self-reinforcement and lock-in will occur when actors put “in place a set
of forces or complementary institutions that encourage that choice to be sustained” (Page,
2006, p. 88). All of this is occurring against the background of exogenous factors, and
they, too, are influencing the development of regional institutions. In the case of
CARICOM, the neoliberal globalization that propelled the actions of the international
community in the 1970s and 1980s created pressures for elite actors to change, however
incrementally, existing institutional configurations.
The development of regional institutions is not determined by the preferences of
just one set of actors but rather through the participation of various elite groups –
political, economic and sociocultural – and the member states involved in the regional
integration process (Hall & Taylor, 1996). Institutions help to structure political and
economic behavior and processes; however, the political and economic behavior of elite
actors also creates and influences institutions (Steinmo, 2001). It is understood that
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institutions are both an arena for political and economic struggles among elites and a set
of incentives and constraints on elite activity. We would expect to see that, with the
deepening of the regional integration process, there would be the establishment of more
supranational institutions and an increase in the number of elites involved at this level.
With the signing of the initial treaty establishing the regional integration process, some
elite activity that began at the national level with national governments, later extended to
the regional level.
Since most regional associations are launched at the lowest form of integration
(free trade area), the elite preferences reflected in those institutions would be economic.14
All things being equal, a domestic economic elite, which may not have direct influence
on the supranational institutions under the initial treaty, will exert its influence on
national government representatives (the political elite) by one or a combination of the
three avenues as expressed in Figure 1 below. The first avenue is through their local
member of the legislature. The legislature will approve, reject, or amend bills associated
with regional issues in accordance with standard procedures (Derbyshire & Derbyshire,
1991; Shugart & Carey, 1992; Weaver & Rockman, 1993). The second avenue is through
the state bureaucracy that implements the rules, laws and functions of the state. The third
avenue is the economic elite’s direct influence on the executive branch (Sartori, 1994;
Weaver & Rockman, 1993). Through consultation with the knowledge elite, the political
and economic elite will negotiate and bargain over their state’s position on the structure
of any new institutional framework for economic development.
14

CARICOM, however, was launched as a mid-level form of integration – a common market that allows
the free movement of the two factors of production – capital and labor – across the national borders of
member states (Mansfield & Milner 1999), thus, still making the above premise true.
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Following Allison & Zelibrow (1999), I presuppose that the decision-making
process at the national level consists of an inner circle of elites who do the actual
bargaining and outer circles who influence the context in which bargaining takes place
within the inner circle. The inner circle will consist of political leaders in government as
well as economic leaders (Allison & Zelibrow, 1999, pp. 255 & 296). Actors in the inner
circle represent departments/agencies and reflect the interests and priorities of his/her
department/agency. The outer circles consist of lower level officials from the public
sector, who work with the executive and legislative branches, opposition members of
parliament, the private sector and non-governmental organizations, the knowledge elite,
the media and the general public (Allison & Zelibrow, 1999, pp. 255 & 296). The
interaction and subsequent conflict/competition among outer circle actors shapes the
context in which decisions are made in the inner circle at the regional and national levels.
All avenues end with the national executives making decisions on the further
expansion of regional integration institutions. This activity occurs within each member
state. By extension, member governments will define their interests, and the interests of
powerful groups in their countries, and bargain in such a manner to actualize those
interests. Negotiations between states can then create new institutions, with varying
levels of sovereignty (Moravcsik, 1993; Munroe, 2006). Additionally, the national
position will be determined by a factor not considered by Moravcsik (1998): the
unintended consequences of earlier decisions, and institutional formulations and
subsequent amendments.
Negotiations and bargaining that lead to the development of new institutions also
open up new channels in the region to elites, not just political elites but economic and
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knowledge elites too. Ceteris paribus, transnational ties between different member states’
economic and knowledge elites will develop as they become more enmeshed in
regional/transnational rules. They will compete and coordinate with one another when it
is beneficial to do so, to effect “incremental [and strategic] economic reform along the
line of least resistance” (Hooghe & Marks 2008, p. 4). In such processes, economic or
knowledge elites focused on a particular sector or economic activity will influence
coordination and collaboration not just within but beyond that sector (i.e., spill over). The
spill over advances economic integration as it fosters additional layers of institutional
complexity and increased interactions and transactions among actors within the region
(Rosamond, 2000; Schmitter, 2004).
Once the national government’s position is set, interstate negotiation and
bargaining will follow the same premise as outlined at the national level. The new inner
circle will only include the heads of government, and the outer circles will now include
national cabinet members, national opposition leaders, national and regional
organization’s top level officials, low level regional organization officials, and possibly
regional elite groups. Even as heads of government are being influenced/informed by
members of the outer circles, negotiations among them will reflect the relative bargaining
power of member states, and their strategies for cooperation and for solving shared
problems (Moravcsik, 1993, 1998; Moravcsik & Schimmelfennig, 2009), as well as the
influence of past decisions and institutions.
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It is understood that when states have more to lose or gain in regional
negotiations, they will expend more resources and exert more influence to ensure
particular outcomes (Moravcsik, 1998). Future economic benefits will also be weighed as
states decide whether to seek greater integration. States will seek to develop regional
institutions that will allow for superior collective outcomes as long as they can agree
upon a distribution of mutual gains among them. They will go as far as “to delegate or
pool decision-making in [these] international institutions…to pre-commit governments to
future decisions, to encourage future cooperation and to improve future implementation
of agreements” (Moravcsik, 1998, p. 73). Therefore,
…integration can be best understood as a series of rational [and historical] choices
made by national leaders. These choices responded to the constraints and
opportunities stemming from the economic interests of powerful domestic
constituents, and the relative power of states stemming from asymmetrical
interdependence and the role of institutions in bolstering the credibility of
interstate commitments. (Moravcsik 1998, 18)
In addition, it is expected that one of the effects of deepened economic integration
will be to alter elites’ strategies regarding future institution building. This may in turn
move regional integration beyond its weakest form to one that includes political and legal
integration. If so, then competition and cooperation among elites will go beyond neofunctionalism’s narrow economic view to include other spheres of influence. As regional
integration matures, elite activity will affect and be affected by regional institutions and
national policy making (Sandholtz & Sweet, 1998). What is more, Liesbet Hooghe and
Gary Marks (2008) note that as Europe’s elites collaborate and cooperate in mutual areas
of interest, these activities have spread into more areas due to “[transnational]
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mobilization, supranational activism and policy spill-over [that] intervene between
sectoral pressures for jurisdictional reform and institutional outcomes” (p. 3).
In CARICOM, however, the process will be riddled with periods of inertia due
limitations intrinsic to Small Island Developing States (SIDS), namely, the overwhelming
effects of external pressures (globalization/neoliberalism) and the limited capacities of
member state economies (Elazar, 1998; Franklyn, 2005; Payne, 1980; Ramphal, 2012).
Given these factors, members of the economic elite may face difficult choices. This
dynamic might divide the economic elite, pitting a more globalized, outward-focused
economic elite against a more inward-focused or, in this case, Pan Caribbean economic
elite. I also expect that if global terms of trade change for the worse, the outward focused
economic elite will turn to the already established regional market they previously
ignored in order to stem losses or increase profits.15
Additionally, it is anticipated that legacies of colonialism and the relative brevity
of the independence period to date may exacerbate competition rather than promote
coordination and cooperation among economic elites, because of the limited interpersonal
trust and segmented nature of post-colonial societies. Low trust levels, for example,
restrict firms to operating disproportionately among friends and family, with local
businesses owned by a few family firms or sole proprietors—or by transnational
corporations or, in key sectors, by the state itself (Pollard, 2004; Ryan, 2001). While
family businesses and Pan Caribbean corporations dominate local economic activity and
have influence on national governments (Pollard, 2004), the governing structures left

15

The pursuit of deeper regional integration thus may also depend on member states’ regional trade
balances.
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behind by the former colonial powers also centralized decision-making within each
member state (Beckford, 1972; Ryan, 2000). Consequently, national governments (the
political elite) will take the lead in regional negotiations over institutionalization and
governance, with the economic elite playing a more indirect role in the process.
Finally, during periods of change we will surely find some actors attempting to
maintain the institutional status quo for as long as possible, even if that status quo is less
than optimal, as it is at least predictable; any change brings with it uncertainty (Pierson,
1993; Steinmo, 2001). Once the old institutional frameworks give way to new ones—as
old institutions are no longer the status quo—the actors’ calculations can change
dramatically. This was, we shall see, the case for the CCJ.
CONCLUSION
Literature on the individual theories do not answer the central question in its
entirety. While the foreign policy literature explains the various domestic factors that
may influence policy, the individual theories describing the main reasons for establishing
and/or strengthening the regional integration process are limited to one or a few factors,
neglecting all possibilities. As such, I constructed an approach that addressed as many
factors as possible and informed my hypotheses. With these concerns address, the
following chapter explains methods of research and data collection used.
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CHAPTER 3:
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND DATA COLLECTION

INTRODUCTION
This chapter explains the research design and includes an account of my research
experiences, the specific methods used, a description of data sources and their relevance,
and the operationalization of the key concepts. A “Few Nations, Across Time, Qualitative
Historical-Comparative Research” (Neuman, 2003) was conducted using content analysis
and process tracing. Jamaica and Trinidad & Tobago were chosen as my cases because
both states are among CARICOM’s largest and/or wealthiest and, thus, considered
among the most influential states. Data was gathered using open ended elite interviews
and secondary data. Also, key concepts used in answering the central question were
further defined and transformed into empirical indicators.
THE CASES – JAMAICA AND TRINIDAD & TOBAGO
The decision to investigate Jamaican and Trinidadian elite dynamics was
dependent on the fact that both states are among CARICOM’s most influential
members.16 This has much to do with Jamaica’s size and Trinidad’s wealth.17 These
factors made it easier to track elite size, organization, and impact. Jamaica and Trinidad
& Tobago are similar in some ways and different in others. Their similarities include

16

Throughout history these states have been the most vocal. They have led to the rise and fall of many
regional integration initiatives. They also contribute to almost 60% of CARICOM’s budget. They were also
members of PREPCOM that wrote the CCJ Agreement. These are further discussed in Chapters 4 and 5.

17

The effect of size and wealth was previously discussed in Chapter 2, pp. 19-20.
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their histories and their development indicators. Notwithstanding these similarities,
however, a number of other factors vary between them.
To begin with their shared histories, Jamaica and Trinidad are both former British
colonies, and as such they have a shared history of exploitation of labor and resources. As
colonies of conquest,18 these countries saw high levels of absentee ownership, which did
not nurture allegiance from the slaves nor establish essential institutions necessary for
stability in these states (Buddan, 2001, p. 36; Knight, 1996). These factors caused slave
revolts and, eventually, the imposition of the Crown Colony Governments (CCG) that
provided limited representation but were largely authoritarian and anti-democratic
(Buddan, 2001; Barrow-Giles, 2002).
With independence, the new domestic elites formalized a British-style system of
government. As one sociologist put it at the time, these elites believed that “the only form
of self-government worthy of the name [was] government through ministers responsible
to an elected legislature” (Hughes, 1954, p. 9). With this came a common language
(English), political system (parliamentary system, welfare state, and British Labour Party
replicas), political culture (subject political culture) and traditions. These transplanted
commonalities have, on the one hand, promoted egalitarian and democratic ideas—but
they have also fostered the development of authoritarian leadership styles.
Authoritarianism is embedded into the social structure; personalities tend to be aggressive
(Singham, 1968, p. 10). Authoritarianism also characterized the elite-mass relationship,

18

Colonies of conquest and exploitation are defined as satellite states that suffered delayed growth and a
broken sequence of evolution, the exploitation of natural resources and labor, ruling classes that related
more with the mother country than the colony, high planter class absenteeism, were governed using CCG,
and had a regressive education system and repressive policing during and after slavery (Buddan, 2001;
Knight, 1996, pp. 74-87).
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which Singham called the “hero-crowd relationship,” where leaders were expected to
lead and the masses would follow obediently. Citizens in such systems tend to have
passive attitudes towards political institutions (Almond & Verba, 1963). Accordingly,
there is little communication between the government and the governed outside of the
election period (a characteristic of subject political culture), with the exception of the
state’s continued contact with (and service to) the former planter class: today’s economic
elite (Barrow-Giles, 2002).
Leaders, in such systems, often present themselves as “messianic” saviors, while
still maintaining the populist pose of a “person of the people.” A leader’s legitimacy,
thus, derives from both paternalism and charisma. He/she also dictates the ideology of his
party, which has a fairly narrow range (center-right to center-left). Political decisions,
whether at the local, regional, or international level, are based on a process in which the
public leaves power in the hands of the political elites they elected to represent them.
While the above characterization is true for both Jamaica and Trinidad & Tobago,
their political processes differ in other ways. These are due, for example, to the periods in
which they were first colonized by the British. This has dictated the societies’ ethnic
compositions and interactions as well as their political and social cleavages, which in turn
affect the organization of power and influence. Jamaica, acquired in 1655 (long before
the end of the slave trade in 1807 and emancipation of slaves in 1834), has an ethnic
composition in which 92.11% of the population is of African descent and the other 7.89%
is of mixed, not stated or other ethnic descent (Statistical Institute of Jamaica [STATIN],
2012, p. xiv). Given the almost homogenous nature of Jamaica’s ethnic composition,
class has been the basis for social and political cleavages in the country. On the surface
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this principle of homogeneity should make consensus building easy in crucial arenas such
as government, the private sector, or civil society (Linz & Stepan, 1996). However, class
creates a dichotomy within Jamaican society. Class can still be largely determined by
one’s color, with the “white” and “brown” minorities making up the upper and middle
classes and the black majority making up the lower class (Smith, 1965; Austin-Broos,
1994). Yet, class is also determined by other markers, such as a “command of the English
language, the school one attended, one’s associates and their networks, and whether one
is rural or urban” (Heron, 2008, p. 64).
Pre- and post-independence Jamaica saw “social status as well as economic
indices determine…upward social mobility…Charismatic nonwhites, especially trades
union leaders, assumed political power…and the ability to cultivate a constituency
successfully required [for] the coalition of masses of varied races and ethnicities”
(Knight, 1996, p. 45). There is the acceptance of class hierarchy based on occupation,
education, color, and status with the rise of the “black” middle and upper classes (AustinBroos, 1994; Buddan, 2001). With some blacks taking leadership roles in the political
and economic spheres and sharing power with “white” and “brown” peoples, what
essentially drives society and political decision making is conflict between the “haves”
and the “have-nots” (Ryan, 1999). To put that more bluntly, Jamaican politics consist of
“a series of unwritten pacts and compromises between the largely brown middle class and
educated middle upper classes who actually controlled state power, and the black
working and lower classes who voted for them and occasionally engaged in internecine
warfare in the rank and file of either party” (Meeks, 1996, p. 126). This speaks to
fragmentation within and between classes, fragmentation which increases competition
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among groups, thus affecting the possibilities for political organization, social inclusion,
and economic redistribution. Essentially, given the societal and political structures left by
the former colonial master, “middle class sensibilities reign in social and political
spheres,” notwithstanding occasional challenges from the majority (Heron, 2008, p. 43).
Trinidad & Tobago was a later acquisition of the British Empire. It was acquired
from the Spanish in 1797. With the abolition of the slave trade in 1807 and emancipation
of slaves in 1834, the plantations had lost the free labor of Africans, and many former
plantation slaves sought to work their own land. Consequently, the plantation owners
instead hired indentured servants from India and (to a lesser extent) China to work the
plantations. Because of this influx of indentured servants, East Indians became the
islands’ largest ethnic group. According to the 2011 census, 35.4% of the population of
Trinidad & Tobago were East Indian, 34.2% of African descent, and 22.8% of mixed race
or ethnicity (Central Statistical Office [CSO], 2012, p. 15). Given the almost equal
number of Africans and East Indians in Trinidad & Tobago, race has been the most
salient political cleavage. As such, there is distrust and a sense of victimization, as well as
occasional violence, in the efforts of each group to obtain wealth and political power
(Buddan, 2001; Ryan, 1999). These racial undertones affect people’s perceptions of the
state and of government performance on indicators such as corruption and competence.
The racial undertone has pushed the leaders of political parties in Trinidad &
Tobago, since independence, to seek to develop multiracial bases of support. In an effort
to both increase national identity and appeal to the masses, these leaders have together
established a racially-mixed civil service, an increasingly diverse parliament and
executive, and a presidency that has alternated between representatives of the two largest
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racial groups since the state became a republic in 1976 (Meighoo, 2003; Meighoo &
Jamadar 2008; Ryan, 1999, 2003). During the National Alliance for Reconstruction
(NAR) government (1986-1991), ANR Robinson19 ensured that there was ethnic parity
for appointments to state boards. “There were 54 chairmanships...named by June 1987.
20...Afro-Trinidadians, 18...Indo-Trinidadians, 11...European, 4...Chinese and
one...Syrian...[T]hose whose business it was to select and approve individuals had
achieved an important goal, namely ethnic balance among the numerically dominant
groups” (Trinidad and Tobago Guardian, June 3, 1987 cited in Ryan, 1999, p. 220).
Patrick Manning20 asserted that “all parties should be broad based reflecting the
composition of the society...It is the coalition of interests. In this way the integrity of the
Westminster system as we have in Trinidad and Tobago is maintained” (Trinidad and
Tobago Guardian, November 10, 1995 cited in Ryan, 1999, p. 236). Basdeo Panday21
echoed the sentiment by stating, “In my house there are many mansions. Under the big
tent of the UNC there is room for all” (Trinidad and Tobago Newsday, September 16,
2002 cited in Ryan, 2003, p. 1).
As a result, there have been no active separatist movements or any racial/ethnic
supremacist parties, and little latent ethnic conflict (Meighoo, 2003). Ethnic/racial
organizations do not seek to deny access to jobs and resources based on race or ethnicity,
as one might imagine would occur in divided societies (Linz & Stepan, 1996). Given the
19

Prime Minister of Trinidad & Tobago from 1986 to 1991 and leader of NAR from 1986-1991 and 19951997.

20

Prime Minister of Trinidad & Tobago from 1991-1995 and 2001-2010 and leader of the Peoples National
Movement (PNM) from 1986-2010.

21

Prime Minister of Trinidad & Tobago from 1995 to 2001 and leader of the United National Congress
(UNC) from 1988-2005 and 2006-2010.
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uneasy balance between the races, Trinidadians have worked to develop power-sharing
models of governance in the public and private sectors, and in civil society (Buddan,
2001; Ryan, 1999).
These shared histories of slavery and colonial oppression have also left Jamaican
and Trinidadian political cultures preoccupied with freedom and independence. This has
laid the foundation for strong nationalist positions held by some (though not all) elites
within these CARICOM member states, which could in turn affect the directions in which
they influenced the structure of the CCJ.
On the other hand, their proximity to other CARICOM member states might
constitute an interesting difference between the two. Owing to Trinidad & Tobago’s
closer proximity with most of the CARICOM member states (which are located in the
Windward and Leeward Antilles), and Jamaica’s greater distance from these members,
comparing Jamaica and Trinidad & Tobago might provide some insights into how this
dynamic works for or against greater coordination between various national elites. The
distance and isolation from the other member states might determine the level of
suspicion of outsiders (Payne, 1980). It could also narrow the national elites’ outlook on
regional matters and foster competition rather than coordination and cooperation with
national elites from other member states (Ramphal, 2012).
Jamaica and Trinidad & Tobago share similar economies, size, levels of
development, and trade patterns. Both states have been classified as More Developed
Countries (MDCs) within the context of CARICOM. Such a definition is based on the
size of the country and the size and diversity of its economy (CARICOM, 1973). They
are also among the CARICOM states with the largest land areas and populations –
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Jamaica with 10,991 square kilometers and approximately 2.9 million people and
Trinidad & Tobago with 5,128 square kilometers and 1.3 million people (CIA Factbook,
2011). But there are differences here, too. Jamaica has a mixed economy that is heavily
dependent on tourism, while Trinidad & Tobago has essentially a manufacturing
economy in conjunction with a large petroleum industry.
Regarding other development indicators, both countries recorded similar levels in
total output/economic activity, expressed as Gross Domestic Product (GDP) based on
purchasing-power-parity (PPP). Recent data show Jamaica with a GDP PPP of Int$22
23.868 billion and Trinidad & Tobago with GDP PPP Int$ 26.329 billion in 2010
(International Monetary Fund [IMF], 2012). Trade patterns indicate that Trinidad &
Tobago and Jamaica, between 1973 and 2001, held the number one and two positions as
the major exporting and importing countries from the CARICOM region; major markets
for both include the United States, Canada, the EU, China, and CARICOM (CARICOM
Secretariat, 2005; CIA Factbook, 2011; European Commission, 2013). Both countries are
also classified as high human development countries. Jamaica is ranked 85 in the world
with a Human Development Index (HDI) of 0.73, while Trinidad & Tobago is ranked 67
with an HDI of 0.76 (United Nations Development Program [UNDP], 2013, p. 145) with
these indices both trending upwards since 1980 (UNDP, 2013, p. 147). This means that
both countries have above-average life expectancies, mean years in school, and Gross
National Income (GNI) per capita.23 These factors – level of development, trade patterns,

22

The International dollar, also called the Geary–Khamis dollar, is equivalent to the purchasing power of a
US dollar in the US at any given time (World Bank 2013).

23

GNI per capita is equivalent to GDP per capita. Economic theory determines that a country’s economic
activity is equal to its national income.
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land size, and population size – all suggest that these states are among the most
influential members of CARICOM.
Other similarities include their relative small size in relation to their major trading
partners, and their past responses to external shocks, both of which may in turn influence
their regional aspirations. For instance, while the US is the number one trading partner
for both Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago, neither country ranks within the US’s top ten
trading partners (US Census Bureau, 2013). The same is true for the EU, which ranks in
the top five for both countries; yet in 2011, Jamaica was the EU’s 135th largest trading
partner, and Trinidad & Tobago was ranked 79th (European Commission, 2013). Second,
these states are also susceptible to changes in world market prices given their small size
and low levels of economic diversification, which can in turn reduce their influence in
international relations (Braveboy-Wagner, 2008). The countries’ reliance on foreign
capital has, on several occasions, led to crises of indebtedness—and to the subsequent
adoption of IMF Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPS) in Jamaica in 1977, 2010, and
2013, and in Trinidad & Tobago in 1986 (The Jamaica Gleaner, July 8, 2012; Trinidad
and Tobago Newsday, November 18, 2010). The relationship between these states and
larger states and international organizations are imbalanced in that they will tend to
reflect the preferences of the larger more powerful actors (the developed states and
organizations). Therefore, the two countries’ positions on regionalism may also be
dependent on international forces.
Other differences in economic composition and trade patterns may also affect
national and regional aspirations vis-à-vis the development of the CCJ. Jamaica has a
large service industry, with tourism constituting 8% of GDP and serving as the largest
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source of foreign currency earnings (Jamaica Tourist Board [JTB], n.d.). Most of the
visitor arrivals are from the US, Canada, and the United Kingdom (JTB, n.d.). Jamaica
has seen a fall in its manufacturing sector in real terms due to increased costs associated
with large scale industrial operations, namely, outdated machinery and high energy costs;
however, manufacturing is still the largest contributor to GDP, at 13% (Planning Institute
of Jamaica [PIOJ], 2009, p. 7). Many manufacturers have switched to the import and
distribution business, with the majority of the products coming from the US, the EU, and
Trinidad & Tobago. These factors have helped the Jamaican elite divide their focus
between extra-regional and intra-regional trade. There are those like Anthony Johnson
(cited in Franklyn, 2005, p. 215), a former Jamaica Labour Party (JLP) senator, who
state:
our exports…to CARICOM is US$50 million…a mere US$50 million. Fifty
million US are the exports of not a large company in Jamaica but a medium-size
company. Fifty million indeed is neither here or there with us…What one wants
to do, therefore, is to have some kind of process which would find out why
Jamaica imports US$400 million and can only export US$50 million in the
CARICOM region…The fact of the matter is Jamaican business is really not
interested…because they do not see the size of the market which they think would
all them to make a reasonable profit.
Jamaica fell from second to fourth position in intra-regional exports (CARICOM
Secretariat, 2005) between 1973 and 2001. However, CARICOM trade patterns also
show that Jamaica has risen from the second-most dominant intra-regional importing
country in 1973 to the leading intra-regional importer in 2001 (CARICOM Secretariat,
2005).
In Trinidad & Tobago, the natural gas, petroleum and petrochemical industry
amounts to 45% of GDP (and 80% of the country’s foreign currency earnings).
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Manufacturing and agriculture are just 6.3% of GDP, and tourism a mere 3.7% of GDP
(World Travel and Tourism Council, 2012). Like Jamaica, the majority of its trade is with
the US and the EU. However, unlike Jamaica, which saw a fall in its share of
intraregional exports from 14.3% to 10.4% between 1973 and 2001, Trinidad has seen an
increase in its share from 55% to 56.7% during the same period (CARICOM, 2005, pp.
114-115). This is largely due to sales in petrol and the development of the manufacturing
industry resulting from low energy costs and improved machinery. Therefore, while both
Jamaica’s and Trinidad & Tobago’s major export and import markets are the United
States and the EU (CARICOM Secretariat, 2005), differences in intra-regional trade
focus may have a significant impact on their national and regional outlooks.
Finally, while there are similarities between the states regarding their total output,
there is a vast difference in their GDP per capita based on PPP. GDP per capita PPP
measures a country’s standard of living, that is, the level of physical wellbeing afforded
to each adult in a country based on access to wealth, goods, and services (Black, 1997).
The 2010 data saw Jamaica with GDP per capita PPP of Int$ 8,742.829 and Trinidad &
Tobago with GDP per capita PPP Int$ 19,980.765 (IMF, 2012). This means that Trinidad
& Tobago, though half the size (population and land mass) of Jamaica, enjoys (in the
aggregate) twice the level of economic welfare. This is noteworthy because it may shape
the dynamics between elites and the mass public within each state (one poorer and larger,
the other richer but smaller).
DATA COLLECTION
Data collection for this research took place between July 1, 2012 and September
30, 2012. I used both archival data and elite interviews.
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Archival and Statistical Data. Archival data was retrieved from five sources.24
The first was from official CARICOM Documents, which are available from the
CARICOM website at www.caricom.org. These included, but were not limited to, the
Treaty Establishing the Caribbean Community; the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas
Establishing the Caribbean Community including the Caribbean Single Market and
Economy; the Agreement Establishing the Caribbean Court of Justice, and the
subsequent Caribbean Court of Justice (Original Jurisdiction) Rules 2006; The
Caribbean Court of Justice (Original Jurisdiction) (Amendment) Rules 2006; CARICOM
Heads of Government Meetings’ transcripts; and communiqués among those involved in
the decision-making process regarding the CCJ. A second set of sources was public
archives and databases, namely the Statistical Institute of Jamaica (STATIN), the Central
Statistical Office of Trinidad & Tobago (CSO), the European Commission (EC), the
United States Census Bureau, and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). A third source
was public media archives for the period under investigation (1980-2006) from Jamaica
(The Jamaica Gleaner and The Jamaica Observer) and Trinidad & Tobago (Trinidad and
Tobago Newsday, The Trinidad and Tobago Guardian and Trinidad Express). A fourth
set of sources came from the private archives of elites who were interviewed:
unpublished documents and transcripts, journals and diaries, and private correspondences
from these elites over the years from 1980 to 2005. Finally, a fifth set of sources came in
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There was to be a sixth source, the semi-public archives, which required special permission to access
them. These included the Jamaican and Trinidadian government offices (most notably the AttorneysGeneral and the Ministries of Justice), the CARICOM Secretariat in Guyana that house the raw data
collected for the Time for Action: Report of the West Indian Commission, and policy contributions from
numerous economic and political organizations and committees. However, access to these institutions was
declined.
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the form of books and journal articles written on Caribbean integration, i.e. the secondary
literature on this topic.
The Treaty Establishing the Caribbean Community was analyzed because it
provides the original rules for the negotiations and conclusion of agreements, settlement
of disputes, the composition of institutions of CARICOM and their functions and powers,
and CARICOM’s legal capacity (Articles 11 – 12; 19 – 20 and 28). These shed light on
the initial framework for interpreting the treaty, for the arbitration of trade disputes and
for ensuring a stable regional economic environment. The Revised Treaty of
Chaguaramas Establishing the Caribbean Community including the Caribbean Single
Market and Economy expressed the changing of the times. This amendment of the
Original Treaty incorporates the nine protocols that provide the legal basis for the CSME
and the importance of the CCJ’s original jurisdiction in maintaining a predictable CSME
(Protocol IX). It is perhaps the crucial artifact of regional integration in the Caribbean,
and, reflects the interplay between institutions and actors in the creation and structure of
the CCJ.
The Agreement Establishing the Caribbean Court of Justice (Articles I-XXIV)
was analyzed for the same reason as the Revised Treaty, as they are the two principal
documents that outline the institutional structure and responsibilities of the CCJ. The
Caribbean Court of Justice (Original Jurisdiction) Rules 2006 and the Caribbean Court
of Justice (Original Jurisdiction) (Amendment) Rules 2006 were scrutinized because they
illustrate how the CCJ operates on a day-to-day basis, and (this dissertation argues)
reflect the influence of different groups of political elites on the institutionality of the
CCJ.
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Additionally, the communiques from the 19th Heads of Government Conference
(CARICOM Secretariat, 1998) and other relevant conferences held between 1987 and
2001 were reviewed.25 These documents reflect the conflicts and collaboration among
member-state officials as they built implementation and enforcement mechanisms for
regional integration.
Reports for the period under investigation from the CARICOM Statistics SubProgram, the Statistical Institute of Jamaica (STATIN), The Bank of Jamaica (BOJ), the
Central Statistical Office of Trinidad & Tobago (CSO), the European Commission (EC),
the United States Census Bureau, and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) were the
sources of statistical data for trade in goods and services, useful for analyzing how an
increase in global trade due to globalization and neoliberalism may have affected Jamaica
and Trinidad & Tobago. Additionally, information via the IMF on the SAPs adopted by
Jamaica and Trinidad & Tobago in the 1970s and 1980s provide information on the
effects of these programs on the countries, on their elites in particular, and on regional
integration initiatives.
The public media archives from Jamaica (The Jamaica Gleaner and The Jamaica
Observer) and Trinidad (Trinidad and Tobago Newsday, The Trinidad and Tobago
Guardian and Trinidad Express) were perused for evidence of elite involvement in, and
impact on, regional integration. Other public archives—namely the University of the
West Indies Libraries in Jamaica and Trinidad, and policy papers from the Jamaican and
Trinidadian Bar Associations—were also examined for information on the points of view
25

These documents are accessible on the CARICOM Secretariat and Caribbean Court of Justices official
websites. However, access to the transcripts and minutes from the 19th Heads of Government Conference
(1998) and other relevant conferences was denied.
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of national elites and their influence on state officials in effecting the final CCJ
arrangements.26 Also, the above archives include occasional polls that would put into
perspective not just elite, but also mass public opinion and its influence (or lack thereof)
on the establishment and evolution of the CCJ.
Elite Interviews. Forty-six subjects were interviewed. These informants were
identified and recruited via the Jamaican and Trinidadian chambers of commerce, the
countries’ bar associations, political party and trade union leadership rosters, and major
media outlets. The specific names of these organizations are listed below. Additional
sources of recruitment were the University of the West Indies, the CARICOM
Secretariat, the annual publications of the Jamaica Directory of Personalities and Who’s
Who in Trinidad and Tobago, and the Caribbean Court of Justice (CCJ) itself. Potential
subjects were invited to participate in an interview via letters mailed to their place of
business and/or their homes, or via email. Only identifiable members of the economic,
political or socio-cultural elite were recruited. Forty-seven invitations were sent in
Jamaica and another forty-three invitations were sent in Trinidad & Tobago. There were
positive response rates of approximately 51% (twenty-four persons) in Jamaica and 28%
(twelve persons) in Trinidad.27 They were informed prior to consent that the researcher
sought to a) gauge their familiarity with Caribbean regional integration and with the
Caribbean Community (CARICOM) more specifically, and b) identify barriers to, and
opportunities for, the subjects’ influence on the establishment of the CCJ.
26

Access to raw data and transcripts from The Preparatory Committee on the Caribbean Court of Justice
(PREPCOM) that would have provided state bargaining positions in the structure of the CCJ was denied.
These resources are housed at the CARICOM Secretariat.
27
The researcher initially sought to interview 25 elite members per country; however, due to differences in
the response rate, the number of interviews conducted in each country was then based the state’s population
size.
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The interviewees were chosen using both purposive and snowball sampling
methods, so as to have a fixed number of elites per category and “select cases with a
specific purpose in mind” (Neuman, 2003, p. 213), while also increasing the pool of elite
interviewees based on referrals from other subjects. The economic elite were found via
the Trinidad and Tobago Chamber of Industry and Commerce (TTCIC), the Trinidad and
Tobago Coalition of Services Industries (TTCSI), the Trinidad and Tobago
Manufacturers Association (TTMA), the Jamaica Exporters Association (JEA), the
Jamaica Manufacturers Association (JMA), and the Private Sector Organization of
Jamaica (PSOJ). The Trinidad & Tobago political elite came from The People’s National
Movement (PNM), the United National Congress (UNC), the National Trade Union
Centre of Trinidad and Tobago, the Public Services Association (PSA) and the Law
Association of Trinidad and Tobago (LATT). The Jamaican political elite included
members of the Jamaica Labour Party (JLP), the People’s National Party (PNP), the
Jamaica Confederation of Trade Unions (JCTU), and the Jamaica Bar Association (JBA).
The sociocultural elite included economics and political science lecturers from the
University of the West Indies in Jamaica and Trinidad.
Face-to-face semi-standardized elite interviews were conducted with available
subjects from each country in the privacy of his/her office or home (See Appendix A).28
They were used to collect data on elite attitudes, perceptions, opinions, and explanations
of their actions with regards to deepening regional integration and the evolution of the
CCJ.

28

All interviews were recorded and saved in a password protected and encrypted computer file.
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These elite interviews have a high added value, for this project and for future
research as there are very few surveys available that gauge elite attitudes in this way
(Boxill, 1997). And the semi-standardized interview format provides a mix of closed and
open-ended questions that can depict attitudes and beliefs more effectively than just
deploying one type of question or the other (Berg, 2001; Neuman, 2003). Simply put,
these elite interviews provided perspectives not offered in the official transcripts and
communiqués of the decision making process regarding the CCJ (See Appendix A).
METHODS
Empirically, through direct contact with local elites in Jamaica and Trinidad &
Tobago and the perusal of CARICOM treaties, laws and other official and informal
documents, I measured the degree of influence that different elites had on the regional
integration process. This was achieved by:
1. ascertaining the domestic and international factors that motivated elite behavior
that led them to support/oppose economic integration and regional judicial
systems;
2. determining whether individual elites supported or opposed any rule changes
under the Original Treaty arrangement, and, more broadly, if they believed they
would benefit from the integration process;
3. evaluating the formal contributions/submissions they made, and the other forms
of influence they may have wielded, in the creation and structuring of the CCJ;
and
4. gauging which types of elite had the most/least influence on the final blueprints of
the CCJ.

63

Once the archival data and secondary sources of information were retrieved, I
performed content analysis in order to examine the documents for evidence on the
behaviors of, and the relationships between, various types of elite actors, and on the
process towards regional institutional development more generally. Using an
interpretative approach to content analysis, I sought to measure the fundamental reasons
behind the actors’ actions. Key terms were inductively identified in the data collected,
and coded as categorical labels or themes. This allowed me to assess both the manifest
content (the visible, surface meaning) and the latent content (its underlying meaning).
Key terms included (but were not limited to) enforcement, submission, involvement,
contribution, opinion, collaboration, competition, response, and arbitration.
Textual data from the different archival sources were analyzed for these and other
key terms (and phrases using these terms),and then examined for evidence of patterns
indicating elite opinions and beliefs, relationships among different elites, and, most
importantly, interactions between domestic elites, national governments and CARICOM
agencies, including the CCJ. These patterns were then considered in light of what they
could tell us about the hypotheses set forth above.
The elite interviews were transcribed and then analyzed not only for their content
but for the purposes of process tracing: “to identify the intervening causal process - the
causal chain and causal mechanism - between an independent variable (variables) and the
outcome of the dependent variable” (George & Bennett 2005, p. 206). In other words, in
addition to deciphering words, phrases, and themes, I sought to map out the process by
which elites affected regional judicial development.
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I used process tracing to test whether the observed processes match the
relationships among variables predicted by her hypotheses. The transcribed interviews
were used to help trace events backward through time from the outcome of interest (the
establishment and structure of the CCJ) to potential antecedent causes. To do this, I
catalogued any details from the interviews that were relevant to the hypotheses under
investigation in order to draw conclusions about elites’ national and regional identities
and their preferences and beliefs about regional integration; relationships among elites
and between elites and institutions; and how these affected the establishment and
functioning of the CCJ.
DEFINITION AND OPERATIONALIZATION OF KEY CONCEPTS
Regional Integration. Regional integration is “the sense of coming together of
previously separate and independent parts to form a new whole” (Burgess, 2004, p. 30).
Regional integration is, thus, the level of interdependence among states within a given
geographical area.
Regional integration has been conceptualized as taking one of five different levels
or forms, each representing differences in the strength and focus of the regional
integration process. The strength of integration can range from an informal arrangement,
which has limited effect on the decisions of member states, to more formalized
agreements that are strictly adhered to by member states. The focus of integration may be
restricted to economic integration or political integration, or it may be all-encompassing
and include economic, social and political unification. In ascending order from the
weakest to the strongest forms of regional integration there is 1) the free trade area; 2) the
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customs union; 3) the common market; 4) economic union; and 5) the political union
(Mansfield & Milner, 1999).
A free trade area is a form of economic union among member states that requires
them eliminate all trade barriers (tariffs, quotas, etc.) for the trade of stipulated goods
among themselves, while not requiring that all member states maintain common external
barriers to trade.
A customs union is, according to Mansfield and Milner (1999, p. 592), a
preferential trade arrangement that eliminates all internal trade barriers among member
states while also establishing a common external tariff (CET) for all non-member states.
It often arises out of an existing free trade area.
A common market allows the free movement of the two “factors of production [–
capital and labor –] and finished goods across the national borders” of member states
(Mansfield & Milner 1999, p. 592). Again, these often evolve out of customs unions in
which key member states seek further integration (Evans & Newnham, 1998).
An economic union is a stronger form of common market and includes the
formation of a monetary union that seeks to coordinate the monetary policies of member
states and create a single currency to be traded on world markets.
Finally, a political union, in its strictest sense, is akin to federalism: the division
of decision-making power between a central, in this case supranational body and several
national or regional units. Based on the definitions and discussion of forms of regional
integration listed above, one could describe CARICOM as a common market,29 perhaps

29

This is true on paper, but there is debate on whether CARICOM can truly be labelled as a common
market. Currently, there are still issues related to the free movement of labor. Free movement is restricted
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one in the process of transitioning into an economic union. Established among the 14
former British colonies in the Caribbean, CARICOM started out as a free trade area –
CARIFTA – which eventually became a customs union prior to the formation of
CARICOM in 1973. With the signing of the Treaty of Chaguaramas, CARICOM
recognized the need for member states to seek full employment, improve working and
living conditions and enhance international competitiveness. In addition to forming a
common market, CARICOM has agreed to cooperation in such areas as health, transport,
culture and education, and the coordination of foreign policies among the member states.
Since the signing of the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas (RTC) in 2001, CARICOM has
made an effort to more fully incorporate a single market whose inputs will move freely
within the region, though this has so far been limited by the uneven implementation of
collective decisions within individual member states.
Elite. The study of the elite goes back to research conducted by Vilfredo Pareto,
who observed that that there were a few individuals in society that held most of the power
and wealth (Bealey, 1999). From this observation he theorized that this uneven
distribution occurs in every society—and that these powerful people excelled in most
areas of life because they were intellectually, morally, psychologically and physically
superior to the masses (Heller, 1969). He divided elites into the governing (the political
elite with direct and indirect influence on government) and non-governing groups. He
further subdivided the governing group into “foxes” and “lions” leaders who wield power
through persuasion and force, respectively (Higley n.d., p. 1).

to specific categories of labor. Therefore, CARICOM could be described as a customs union in the process
of transitioning into an economic union.
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Later elite theorists built on these observations, discussing how political power is
related to economic and social control. Karl Marx argued that the power of the governing
or ruling group (the bourgeoisie, in a capitalist system) is based on its ownership of the
factors of production. However, this was later critiqued by scholars such as Max Weber,
who argued that ownership alone is not enough to dictate whether one is a member of the
elite. Not everyone who enjoys ownership of factors of production seeks to affect
political outcomes. And the distribution and use of political power is not merely an
extension of economic power.
Elite status, for Weber, is determined by who comes out on top in terms of class
(economic order based on economic market opportunity), status (social order based on
people’s levels of prestige and honor), and party (political/legal order based on people’s
pursuit of a certain cause) (Bealey, 1999; Parkin, 2002). Given this position, it is evident
the elite are not a homogeneous group. They can be, at minimum, divided into three
basic categories – the political, the economic, and the socio-cultural elite.
However, the state remains central to elite politics in Weber’s view. The state is
an arena for allocating and competing for power among the above mentioned groups—
but it can also become an actor in its own right. What is more, the state is the “legitimate”
means of control over individuals and groups in society, with power exercised via
organized bureaucracy but also, potentially, by the legitimate application of violence and
coercion. But elites do not operate only though the state. More generally, elites are
characterized as that group “who in some way is superior to the rest of the community”
(Bealey, 1999). As such, they can have an influence over the political, economic and
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social processes through direct interaction with political processes, by influencing public
opinion, and by other indirect means as well (Boxill, 1997).
The elite, and their attitudes and behaviors, constitute a key independent variable
in this research. Elites within each country will not be treated as a homogeneous group
but will be divided into three basic categories – the political, the economic, and the sociocultural elites. For the purposes of this study, these categories will be treated as mutually
exclusive and exhaustive (a necessary oversimplification), based on the most
predominant activity of individual members of the elite. Representative examples of each
elite group are listed below.
Table 1
Categorization of the Elite Groups
POLITICAL ELITE

ECONOMIC ELITE

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

1. Important Business
people in the Private
sector
2. Heads of economic
organizations

Politicians
Top civil servants
Lawyers
Judges
Trade unionists

SOCIO-CULTURAL
ELITE30
1. University professors
2. Media executives and
journalists
3. Civil Society leaders
4. Religious and cultural
leaders

Public Opinion. Public opinion is the aggregation of individuals’ and groups’
attitudes and beliefs, a set of attitudes and beliefs that can (but does not necessarily)
inform government action and policy (Bealey, 1999). There is no one public opinion, due
to differences in people’s political socialization and circumstances within a society
(Edwards, Wattenberg & Lineberry, 2005). Public opinion is generally measured through
interviews and/or surveys (Neuman, 2003). It can be based on a random sampling of the
30

Socio-cultural elites will be labelled as the “knowledge elite” for the purpose of this research because I
was only able to interview university professors.
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population, though other forms of sampling can be used, depending on the researcher’s
topic or interest (Neuman, 2003).
In this dissertation, public opinion is treated as the independent variable and
operationalized based on responses to annual public opinion polls conducted in Jamaica
and Trinidad & Tobago, public opinion polls conducted by the CARICOM Secretariat in
Jamaica and Trinidad & Tobago, and interviews conducted in Jamaica and Trinidad &
Tobago.
Institutions. The concept of an institution has different meanings within political
science. But there is agreement that institutions are important to the outcome of human
interaction (Hodgson, 2006, p. 8; Lane & Ersson, 2000). Institutions constrain and
empower actors’ behavior.
Approaches to the study of institutions have evolved over time. A very formal,
structural perspective was central to the traditional study of institutions (“old”
institutionalism). It defined an institution as “a public body with formally designated
structures and functions, intended to regulate certain defined activities, which apply to the
whole population” (Bealey, 1999). This definition encompasses the legislature, the
executive, judiciary and the bureaucracy. This is a very limited view of institutions,
highly descriptive and markedly, parochial, and would limit any analysis to comparing
institutions that have some similarities in their formal structures and examining any
observed differences.
The definition of an institution has more recently been extended to include the
means by which these institutions relate to one another and society as a whole. There are
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three main schools of thought on this relationship: rational choice institutionalism,
sociological institutionalism, and historical institutionalism.31
All of the “new institutionalist” approaches limit the definition of an institution to
an entrenched rule or norm that was intentionally agreed upon by the relevant actors from
among several different options (Hall & Taylor, 1996; Lane & Ersson, 2000). Institutions
have both formal (constitutions, common law and regulations) and informal (conventions
and codes of conduct) rules. These general institutions, the school argues, appear in all
states in one form or the other. What is more, institutions adapt. That is, they are
strategically added or deleted as actors’ needs and preferences change. What is
interesting with this school is that it distinguishes between organizations and rules.
Formal structure does not equate to institution. In other words, this definition of
institution will designate the legislature, the executive, judiciary and the bureaucracy as
organizations or public bodies/players that are simply the agents of institutional rules
(North, 1997; Lane & Ersson, 2000).
31

For the purposes of this dissertation, I use the thin definition provided by rational choice institutionalism
(North, 1997; Lane & Ersson, 2000). However, it should be noted that the sociological school takes an
entirely different approach to the definition of an institution. It does not limit the definition to an
entrenched norm or rule but includes culture, knowledge, technology, paradigms, people and their
behavior, and organizations (Hall & Taylor, 1996; Lane & Ersson, 2000). As such, this school treats these
factors as small institutions that make part of a whole and that the connections between the parts “fit
together as a pattern that define the parts” (Lane & Ersson, 2000, p. 5). This interpretation of institutions is
defined by a cultural/national identity, which is in contrast to the rational school that believes that
institutions are general present in one form or another across states. The sociological school believes that
each state has its own distinct institutions due its cultural context.
The historical institutionalism school has taken a middle ground approach analyzing institutions. It,
however, seems to adopt a definition that is consistent with the rational choice school. Institutions are
defined as “the formal and informal procedures, routines, norms and conventions embedded in the
organizational structure of the polity or political economy…In general, historical institutionalists associate
institutions with organizations and the rules and conventions promulgated by formal organization” (Hall &
Taylor 1996, p. 938). The school contributes to the analysis of institutions through two means by: 1)
arguing that you can retrace history through in the development of specific institutions; and 2) theorizing
that an initial institution will set its development along a specific path that cannot be easily altered.
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The rules affect the structures and functions of these organizations. An institution,
by this definition, determines what the organization is prohibited and/or permitted to do.
I, for the purposes of this dissertation, used the definition provided by Douglass North,
which allows me to focus on just the rules of the game and provide a more powerful
comparative analysis than a legalistic focus solely on high-level, formal governing
bodies. Institutions are, therefore, “humanly devised constraints used to restrict human
interaction” (North, 1997, p. 23) that can be manifested both formally and informally.
In this study, institutions are both independent and dependent variables.
Institutions are operationalized as the prevailing rules and common practices of
organization within states and at the CARICOM level. As an independent, institutions are
a) the formal rules that previously governed Caribbean integration, and b) the rules and
structures of politics (including, but not limited to, laws and constitutions) in each
member state. But the dependent variable of this study is also institutional in nature: I
seek to explain the development of new regional formal rules governing Caribbean
integration, and the rules and mechanisms devised for the Caribbean Court of Justice
(CCJ) in particular.
Small State. A small state is difficult to define; however, the standard criteria for
defining a small state include population size, land area, level of development and
position within the international system (Hey, 2003; Vital, 1967; Braveboy-Wagner,
2008). As it relates to population size, “small states” can range from as high as 30 million
(Vital, 1967) to as low as 300,000 (Plischke, 1977). However, a population of less than
10 million tends to be the accepted benchmark (Kuznets, 1963; Ramsaran, 1989; Taylor,
1971). According to Braveboy-Wagner (2008), “when we look at the bulk of the world’s
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territories, about 129…have populations below 10 million, a reasonable upper limit for a
small state given that the top states of the world have more than 1 billion people” (p. 9).
Land areas of less than 20,000 km² are also considered “small” (Kuznets, 1963;
Ramsaran, 1989; Taylor, 1971).
Land size and population alone cannot define a state; the state’s power in relation
to other states must be considered. This in turn depends on the state’s level of
development. States defined as “developing” or “less developed” are states that have a
low human development indices, middle to low standard of living; middle to low gross
domestic product (GDP) per capita, and middle to low gross national income (GNI) per
capita (Black, 1997; IMF, 2013; Graham & Newnham, 1998; World Bank, 2013b).
Though “less developed” is not synonymous with “small,” it has been noted that the
majority of small states are former colonies in the global south, i.e. “developing”
countries (Barrow-Giles, 2002; Buddan, 2001).
These factors shape the state’s capacity and its position within the international
system. Low state capacity results in “fewer diplomatic and information-gathering
resources” (Hey, 2003, p. 4), which reduces small states’ power internationally. Thus, I
define a small state for my purpose is a developing country with a population size of less
than 10 million and land size of less than 20,000 km² —a category into which both
Jamaica and Trinidad & Tobago fall.
Globalization, Neoliberalism and Trade Patterns. Globalization is not a new
phenomenon. It has and will continue to have an impact on various aspects of life –
economics, politics, and culture. For Gordon (2001), globalization is both an objective
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and subjective phenomenon.32 David Held (1997) gives an image of globalization as a
“spatial phenomenon, lying on a continuum with ‘the local’ at one end and ‘the global’ at
the other” (p. 1). Additionally, it is recognized as a vehicle for transmitting ideas, goods,
and services from ‘the local’ to ‘the global.’
The pace of transmission has a lot to do with the ideas and ideologies behind
globalization. There have been different approaches over the centuries but since the
resurgence of neo-classical economics in the 1970s, the pace of the transmission of ideas,
goods, and services has increased exponentially. Rebranded as neoliberalism, classical
economic doctrine has resulted in the advancement of a free market economy through the
process of liberalization (the main tenet of neoliberalism), privatization, deregulation and
the limiting of the role of the state in the economic and social spheres locally, which has
translated into free trade at the global level.
The transmission of these neoliberal principles from ‘the local’ to ‘the global’ are
attributed to the capitalist classes and pro-business academics in Britain and the United
States using international organizations, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF),
to support their position that state intervention hinders economic growth (embedded
liberalism) and that the market, if left alone, can self-correct social and economic
problems (neoliberalism) (Harvey 2005). In other words, they supported “liberty,” which
is equivalent (in this view) to the freedom of exchange and contract. David Harvey
(2005) also found that technological and financial advances have increased production
flexibility and have strengthened the mobility of capital to do offshore manufacturing.
32

It is objectively a greater interconnectedness of people that has brought about new forces and tensions. It
is subjective because people believe that nothing is as it seems and thus question all that was once held as
truth. People are now open to new ideas of what is to come and should come (Gordon, 2001).
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William Robinson (2004), in A Theory of Global Capitalism, asserts that the
world is experiencing a fourth phase of capitalism – transnational
capitalism/globalization, which emerged during the 1970s. This neoliberal globalization
has amounted to the intensive and extensive growth of world capitalism via the
transnationalization, marketization and commodification of production, capital and social
services (privatization of services) and the increased spread of capitalism across
territories. There has been a rise in the number of transnational corporations (TNCs),
cross border acquisitions, mergers and strategic alliances. These developments have
resulted in the diminishing importance of the nation-state, and the growing
influence/importance of the global economy.
Harvey (2005) and Robinson (2004) also opined that neoliberal globalization has
led to great economic advances, though with some internal contradictions
(overproduction and underconsumption; the crisis of state legitimization; and an
ecological crisis). Therefore, neoliberal globalization is not only visible but it has affected
all aspects of life through the homogenization, hybridization and polarization of culture.
Globalization is economic at its core but has influenced the political and social spheres
too.
In this dissertation, neoliberalism was equated to economic globalization.
Neoliberal globalization was treated as an independent variable and operationalized as
the country’s structural adjustment policy. This included, but was not limited to, the
country cutting social expenditures, ensuring investment stability (by supplementing
foreign direct investment with the opening of domestic stock markets), and removing
price controls and state subsidies. Additionally, neoliberal globalization is
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operationalized as the occurrence of trade liberalization (the lifting import and export
restrictions), devaluation (this results in an increase in exports, a decrease in imports, an
increase in the value of currency, and a decrease in attractiveness], deregulation (an
increase in incentives to export), fiscal discipline (an increase in interest rates), and
privatization (an increase in government revenues, and a decrease in expenses).
Trade logistics/patterns are simply the trends in the movement of goods and
services between a country and other states. This was treated as an independent variable
and operationalized from the annual statistical trade reports from the CARICOM
Secretariat and the Jamaican and Trinidadian Ministries of Trade and Commerce. It was
divided into 2 categories:
1. Trade balances between the CARICOM member state and the United States and
the EU from 1980 to 2001.
2. Trade balance between the CARICOM member state within the CARICOM
region between 1980 and 2001.
CONCLUSION
This chapter presented an overview of the cases under investigation, the data
sources and methodology used, and the operationalization of the key concepts. In the
proceeding chapters readers should expect that what was discussed in this chapter will
provide the basis for the analysis of elite influence in the development and structure of
the CCJ.
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CHAPTER 4:
JAMAICA

INTRODUCTION
In the chapter I discuss factors that determined Jamaica’s degree of influence on
the formation and establishment of the CCJ. This discussion focuses on three levels of
analysis: the international, the regional, and the national/domestic levels. The
international level addresses the literature and theory on the effects of neoliberal
globalization on small states, large state/small state influence on small state foreign
policy, and the domino effect of rising economic blocs on a state’s desire to deepen its
region’s economic integration. In order to apply these theories to the Jamaican
experience, an overview of international economic trends is presented. At the regional
level I discuss the applicable theories of regional integration. This is followed by my
examination of how the CCJ Agreement negotiations fit or differ from the established
regional integration theories and how Jamaica’s status as a relatively large state within
CARICOM affected these negotiations. The domestic level reviews theories of
ideological cleavages, civil society participation, and small state foreign policy, which is
followed by an overview of Jamaica’s political and civil society development. This
section concludes with an analysis of the influence of the political, economic, and
knowledge elites, and the public on Jamaica’s position on the final structure of the CCJ.
OVERVIEW
Jamaica is the third largest island in the Caribbean and the largest English
speaking island in the region. It gained independence from the British in 1962 and has
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maintained a stable two party parliamentary system that regularly switches between the
social democratic People’s National Party (PNP) and the free enterprise/conservative
Jamaica Labour Party (JLP). It also maintains a mixed economy with tourism,
manufacturing, and agriculture being its main foreign exchange earners.
Jamaica has always played an integral part in the Anglo-Caribbean integration
movement. In the first instance, Jamaica assisted in the drafting of a constitution for a
federation in 1932, and held the 1947 Montego Bay Conference where attendees accepted
the principles of federation. This was followed by the formation of the West Indies
Federation (1958-1962) after 10 years of negotiations between the British Government
and the new and emerging Caribbean leaders led by Jamaican Norman Manley. Jamaica
was later influential in transitioning CARIFTA into CARICOM and was also
instrumental in CARICOM states adopting the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas (RTC)
and moving towards a single market and economy.
INTERNATIONAL DYNAMICS OF REGIONAL INTEGRATION
Theory. The international environment affects states differently. There are three
international factors that steer small states towards regional integration. The first is
neoliberal globalization, the second is whether the policies of powerful states and
organizations favor regional integration, and the third consists of the domino effect of
regional blocs.
Neoliberal globalization has played a great part in intensifying a new form of
regional integration known as ‘open regionalism’ (Acosta, 2004; de la Reza, 2003).
Globalization is a phenomenon that creates the rapid deepening and widening of trade,
finance, and production integration across national boundaries. Neoliberalism is an
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economic doctrine that supports free markets and free trade through the process of
liberalization, privatization, deregulation and the limitation of the role of the state in the
economic and social spheres.
Neoliberal globalization offers both advantages and disadvantages to Small Island
Developing States (SIDS). It allows for their convergence with the world economy but
competition from neoliberalism in this sphere is often cutthroat (Bernal, 2000;
Ohiorhenuan, 2000). Second, it makes SIDS vulnerable and volatile and forces them to
adopt survival strategies in order to navigate this new harsh environment, the most
evident being greater regional integration (Bernal, 2000; Blake, 2000; Byron, 2000).
Regional integration is, therefore, thought to be essential to overcoming the
expected limitations that individual SIDS face due to their size and levels of
development. This is expected to make SIDS more competitive in the international
economy. Second, regional integration protects against exogenous shocks that can be
damaging to small state competitiveness. Increased mobility of capital and labor within
the region should amount to increased market elasticity and productivity, which in turn
increases the region’s capability to pull through these shocks, which should facilitate
economic growth and development (Bernal, 2000; Blake, 1997; Demas, 1965). Third,
neoliberal globalization leads to regional integration because it strengthens SIDS’
position on the international stage by increasing their bargaining power against external
threats and through negotiating foreign trade and economic policies (Braveboy-Wagner,
2008; Pollard, 2003).
Regarding small state foreign policy, it is believed that large developed/powerful
states dictate the movements of the international system and that small dependent/weak

79

states are largely affected by these external forces (Elman, 1995). Paul Sutton (1987),
Robert Jervis (1978), Stephen Walt (1987), and Jack Snyder (1991) have argued that
small/developing states are reactionary and likely to adapt to external constraints because
of vulnerability to economic competition, a lack of cushioning for foreign policy
mistakes, their low positions/influence in the international system, and bandwagoning.
A powerful state’s or international organization’s ability to influence the foreign
policy of smaller dependent states can be described by either the Bargaining Model or the
Dependency Model. The Bargaining Model notes that the relationship is determined by
promises and sanctions that will reflect the preferences of the larger more powerful
state/organization (Kay, 1967; Keohane, 1967; Mason, 1964; Moon, 1983; Westwood,
1966). Edward Mason (1964) and Andrew Westwood (1966) observed that the
reward/punishment behavior primarily occurs when a large powerful state gains
compliance from the small dependent state through the issuance of military aid and
economic assistance. The Dependency Model maintains that the relationship is based on
a longstanding structural dependence that gives the smaller, weaker state less freedom in
determining their actions (Amin, 1974; Cardoso & Faletto, 1979; Frank, 1968; Galtung,
1971; Kaplan, 1975; Payer, 1974). Dependency-producing transactions come in the form
of aid and foreign direct investment. They are believed to establish and maintain an
asymmetrical relationship between the powerful and weaker states as the powerful state
provides enough help to integrate the weaker state into the international system at the
minimal level, which in turn keeps the weaker state dependent on the powerful state.
Therefore, a powerful state or organization’s support for neoliberal globalization and
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regionalism will have an effect on small states’ foreign policy with the latter gravitating
towards regional integration measures.
Lastly, with the increase in regional groupings worldwide, states within close
geographic proximity will most likely form their own regional bloc due to a domino
effect or the pressures of inclusion. Richard Baldwin (1997, 2004) and Sanoussi Bilal
(2001) argued that if geographically close states decide to deepen an already established
economic bloc or form a new regional economic bloc, non-members within close
proximity will be induced to join the organization. This is as a result of these states
already being natural trading partners and/or the negative effects of trade and investment
diversion for non-members. Therefore, non-members will seek to join the economic bloc
to eliminate any costs associated with exclusion. In instances where these states are
barred from joining, all excluded countries will the form their own regional bloc. This
process will cause a domino effect and the creation of many new economic blocs.
Background. The international environment from the 1970s onward has seen
classical economic doctrine being reintroduced under the term, “neoliberalism.” There
was the call for the return to a free market economy through the process of liberalization,
privatization, deregulation and the limitation of the role of the state in the economic and
social spheres locally, which has translated into free trade globally. This has been
attributed to the capitalist classes, and pro-business academics and governments in
Britain and the United States, and further perpetuated by international organizations, such
as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (Harvey, 2005). They decried state
intervention and blamed it for hindering economic growth. They argued that the market,
if left alone, can self-correct social and economic problems (Harvey, 2005).
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William Robinson (2004) observed that this neoliberal globalization has
amounted to the intensive and extensive world capitalism via the transnationalization,
marketization and commodification of production, capital and social services, which has
unified states under a shared economic system. As a consequence, there has been a rise in
the number of transnational corporations (TNCs), cross border acquisitions, mergers and
strategic alliances. These developments have resulted in the diminishing importance of
the nation-state, and the growing influence/importance of the global economy.
Through the proliferation of neoliberal globalization there was an increase in
world trade beginning in the late 1970s until the global recession in 2008 (WTO, 2011).
Statistics supplied by the WTO and displayed in Table 2 show that for each decade the
percentage change in the volume of goods exported worldwide showed a positive change
with the exception of 2001 where the drop off is attributed to the dotcom crisis (WTO,
2008, p. 19).
Table 2
Annual Percentage Change in the Volume of World Merchandise Exports, 1970 – 2005
Year
1970-1980*
1980-1990*
1990-2000*
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005

Exports (% change)
5.3
3.9
6.5
-0.2
3.5
5.6
9.7
6.5

KEY: * = the average annual percentage change for that decade. World Trade
Organization (2011) International Trade Statistics 2011 online.
Through the principle of competitiveness, the WTO has become the seat for
negotiating trade agreements (Barrow-Giles, 2002). Also, Article XXIV of the WTO
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Charter has allowed for the concurrence of free trade areas and customs unions with the
WTO (Andrew cited in Barrow-Giles, 2002, p. 55). Since the formation of the WTO,
regional trade agreements in either form have become more common. The WTO (2013)
notes that 2/3 of 379 regional trade agreements in effect today, inclusive of free trade
agreements, customs unions, common markets, and economic and monetary unions, were
formed after 1995. The most notable manifestation in the region came in the form of
NAFTA (WTO, 2013), which has been attributed to the US’s first overt support for the
principle of regionalism.
Additionally, with the spread of neoliberal globalization came the homogenization
and hybridization of culture, politics, and economics (Harvey, 2005; Robinson, 2004).
Communism was no longer viewed as an effective alternative to capitalism and
democracy, making the world unipolar and bringing an end to the Cold War. It was
observed that with
…the collapse of the Berlin Wall the European bloc turned its focus inward,
deepening its integration process with the signing of the Single European Act
(SEA) and channeling its energy and resources towards the democratization,
liberalization and rebuilding of Central and Eastern Europe. The United States
also turned its interests elsewhere…most significantly to the North American
region with the signing of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).
(Thorburn & Morris, 2007, p. 25).
The regional outlook of NAFTA and the inward looking of Europe in the signing
of SEA in 1992 is said to bring with them a new wave of regionalism that “[drew] on the
experience of the European Union… [and encouraged] parallel initiatives in political
evolution and economic development and integration without engaging in a close federal
structure to achieve its objectives” (Teló, 2007, pp. xii-xiv). This, he says, paved the way
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for similar approaches to regional integration across Latin America and the Caribbean,
Africa, and Asia creating a domino effect worldwide.
Jamaica, like all other CARICOM states, faced economic challenges due to a
changing international environment starting in the late 1970s. Jamaica faced a sharp
increase in oil prices that gave rise to growing debt, budget deficits, balance of payment
deficits, an increased cost of living, and the PNP government adopting the IMF’s
Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) in order to access loans and manage debt in the
1977 (Hall, 2001; The Jamaica Gleaner, July 8, 2012). This made the IMF “an important
participant in the decision making process” in Jamaica (Barrow-Giles, 2002). So much in
fact, that the relationship between the Jamaican government, the US government, and the
IMF in the early 1980s was described as a “cozy honeymoon” (Thorburn & Morris,
2007).
Jamaica, throughout the 1980s and 1990s, adopted the IMF’s SAPs of
“liberalization of trade and reduction of tariffs; liberalization of exchange rates; reform of
public institutions; privatization of development institutions; and constrained fiscal policy
through expenditure cuts, tax reforms and the sale of public assets” (Barrow-Giles, 2002,
p. 7). The SAPs were designed to make Jamaica more open to and competitive on the
international market; however, while embracing these neoliberal principles, Jamaica
began failing the IMF performance tests by the mid-1980s because the SAPs resulted in
higher inflation rates, increased debt, and an uncertain economy because the devaluation
of currency further increased the state’s import bill while not proportionately increasing
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the state’s exports (Barrow-Giles, 2002; Harris, 1997; Thorburn & Morris, 2007).33 This
is evident in the disparity between the growth rates of Jamaica’s imports and exports with
its major trading partners (See Figures 2, 3, and 4). Jamaica also had its debt balloon to
US$4.3 billion in the 1980s (Hall, 2001). Even with these shortcomings, Jamaica has
maintained its commitment to neoliberal economics and has, in part, looked to
CARICOM to overcome them.
To ease these difficulties from international trade while embracing neoliberal
SAPs, Jamaica endorsed the 1984 Nassau Understanding. The Nassau Understanding
resolved that
… [it] essentially involves a conscious and determined shift to a new development
path to accelerate development, while adapting to major external or internal
shocks to the economic system… Heads of Government stress the cardinal
importance of revitalising intra-regional trade…In discussing the role of
CARICOM in structural adjustments, Heads of Government reaffirm the spirit of
Caribbean co-operation and solidarity which has always constituted the
foundations of the Community. (CARICOM Secretariat, 1984)
Prime Minister Edward Seaga was quoted at the Nassau Conference of the Heads of
Government as stating, “Jamaica has taken the lead in economic adjustment by devaluing
its currency, reducing budget deficits, increasing foreign exchange and eliminating price
controls…the most significant result of the Caricom meeting was a decision in principle
to apply the structural economic adjustment program at the regional level” (The Globe
and Mail, July 7, 1984). This declaration demonstrates Jamaica’s acceptance of neoliberal
principles for economic development and growth, a position that Jamaican political
scientists Diana Thorburn and Dana Marie Morris (2007) describe as “being pushed by
33

It should be noted that Jamaica was able to reduce the inflation rate from a high of 80% in 1991 to 8% in
1998. Jamaica still struggles with high debt, a falling currency, and a wide trade deficit (PIOJ, 2009). All
while continuing to ascribe to neoliberalism.
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‘the nexus’ of the IMF, World Bank and United States Agency for International
Development (USAID)” (p. 22).
Jamaica later endorsed the 1989 Grand Anse Declaration given the changes in the
international system. The declaration recognized that “the Heads of Government of the
Caribbean Community inspired by the spirit of cooperation and solidarity…need to work
expeditiously together to deepen the integration process and strengthen the Caribbean
Community…to respond to the challenges and opportunities presented by the changes in
the global economy” (CARICOM Secretariat, 1989a). The meeting communique further
clarified that “the globalisation of the world economy was creating new centres of
economic power, with states combining into large economic groupings and unified
markets” (CARICOM Secretariat, 1989b).
The International Environment’s Influence on CCJ Development.
The Neoliberal Globalization Effect. The same pattern of increased international
trade evidenced in Table 2 is true for Jamaica. Figures from the Statistical Institute of
Jamaica (STATIN) show the country’s monetary increases in imports from, and exports
to its main trading partners – the United States, the European Union (EU), and
CARICOM. It is interesting to note that imports from the US increased at a faster rate
than exports. Trade with the EU fared better for Jamaica with imports from and exports to
the EU increasing at almost the same rate. Trade with the EU increased because of the
long established colonial trade relationship between Jamaica and Britain (Barrow-Giles,
2002; Thorburn & Morris, 2007). Trade with other CARICOM members, however,
differed with exports to CARICOM states remaining stagnant and Jamaica’s import bill
from CARICOM states increasing significantly. Statistics further show the percentage
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share of exports to Jamaica’s main trading partners also increased, if only marginally (see
Figures 2, 3, and 4).
According to STATIN and the IDB, Jamaica’s share in merchandise exports to
the US under the period of investigation, started from 33% in 1985 to a high of 40% in
1998 before eventually declining to 31% in 2001 (Harris, 1997, p. 70; Jessen & Vignoles,
2005, p. 65). For the EEC/EU, the share was 24% in 1985 and ended on a high of 30% in
2001 (Harris, 1997, p. 70; Jessen & Vignoles, 2005, p. 65). CARICOM, on the other
hand, experienced a decline from 7% in 1990 to 4% in 2001 (Harris, 1997, p. 70; Jessen
& Vignoles, 2005, p. 65).
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Figure 2. Jamaica's Trade with The US in $US Millions, 1984 – 2001. Adapted from
figures from the Statistical Institute of Jamaica (STATIN) for the years 1984-2001
available on the Bank of Jamaica (BOJ) website. The exchange rates existing at the time
are used to convert to U.S. dollars.
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Figure 3. Jamaica's Trade with The EU/EEC Including The United Kingdom in $US
Millions, 1984 – 2001.Adapted from figures from the Statistical Institute of Jamaica
(STATIN) for the years 1984-2001 available on the Bank of Jamaica (BOJ) website. The
exchange rates existing at the time are used to convert to U.S. dollars.
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Figure 4. Jamaica's Trade with CARICOM in $US Millions, 1980 – 2001. Adapted from
figures from the Statistical Institute of Jamaica (STATIN) for the years 1980-2001
available on the Bank of Jamaica (BOJ) website. The exchange rates existing at the time
are used to convert to U.S dollars.
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Jamaica adapted to neoliberal globalization in the following ways. It increased
trade to and from Jamaica, but exports were not been able to keep pace with imports on
account of increased external competition in trade as Jamaica began converging with the
world economy34 (Barrow-Giles, 2002; Thorburn & Morris, 2007). In Jamaica,
convergence was made possible through the adoption of neoliberal principles. Like the
developed states that promote neoliberal capitalism, the Jamaican economy limited the
involvement of the state in the market by privatizing and divesting national industries
(Barrow-Giles, 2002; Thorburn & Morris, 2007). Further, since the late 1980s, Jamaica
has liberalized the economy by eliminating controls on its exchange rate, removing
restrictions on investment, trying to decrease inflation, and reducing tariff and non-tariff
barriers to trade (Barrow-Giles, 2002; PIOJ, 2009; Thorburn & Morris, 2007). Also,
Jamaica attempted to reduce the size of the government and its spending.
Increased competition from neoliberal globalization brought vulnerability and
volatility. Jamaica had difficulty in transitioning its manufacturing sector, which in the
1980s and early 1990s was Jamaica’s largest exporter, from an import substitution,
preferential access industry to an export-led industry (Harris, 1997). The structure of the
economy did not allow exporters to improve their competitiveness. Neoliberal policies
liberalized and opened the economy, but the local economy experienced a number of
stresses: increases in operating costs, particularly for electricity and security; minimal
resources were directed towards training and the purchase of new machinery; high
inflation; a devalued dollar; and increased risk and instability, which eroded demand for

34

Convergence occurs when more than one state’s economy become similar with respect to method of
economic organization, social policy, interest rates and so on (Black, 1997).

89

Jamaican goods (Harris, 1997). As a result, Jamaica lost more than half its market share
in exports on the global market by the end of the 1990s and a fall in manufacturing from
a high of 22% of GDP in the 1980s to just under 16% in 2001 (IDB, 2005).
For instance, Jamaica had enjoyed preferential access to the EU and the US until
the mid-1990s (Jessen & Vignoles, 2005). Since the restructuring of the global economy
both the EU and the US altered their relationship with Jamaica. As a result, Jamaica has
seen a reduction in exports in traditional exports such as bananas and sugar to the EU.
Since the removal of non-tariff barriers to the EU market, Anneke Jessen and Christopher
Vignoles (2005, p. 6) calculated that Jamaica saw an average decline of 13% in banana
exports since 1998, and an average 10% decline in sugar exports since 1994. This proves
significant since 90% of these goods are exported to the EU (Jessen & Vignoles, 2005).
For the US, they noted that Jamaica’s apparel industry lost preferential access with the
formation of NAFTA, which resulted in the rise in Mexican apparel imports to the US
(Jessen & Vignoles, 2005, p. 6). There was further decline in Jamaican apparel exports to
the US in 2005 with increased competition from Asian producers as global liberalization
continued to take hold (Jessen & Vignoles, 2005, p. 7). It is against this background I
investigate the impact of world trade on Jamaica and the CARICOM region and its
members’ decision to strengthen economic integration and design appropriate institutions
to manage its operation.
Jamaicans have viewed neoliberal globalization as promoting Caribbean regional
integration for both convergence and competition in the international economy. In 1989,
“Michael Manley had said that Jamaica must use CARICOM as an opportunity to
improve its competitiveness if it was to be able to compete with the wider world” (The
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Jamaica Gleaner, May 9, 2004). He is further quoted as saying that the “only way small
countries will advance is if they can, as rapidly as possible, get together to create a single
economy with economies of scale” (The Financial Post, August 2, 1989). The Preamble
of the RTC, signed twelve years later, was written with this in mind. It expresses that
CARICOM members recognize “that globalization and liberalization have important
implications for international competitiveness” (CARICOM Secretariat, 2001, p. 1).
Article 6§(c), (d), and (e) further states that the objectives of CARICOM are “accelerated,
co-ordinated and sustained economic development and convergence; expansion of trade
and economic relations with third States; [and] enhanced levels of international
competitiveness.”
Out of my small sample of twenty-four Jamaican members of the elite, twenty
interviewees recalled that CARICOM, in the context of globalization, was viewed a
means by which to prepare the region to better converge or trade with third countries. A
government minister asserted,
By the late 1980s the increased pace of global integration had further quickened
our [Jamaica’s] reaction in terms of deeper integration and that…was done to
meet the challenges posed by third countries…there was the recognition that
single market was needed to deepen the integration arrangement and then the
single market and economy and the treaty had to be revised to build new
institutions and create policy sets so that the community still exists. (JM13,
Interview, July 26, 2012)
Additionally, Jamaicans viewed regional integration as a means of protecting
volatile and vulnerable SIDS from the effects of increased competition in the
international environment. The preeminent Jamaican economist, Byron Blake, who was
director of economics and industry for CARICOM in 1989 expressed that “Caribbean
countries are being forced to make this move because of external factors…All these
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changes have forced Caribbean countries towards the conclusion that they will have to be
more dependent on each other, both in trade and financial matters” (Financial Times,
August 1, 1989, p. 6). In conjunction with this view, of the twenty Jamaican respondents
who viewed CARICOM as a means for preparing the region to better converge/trade with
third countries, eighteen noted that CARICOM was also used as a means of survival
given the new challenges and opportunities posed by changes in the international
economic environment. For them CARICOM was used to promote internal trade and the
honing of the region’s trading skills on a small scale before taking on the “big fish” (the
global economy) and becoming more competitive on the international stage. While
Jamaican elites viewed the effects of neoliberal globalization as prompting their decision
to strengthen regional economic integration, another international factor – the post-Cold
War/ Liberal Multilateralism – was considered.
The Post-Cold War/Liberal Multilateralism. Former Prime Minister of Jamaica,
PJ Patterson35 (2010) noted that, in general, “[one] of the apparent contradictions in the
current intense new process of globalization is the drive for deeper collaboration by
countries in close, and sometimes, not so close geographic proximity” (p.3). He further
acknowledged that in the late 1980s,
the world had changed inexorably; The Cold War had ended, [globalization]
reflected the diktat of a unipolar world [and the] magic of the market was the only
game in town…It was largely due to these and other far-reaching changes
imposed on the Caribbean, that impelled Caribbean Leaders to establish in 1989
the West Indian Commission which produced that comprehensive landmark
Report – Time For Action (Patterson, 2012, p. 16).

35

Percival James Patterson, Leader of the PNP and Prime Minister of Jamaica from 1992-2006.
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In this new unipolar world, with the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) negotiations and the formation of the WTO, it was expected
that multilateralism would replace the region’s favored bilateralism with third states.
However, the Uruguay Round negotiations offered “no sure benefits, and held a number
of serious potential threats” to the CARICOM region (West Indian Commission [WIC],
1992, p. 21). Essentially, the hindrances and duration of negotiations during the Uruguay
Round have been attributed to the increased appeal for strengthening regional economic
integration and institutions in order to achieve trade liberalization (Hall, 2003a; WIC,
1992). This led to the provision for regional trade agreements under Article XXIV, which
has influenced Jamaica’s support for enhancing CARICOM and its institutions. A senior
academic that specializes in international affairs, economics and law admits,
…Jamaica reacted, particularly from the Grand Anse Agreement, to
globalization…and the regional arrangements that have been committed or
admitted to the WTO arrangements. Jamaica sees that [CARICOM] fits into that
global model of regional arrangements that will facilitate globalization and
liberalization. (JM09, Interview, July 25, 2012)
Jamaica, as a signatory of the WTO, has significantly reduced trade tariffs and
met most of its Uruguay Round obligations, more so that other CARICOM members,
some say to its detriment (Jessen & Vignoles, 2005, p. 50). Robert Buddan (2004) noted
Jamaica went into the spin because of the fast pace of change and the high degree of
liberalization required by the WTO and other international organizations.
Consequently, Jamaicans, as well as other CARICOM member states, saw further
integration as a complement to US unilateralism and global multilateralism. Jamaican
Louise Bennett, when interviewed by the WIC on the issue in 1992, responded with
“Han’ stronger than finger…One finger kyan ketch flea” (WIC, 1992, p. 23). This

93

essentially means that if united, we as a region will be better able to face the changing
international environment.
It should be noted that global changes alone did not inspire Jamaican elites
towards regional integration. There was also the influence of powerful states and
organizations, namely the EU and the US.
EU Influence and Support. The EU has directly influenced Caribbean regional
integration. CARICOM’s use of the EU model is known as ‘extra regional echoing’
(Avery, 1973). This describes European integration as “a major stimulus for similar
endeavors in other regions and still remains the model for most integration efforts”
(Avery, 1973, p. 550). CARICOM leaders view the EU as a success and want to imitate
it. The EEC model provided a blueprint for transforming CARIFTA into CARICOM. It
was influential on CARICOM’s development because it placed primacy on economic and
functional cooperation, which was viewed as a means of overcoming political and
ideological differences (Demas, 1987).36 Given the failure of the politically-driven West
Indies Federation, Jamaica and other Anglo-Caribbean states looked for a different model
to promote the developmental strategies needed for regional and national sustainability
(Barrow-Giles, 2002; Boxill, 1997; Payne, 2008). The region looked to the Treaty of
Rome that established the EEC as a model for the Treaty of Chaguaramas, which

36

The EU, an ideologically, culturally, and economically diverse bloc, began as the six state European Coal
and Steel Community (ECSC). Its focus was to establish a common market for steel and coal in order to
prevent any future war between France and Germany (Wood and Yeşilada, 1996). It later evolved into the
European Economic Community (EEC) that extended the common market to goods, services, capital, and
labor.
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launched CARICOM.37 This model was fervently promoted by Jamaican Prime Minister
Michael Manley and the Jamaica Manufacturers Association (JMA) in the late 1960s and
early 1970s prior to the signing of the treaty (Gilbert-Roberts, 2013).
In later years, when the international environment changed, it was the creation of
a European single market under SEA that sparked debate on the development of the
CSME (Mullerleile, 1995). The Jamaica Gleaner reported that in 1989, Prime Minister
Michael Manley, a keen supporter of European integration, called for the deepening of
economic integration in order to improve Jamaica’s competitiveness. “CARICOM
became one of the first regional organizations outside of Europe to declare in favor of a
single market and economy. It was a prescient decision. Since then SMEs have become
popular goals of many regions under the concept of open regionalism” (The Jamaica
Gleaner, May 9, 2004). Manley noted that changes in the EEC gave the region a reason to
look at its own integration efforts. He stated, “The formation of a single market in Europe
in 1992 should provide us with an inescapable point to try to settle practical questions for
our own common market” (Financial Times, August 1, 1989, p. 6). Further, he argued
that the “EEC's integration would also blaze a trail for the Caribbean to have to accelerate
the parallel process of integration” (The Guardian, June 17, 1989). The CSME and other
recommendations coming from WIC were fashioned from the then EEC, namely the
establishment of a Caribbean Court of Appeal,38 a CARICOM Charter of Civil Society, a
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It should be noted that by the late 1970s and 1980s, CARICOM was described as a flawed version of the
European Economic Community (EEC). CARICOM was, and is still, considered one rung lower than the
EU. CARICOM does not have the ability to implement and enforce decisions as does the EU. Decisions
have been delayed or stalled because the mechanisms found in EEC rules were missing from the
CARICOM institutions/rules (Lewis, 2001).

38

Later renamed the Caribbean Court of Justice (CCJ).
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CARICOM Assembly of Parliamentarians, a Council of Ministers and the establishment
of a CARICOM Commission with executive responsibilities (WIC, 1992).39
The EU has further influenced the Caribbean integration process through the
negotiation process of the CARIFORUM-EU40 Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA).
The EPA acknowledges the importance of regional integration among the Caribbean
states. The proclamations page reaffirms the signatories “commitment to support the
regional integration process among CARIFORUM States, and in particular to foster
regional economic integration as a key instrument to facilitate their integration into the
world” (European Commission, 2008, p. 4). The language of the EPA ensures the
integration process by encouraging and improving its prearrangements.41
The EPA offers a break for a deeper, more even integration through the CSME
than CARICOM has been able to accomplish on its own. The Economic Commission for
Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) (2008, p. 16) said it best as it observed that
“the EPA seeks to advance the CSME process by locking in Caribbean-wide harmonized
regional policies throughout the entire Agreement.” This advancement of the CSME
increases the relevance of the CCJ as an interpreter and adjudicator of CARICOM rules
and law.
39

As previously noted, the latter was not adopted as all CARICOM agreements since its establishment rest
on the principle of economic cooperation and have not supplied pointers for developing a political unit.
40

CARIFORUM is a regional organization that includes CARICOM member states and the Dominican
Republic that negotiates aid arrangement and economic partnership agreements with the EU.
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See CARIFORUM-EU EPA articles 1 and 4. Article 1 (b) of the EPA avows its commitment to
“[promoting] regional integration, economic cooperation and good governance thus establishing and
implementing an effective, predictable and transparent regulatory framework for trade and investment
between the Parties and in the CARIFORUM region.” Article 4 (4) elaborates by declaring that “without
prejudice to the commitments undertaken in this Agreement, the pace and content of regional integration is
a matter to be determined exclusively by the CARIFORUM States in the exercise of their sovereignty and
given their current and future political ambitions.”
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The EU funded CARICOM regional integration under the Lomé Convention from
1975 to 2000. The Convention “was an international aid and trade agreement between the
[African, Caribbean and Pacific States] ACP and the European Community (EC)” with
funding coming from the European Development Fund (EDF) (CARICOM Secretariat,
2011). It was replaced with the ACP/EU Cotonou Agreement that promotes
regionalization and the integration of ACP countries into the international economy
through reciprocal trade agreements and funding from the EDF (CARICOM Secretariat,
2011). The EDF has been used to fund regional organizations such as the University of
the West Indies and is “geared towards the Caribbean as a regional unit, thereby
facilitating both formal and functional regional integration” (Mullerleile, 1995, p. 130).
The EU and CARICOM’s aid relationship is built on overcoming vulnerabilities
in the latter region’s quest to deepening economic integration while providing economic
and social development. Luis Ritto (2002) observed that between “1976 to 2000 € 353
million were allocated to regional integration and co-operation, with focus on business
and trade facilitation, the development of an integrated 3rd level education system,
transport infrastructure, tourism development, disaster preparedness, drugs control and
health” (p. 25). Between 1975 and 2012, Jamaica alone has received EDF support
towards regional integration efforts amounting to € 840 million (Delegation of the
European Union to Jamaica, Belize, The Bahamas, Turks and Caicos Islands and Cayman
Islands, n.d.). Further, the Commission of the European Union ordered a country
evaluation of their efforts in integrating Jamaica into regional and international markets.
It found that since 1993, their financial and technical interventions resulted in Jamaica’s
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economy being diversified enough to be marginally competitive at the regional and
international levels (EC, 2012, p. 180).
The EU’s 1996 Green Paper on the future of the Lomé Convention contributed to
the deepening of the CARICOM economic bloc and associated institutions, as
CARICOM had to find an alternative to the previous preferential system that was
challenged by the WTO on behalf of the US banana producers. The Green Paper,
prompted by changes in the international environment, sought to outline the EU’s
position on regional integration. It laid out the challenges the Caribbean would face if
states took on globalization and liberalization individually. It lists the marginalization of
the CARICOM region, problems managing the economic transition under the new
regime, and the formation of NAFTA as some of the main challenges the region would
face. As such, the EU sought to make “regional economic integration strategy
increasingly attractive. The main aim of integration would be to provide an economic and
trade framework that would offer step-by-step liberalization and prepare the region’s
economic operators for competition” (EC, 1996, p. 32a). This, they proposed, would be
achieved through technical and financial cooperation between the two. Therefore, EU
support would evolve from a “protection partnership” to “regional economic partnership”
(Lewis, 2008, p. 12).
A former Caribbean Ambassador to the EU and WTO asserts that “[if]
[CARICOM] wasn’t getting support from the EU it would have collapsed long ago”
(JM14, Interview, July 27, 2012). A trade specialist and former head of a Pan Caribbean
multinational company also supports this view. He stated, “The EU has been the largest
contributor to the regional integration. They have brought an awful amount of money into
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the Caribbean” (JM17, Interview, July 31, 2012). Such efforts from the EU demonstrate
that Jamaica and CARICOM cannot exist without development aid.42
US Influence and Support.US support, or lack thereof, has affected Jamaica’s
desire to deepen Caribbean economic integration and adopt regional institutions that
would promote this venture. When Jamaica experienced preferential treatment and
support from the US, desires for Caribbean integration waned. In the Cold War Era
(1953-1990), Jamaica received a lot of support from the US. The US was concerned with
the spread of communism and became interested in developing a relationship with the
newly-independent Jamaica. Under the leadership of Edward Seaga, Jamaica sought to
develop its export market and petitioned the US for a Caribbean version of the “Marshall
Plan.” It was this petition that led to the US offering its most recognizable policy of this
era – the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI), which was a unilateral policy that provided
economic assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean and laid out trade measures
between the US and the individual countries (Henke, 2000).
While the CBI restricted access to parts of the US market, Jamaica benefited from
an increase in its foreign exchange earning capacity, in investment, jobs and export
production (Barrow-Giles, 2002; Grant, 1997; Thorburn & Morris, 2007). However, US
transnational corporations (TNCs), namely Hanes and Fruit of the Loom, were the
biggest beneficiaries and experienced great surpluses to the eventual deficits garnered by
Jamaica (Barrow-Giles, 2002; Grant, 1997). The CBI strategy has been blamed in part for
stymieing Caribbean economic integration. Former Prime Minister, PJ Patterson recalled
42

EU influence and support have proven to be a double-edged sword. The EPA and gradual phasing out of
preferential access to Europe have placed CARICOM in a difficult position from which there is nothing it
can do.
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“[somewhere] in the 1980s our exports to CARICOM began to fall as Jamaicans
industrialists were told that the CARICOM market was too small to matter. They were
told to concentrate on the extra regional market and more significantly, extra-regional
imports” (Patterson, 2012, p. 20). Figure 4 demonstrates this fall in the 1980s and
statistics show that intra-regional trade fell from 13.5% in the early 1980s to 7.8% in the
early 1990s (CARICOM Secretariat, 2005, p. 117).
The CBI reduced Jamaica exports to other CARICOM states as Seaga encouraged
Jamaican manufacturers and traders to focus on the US as it meant “free entry to the
markets of the United States (with important exceptions), incentives for encouraging
investment and a sizeable increase in aid and technical assistance” (Mills, 1989, p. 162).
For instance, CBI foreign direct investment in export processing zones (EPZ) or free
zones resulted in Jamaican manufacturers increasing employment from 960 in 1983, to
14,220 in 1992 (ECLAC, 2004, p. 347). Also, foreign direct investment (FDI) for the
apparel industry saw employment increasing from “6,191 in 1982 to 28,700 in 1992”
(ECLAC, 2004, p. 347).
By the Post-Cold War Era (1990 onwards), the US was driven by new concerns
and the diminished interest towards the Anglo-Caribbean (Grant, 2000). The US had
turned its interest to the Middle East and the former Soviet bloc at the expense of
Jamaica. For instance, US$ 25 million that was earmarked for Jamaica was diverted to
Poland in 1990 (The Weekly Gleaner, May 15, 1990 cited in Mullerleile, 1995, p. 166).
Subsequently, Prime Minister Michael Manley twice visited the US to gain assurance that
aid to Jamaica and the rest of CARICOM would not be further diverted to the former
Soviet bloc (Mullerleile, 1995, p. 166).
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Jamaica also found itself losing the preferential treatment it had under the CBI.
With the introduction of NAFTA, the US’s free trade area with Mexico and Canada,
Jamaica saw a fall in US FDI for EPZs and the apparel industry. As a result, employment
at EPZs fell to 6,000 in 1998, and the apparel industry found employment decrease to less
than 6,000 in 1997 (ECLAC, 2004, p. 347). Jamaica was now viewed as a part of Latin
America and considered to be an insignificant trading partner (Sullivan, 1993). This loss
in market share resulted in Jamaica, as an individual country and as part of CARICOM,
formally asking to be listed as eligible for membership of NAFTA (Journal of
Commerce, April 18, 1994, p. 5A).
Under the Clinton Administration, the US became interested in replacing a
preferential trade agreement with trade liberalization and full reciprocity on both sides
(Grant, 2000; Maingot, 1994) under a proposed Free Trade Area of the Americas
(FTAA). During negotiations for the FTAA, the US expected Jamaica, a small
developing state, to compete equally with more developed Latin American states, such as
Brazil and Argentina. However, the CARICOM states, led by Jamaica, with a strategic
alliance with most Latin American countries stalled the 2005 talks that would have
launched the Free Trade Areas of the Americas (FTAA) given the unfair advantage the
US would gain in the region (The Jamaica Gleaner, November 4, 2005). Tony Heron
(2004), a former Research Fellow at the Caribbean Policy Research Institute (CaPRI) in
Jamaica, observed that the US used the NAFTA and FTAA processes for the “dual
process of ‘locking-in’ the neo-liberal economic reforms introduced in Latin America and
the Caribbean during the 1980s, while, at the same time, providing the US with additional
leverage in the multilateral trading arena of the GATT and post-GATT system” (p. 51).
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These circumstances led Jamaica to look to CARICOM to deepen and widen
regional economic integration in order to foster development and survival. The United
States adoption of regionalism, therefore, influenced Jamaica’s desire to do the same. The
manner of deepening economic integration came in the form of the adopted WIC
suggestions discussed earlier. At the height of the NAFTA/FTAA negotiations Prime
Minister PJ Patterson opined, “If we cannot create the single market we will hardly be
ready to participate in the hemispheric free trade area which we decided should come by
2005…We must either step up the pace now or languish forever behind” (Financial
Times, July 14, 1995, p. 4).
The regional integration efforts, however, did not translate into Jamaica
increasing its share in intra-regional exports. Instead, total and share percentage in
CARICOM exports continued to decrease. Total CARICOM exports fell from US$75
million in 1990 to US$54 million in 2001, and its share percentage fell from 7% to 4%
for the same period (See Figure 4; Jessen & Vignoles, 2005, p. 65). This is on account of
both rising local operating costs and Trinidad & Tobago’s cornering of most of the
regional market since the mid-1980s due its governments’ tax and export incentives,
which encouraged global and regional export expansion (Harris, 1997; IDB, 2005)
On the widening of regionalism, Heron (2004) noted that the Association of
Caribbean States (ACS)43 was established in 1994 as a direct response to NAFTA. It is
based on Jamaican Prime Minister Michael Manley and Venezuelan President Carlos
Andres Perez conception of a Latin American alternative when the US established the
43

The ACS includes 25 countries in Latin America and the Caribbean and provides a market of 200 million
people. It was considered the most ambitious arrangement to link Anglo and Latin Caribbean countries.
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terms of membership to NAFTA (The Jamaica Gleaner, May 9, 2004). The ACS seeks to
improve and broaden CARICOM-Latin American relations so as to increase
CARICOM’s market. Heron (2004) maintains that its significance is yet to be
determined. However, Robert Buddan (2004), Jamaican scholar Norman Girvan (2000b),
and Hall (2001) argue that the ACS was established to increase CARICOM’s bargaining
power relating to the globalization effects and the possible creation of the FTAA. Girvan
(2000b) recognized:
One of the significant developments of the 1990s was the expansion of certain
traditional regional structures in the Anglophone Caribbean to embrace nonEnglish speaking countries. The expansion of CARICOM’s membership and the
establishment of CARIFORUM and of the Association of Caribbean States (ACS)
were key institutional expressions of this trend. Expansion of regionalism
represented one of the responses to a changing external environment. (p. 1)
Based on these events, I agree that Braveboy-Wagner’s (2003) suggestion is
persuasive. She notes, during this era “the Caribbean is being forced to look inward and
the latest thrust of regional integration has not been as a result of the region’s own design,
but out of the perception of there being no other option” (Braveboy-Wagner, 2003, p. 35).
This occurred even though the expected benefits to Jamaica were not realized.
Influence and support from the US and the EU provided evidence of international
trends towards the development of regional economic blocs.
The Domino Effect. This is one of the reasons for CARICOM’s move towards
deepening its economic integration and the adoption of new institutions. Then Prime
Minister of Jamaica, Michael Manley,44 at Tenth Conference of the Heads of Government
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Michael Manley, leader of the People’s National Party (PNP) from 1969-1992 and Prime Minister of
Jamaica from 1972-1980 and 1989-1992.
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held in Grand Anse, Grenada in 1989, recognized the effects of the international
economy on CARICOM and the development of economic blocs.
Increasingly, we occupy a globalized economy…Those are the realities that are
compelling the formation of the great economic blocs which confront us, but the
mistake we would make, is to think that it is the economic blocs that are the
underlining reality. It is the globalization of the world economy that is forcing the
formation of the blocs. That is the reality. (Manley cited in Hall, 2003a, p. 84)
Jamaican scholar Kenneth Hall reported that this, the regionalization in the
Americas and Europe, in addition to globalization and liberalization renewed the
CARICOM states’ interest in regional economic integration and supporting regional
institutions. He wrote:
…regionalism seemed to have gained a new lease on life with creation of the
North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA) and the decision of the European
Economic Community (EEC) to dismantle tariffs by 1992 and create a single
market. The time for action had come… This issue compelled the
Community…to reinvent and reposition itself…The reform of the existing
institutions of the Caribbean Community and the creation of new ones to
accommodate the new trends and direction of the integration process necessitated
major institutional restructuring…In 1997, the Community took the first steps to
restructure organizations and institutions. (Hall, 2003a, pp. 28, 30, & 39)
As the Jamaican elite recognized these external factors some recalled the impact
they made in influencing their role in the creation of a regional court.
The Neoliberal Globalization Effect – A Jamaican Retrospective. By 1989,
CARICOM had reached a point where change was necessary given shifting world
circumstances and philosophies that were attributed to accelerated globalization. Hall
wrote:
[between] the time of its establishment in July 1973 and the end of the 20th
century, the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) has undergone profound change.
The transformation was proceeded from the recognition that the political and
economic philosophies that underpinned its original structure are no longer
applicable and cannot accommodate the forces released by globalization…With
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the onset of globalization, the leaders of the community understood that their
approach to international affairs and its institutions had to undergo a major
transformation. Beginning in 1989, a number of wide ranging decisions were
taken with the intention of bringing the Community into the 21st Century. But
economic difficulties by the Community in the 1980s…and the emergence of the
forces of globalization, demanded its restructuring (Hall, 2003b, pp. ix-xi).
The CCJ, along with other newly adopted institutions,45 is further described as “a product
of the drive to create institutions compatible with the new international environment in
which the community finds itself [and that these] new institutions…has (sic) in fact given
the Caribbean a new political and economic personality” (Hall, 2003b, p. 33).
As stated earlier, the sample of twenty-four Jamaican respondents argued
neoliberal globalization and its ripple effects were the main reasons for CARICOM
moving towards a proposed economic union and its supporting institution, the CCJ. In
addressing the specific events leading to the establishment of the CCJ, six of the twentyfour Jamaicans interviewed had direct influence on the movement towards an economic
union and a Caribbean regional court through writing the articles of the RTC and/or in
the capacity as head of government, government minister, or opposition representative.
Eight other respondents contributed based on interviews conducted by the WIC, and one
person contributed through his role as commissioner on the WIC.
When these fifteen were asked about whether they suggested there be a court with
original jurisdiction at this interim only five (all of whom were directly involved)
suggested such a court. They argued that with increased economic integration there
would be an increase in trade and a corresponding increase in potential disputes,
therefore, such a court was needed. A former Caribbean Ambassador to the EU and WTO
45

The Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas, the CARICOM Single Market and Economy (CSME), The Charter
of Civil Society, and Assembly of Caribbean Community of Parliamentarians.
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stated “it was absolutely essential that you had a regional court that arbitrated in disputes
that arise from time to time and that was the natural progression of any trade arrangement
that existed…that is why I view the CCJ as being so important because it structured and
formalized the arbitration process in a way it wasn’t before” (JM14, Interview, July 27,
2012). The eight interviewed by the WIC noted that they did not suggest the Court but
supported the idea. Six of this eight are a part of the economic elite. The one respondent,
who was a development economist and WIC commissioner, noted that there was
overwhelming support for a Court of Appeal with appellate and original jurisdictions by
all the heads of government when the report had initially been read to them. He/she
noted,
[the] court was really not controversial at all. None of the governments had a
problem with it…As a matter of fact the arrangements for financing the court
which would involve the CDB46 borrowing money and setting up the trust fund
was supported by everyone…They thought that the idea of Caribbean
jurisprudence was excellent. (JM24, Interview, August 16, 2012).
Essentially, this means that fourteen out of the fifteen Jamaican interviewees
acknowledged the link among neoliberal globalization, economic integration and the
development of a court with original jurisdiction. By extension, the region too supported
this position. It was later reported that the “Heads of Government underscored the
centrality of the Caribbean Court of Justice in the institutional structures of the
Community, including its importance to the successful functioning of the CARICOM
Single Market and Economy” (CARICOM Secretariat, 1999).
International Dynamics: Discussion. The evidence suggests that external
factors, particularly the international trade driven by neoliberal globalization, have played
46
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a great part in intensifying regional integration within CARICOM. Additionally, this
move towards deepening integration is an example of the influence of a powerful state
and/or organization policy on the foreign policy of smaller dependent states. This has
been in the form of the neoliberal policy endorsed by the IMF and the promotion of
regionalism driven by Western Europe and the US.
Jamaican leaders recognized the need to strengthen regionalism and adopt new
institutions as a means of competing and conforming to new economic policy regimes
and survival within and beyond the regional level. Surprisingly, even though the reason
behind this transformation is mixed, displaying features of both the bargaining and
dependency models, Jamaica is a capital importing state and heavily dependent on
foreign direct investment. Therefore, its regional policy, to some degree, will reflect the
preferences of a larger more powerful state/organization. Dependence on EU assistance,
adherence to WTO rules, the admiration for the EU, CARICOM negotiations with the EU
and the US on specific issues, and the call by larger states to negotiate with CARICOM
as a bloc as opposed to individual states were all reasons for greater integration efforts.
All these points demonstrate that Jamaica, in some instances, has sought to bargain and
act strategically so as to maximize its benefits, namely to ensure economic growth,
increase efficiency and to signal to third parties that the country was a sound investment
option. In other words, policy makers from Jamaica took the actions and promises of the
other large states and international organizations into consideration and then made
choices that reflected its self-interests as much as possible. This was mainly evident by
the manner in which Jamaica and the rest of CARICOM handled the NAFTA/FTAA
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negotiations and the outcome of the CARIFORUM-EU Economic Partnership Agreement
negotiations.
Nevertheless, external constraints due to vulnerability to economic competition
and a lack of cushioning for foreign policy mistakes, the country’s low position/influence
in the international system, and the country’s impulse to bandwagon is also
demonstrative of the dependency model. We have seen the adopted and internalized
values of the more powerful state/organization resulting in a change in the social and
political structure of the weaker state to the point that the elite in the weaker state
developed interests, perceptions and values comparable that those of the elite of the larger
more powerful state/organization (Amin, 1974; Cardoso, 1979; Frank, 1968; Galtung,
1971). The adoption of neoliberalism through the SAPS, resulted in the shared thinking
between the developed and developing states thinking. Seaga’s unwavering support for
the SAPs and his close relationship with President Reagan are indicative of this
internalization and adoption of the neoliberal view. Unlike prior Jamaican leaders, Seaga
was raised in the US during his formative years and was Harvard educated, which
provided the foundation for this unwavering support. Further, the hardline democratic
socialist stance of the PNP has been softened to one more open to free market enterprise
after Jamaica adopted the IMF’s SAPs in the late 1970s. The PNP has since espoused the
tenets of neoliberalism with no attempt to revert to its former position to the point that it
again returned to the IMF to extend funding in 2012, and has made further attempts to
limit government spending and intervention. Also, Jamaica, though it participated, had
little to no influence on the Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations that led to the
formation of the WTO and had to largely observe from the sidelines as the WTO ruled to
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end preferential treatment of ACP banana imports to the EU, a position it had to accept
(Barrow-Giles, 2002).
The discussion now moves to the regional level of analysis in order to determine
how Jamaica’s background and regional elite behavior affected its bargaining position on
the creation and structure of the CCJ.
REGIONAL DYNAMICS
Theory. The manner in which CARICOM regional institutions are created have
been explained by using the theories of neo-functionalism or liberal
intergovernmentalism. Neo-functionalism indicates that economic elites and interest
groups should lead the charge of regional integration by first competing then
collaborating with one another so as to form supranational institutions and various forms
of ‘spill overs’ (Haas, 1968; Lewis, 2002). The precondition for such action is a shift in
elite focus from national self-interest to cooperation for purely practical reasons. Spill
over is theorized as a process in which integration in one economic area carries over to
other related economic and socioeconomic areas due to the creation of new needs,
pressures, and dilemmas (Haas, 1968; Haas and Schmitter, 1964). This is owing to the
fact that the integration of one economic sector cannot be isolated, which eventually
results in states adopting similar standards and regulations across various sectors
(George, 1996).
As more sectors become integrated and regulated, the focus of various elites and
interest groups (trade unions, lobbyists, private sector representatives, and so on) will
shift from the national to regional level in order to gain influence in decisions that will
affect them. This strengthens the power of already established supranational institutions
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and creates the need for new regional institutions to address the needs and wants of these
elites. Hence, economic and socioeconomic integration would eventually create political
integration in the form of the establishment of supranational institutions (Haas, 1968;
Boxill, 1997; Schmitter, 2004), which furthers and deepens regional integration.
Liberal intergovernmentalism, to some extent, reconciles intergovernmentalism
with neo-institutionalism and the liberal theory of national preference formation in order
to provide an all-inclusive approach to studying regional integration. Like its predecessor,
liberal intergovernmentalism holds that national governments/the political elite play the
primary role in the integration process because it is these national governments’
preferences and ‘history making decisions’ (Peterson, 1995) that dictate whether or not
regional integration will be initiated or deepened. However, it maintains that a
government’s national preferences are primarily motivated by economic benefits and
local political and social pressures. Knowing its national preferences, governments will
create its substantive gains by bargaining with other member states at the regional level
(Moravcsik, 1998). A state’s bargaining power is determined by asymmetrical
interdependence and concessions that result in all members sticking to the final
agreement/commitment (Moravcsik, 1998). To maintain this commitment national
governments will create regional institutions “to delegate or pool decision-making…to
pre-commit governments to future decisions, to encourage future cooperation and to
improve future implementation of agreements” (Moravcsik, 1998, p. 73). The
institutional choice can range from intergovernmental cooperation to the transfer of
sovereignty.
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Country Background. Jamaica is considered one of the most influential member
states of CARICOM. It has been at the forefront of every attempt at regional integration
within the region.47 It has been argued influence is based on its size and current
classification (Braveboy-Wagner, 2003; CARICOM Secretariat, 1973). Jamaica is 10,991
square kilometers and has a population of approximately 2.9 million people (CIA
Factbook, 2011). CARICOM classifies it as a More Developed Country (MDC) based on
its country size, and the size and diversity of its economy (CARICOM Secretariat, 1973).
Jamaica has a mixed economy with a Gross Domestic Product (GDP) based on
purchasing-power-parity (PPP) of Int$ 23.868 Billion in 2010 (IMF, 2012). Its primary
source of income are services, manufacturing, and agriculture. It provides the largest
market within CARICOM48 and is the bloc’s largest importer of intra-regional goods and
services (CARICOM Secretariat, 2005).
Due to its status, Jamaica is the second largest contributor to CARICOM’s
regional organizations. Presently, Jamaica’s contribution to the CARICOM Secretariat
stands at 24% (Thorburn & Morris, 2007, p. 48). Additionally, its contributions to other
CARICOM organizations ranges from 23% to 29% (CARICOM Secretariat, 2005).
Jamaica alone contributed US$27 million of the US$100 million designated to the trust
fund used for the financing of the CCJ (Franklyn, 2005; Gilbert-Roberts, 2013; Payne,
2008; Pollard, 2004). Table 3 displays Jamaica’s contributions to CARICOM from the
signing of the CCJ Agreement and RTC to the launch of the CCJ.

47

See introduction to the chapter.

48

Haiti is actually the largest market with a population size of approximately 9.8 million (CIA Factbook
2013); however, CARICOM lists it as an LDC given its current lack of resources, which hinders its ability
to trade regionally. Additionally, it does not currently participate in the CSME.
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Table 3
Jamaica’s Contribution to CARICOM in Jamaican Dollars, 2001 – 2005
Year
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005

Contribution in Jamaican dollars (millions)
84.0
83.3
81.8
133.2
158.6

Note. Adapted from Jamaica’s Foreign Policy: Making the Economic Development Link
(p. 48), by D. Thorburn and D. Morris, 2007, Kingston, Jamaica: CAPRI.
There are growing questions over the fairness of Jamaica continuing its MDC
status (Hall, July 5, 2009). While Jamaica is large and its resources envied, it records the
highest debt to GDP ratio and one of the lowest GDP per capita within CARICOM.
Jamaica’s debt to GDP ratio stands at 140% and is considered one of the highest in the
world (Haughton, October 23, 2013). Jamaica saw GDP per capita PPP at Int$ 8,742.829
in 2010 (IMF, 2012). This is well below several fellow CARICOM states for the same
period. Antigua and Barbuda (Int$ 17,692.52), St Lucia (Int$ 12,390.57), and St Kitts and
Nevis (Int$ 15,870.96), which are a quarter of Jamaica’s size. They are considered Less
Developed Countries (LDCs) within CARICOM (CARICOM Secretariat, 1973; IMF,
2012), yet seem to be in better standing than Jamaica. Additionally, Jamaica has seen a
fall intra-regional exports, but it has become CARICOM’s number one intra-regional
importer. This creates a trade imbalance for the state within the economic bloc. However,
even with the shortfall in wealth and trade Jamaica is still among the four most influential
states in CARICOM (CARICOM Secretariat, 2005). The other three are Barbados,
Guyana, and Trinidad and Tobago (Braveboy-Wagner, 2003; Payne, 2008).
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Jamaica’s Regional Influence on CCJ Development. Cooperation and
collaboration has not been fully realized among various elites at the regional level. There
have been attempts at transnational ties but the links made were weak and their regional
influence limited. The Jamaican knowledge elite has established links through the
regional university – The University of the West Indies – and the political elite
collaborates through various intergovernmental meetings at the CARICOM level.
However, the economic elite has not been able to maintain regional ties. This slows the
economic integration process and its complementary institutionalization and governing
complexity.
Jamaican trade unions and economic organizations had been at the forefront of
regional integration in the 1960s and 1970s. The Jamaica Manufacturers Association
(JMA) has been credited for getting the Jamaican government to join CARIFTA,
CARICOM’s precursor, in 1968 (JMA, 2008; JM11, Interview, July 26, 2012; Payne,
2008). The local manufacturers and businessmen continued to support CARICOM at its
formation as CARIFTA had resulted in an increase in exports to all member states (JMA,
2008). However, the tide turned and the local economic elite was either ignored or
remained silent on regional integration issues. Subsequent to the formation of
CARICOM, most of the economic integration proposals have come from economists, the
UWI academia, and/or technocrats attached to the CARICOM Secretariat (Boxill, 1997;
Hall, 2001; Payne, 2008). By the time the 1980s came around, the Jamaican economic
elite had experienced stagnant trade with other CARICOM states due to hardships
associated with neoliberal globalization, high debt, and two oil crises. Their lifeline came
in the form of the Edward Seaga’s promotion of the CBI and as such, regional matters
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were of less interest to them than international trade with the US (Hall, 2001; Ramphal
2012; Payne, 2008).
The Caribbean Association of Industry and Commerce (CAIC) was one attempt at
creating a Pan Caribbean business lobby. It was once considered a good representative
and interest group for the economic elite across CARICOM in the 1980s and 1990s.49
Mullerleile (1995) recalled the CAIC as “the most important employer organization of
the Commonwealth Caribbean [that] sees itself as the training and co-ordination center of
the private sector, with special emphasis on CARICOM” (p. 71). He further outlined that
it helped exert “influence on political decisions in the region, in order to ‘seek to
influence…regional policy, in ways that help to build an environment favourable to the
growth and development of private enterprise, the improvement of regional and
intraregional trade, and the region’s social and economic integration’” (Mullerleile, 1995,
p. 72). It has weakened over time due to lack of resources.
Of the twenty-four members of the various elites interviewed, three from the
economic elite, two from the knowledge elites and one from the political elite recalled
that CAIC tried and failed to increase regional collaboration. A former head of the
Private Sector Organization of Jamaica (PSOJ) recalls “[from] the private sector we tried
to regionalize through the CAIC and that isn’t doing an awful lot and I think financing
from the member states has been one of the issues that led to its relative inactivity. It had
provided a channel through which the concerns of the private sector have within the
different countries can make their own concerns heard” (JM06, Interview, July 23, 2012).
Information on the CAIC’s possible influence on the CCJ is limited.
49

It is considered informal because it is not an official organ of CARICOM.
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Outside of the CAIC there have been a few members of the Jamaican private
sector who have attempted to build transnational ties with their CARICOM counterparts.
For instance, the Grace Kennedy Group, the largest Pan Caribbean Company within
CARICOM, has been able to acquire and/or start many businesses and financial
institutions in the Canada, US, the UK, Africa, and other CARICOM territories.
Currently, it owns and operates food retail, food manufacturing, distribution, bill payment
services, currency exchange services, financial services, remittance services, and
insurance companies in at least nine CARICOM full and associate member states (Grace
Kennedy Group, 2013).
Nonetheless, the various members of the Jamaican elite have determined that the
shortcoming in the development of transnational ties has been due to a number of
constraints. All the economic elite respondents acknowledged that they have on occasion
attended regional meetings; however, they often have to do so at their own expense,
which is not economical; hence, the high level of absenteeism at this level. A senior
executive with the JMA said that “Cost is the main reason the JMA doesn’t participate
more regionally” (JM08, Interview, July 24, 2012). Travel across the region is more
expensive and grueling than travelling to the US or the UK. Travelers may have multiple
stops before arriving to your final destination and even though you are travelling within
the bloc each stop cost the equivalent of arriving at a new international destination
(CARICOM Secretariat, 2005).
In addition to the cost of transportation and geography being recognized as a
constraint to economic and knowledge elites getting more involved at the regional level, a
lack of will (three respondents), lack of resources (two respondents), not knowing the
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proper channels (two respondents), and a lack of expertise (one respondent) were also
listed as constraints. Regarding lack of expertise, a senior executive with the JMA notes
that the organization does not have a trade specialist (JM08, Interview, July 24, 2012).
On lack of will, a trade specialist blames insularity and competition between CARICOM
states (JM17, Interview, July 31, 2012). Insularity and competition emerges on account of
CARICOM member states trading in the similar goods and services. This results in low
complementarity among CARICOM states that would help to foster spill over into other
industries, thus, diminishing the desire for elites to cooperate with one another and drive
regional integration. (Hall, 2001; Pollard, 2003; Ramphal, 2012). This is most evident in
the continued ‘trade war’ between Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago manufacturers.
These elites produce many of the same goods but continue to be at enmity with one
another due to the apparent unfair advantage Trinidad has, which are lower fuel costs and
better machinery.
Concerning not knowing the proper channels, one exporter and jurist remarked
“We just accept the [regional] rules as is…and it may be because we don’t know who is
in charge to get things [changed]…Is it MFAFT, MIIC, JEA?”50 (JM03, Interview, July
19, 2012). One respondent, an opposition member of parliament, did state that there are
no constraints but rather, “[People] are just not attracted to [regional policymaking and
associated institutions]. No desire, no attraction. It may have to do with the process of
how we got there” (JM02, Interview, July 19, 2012).

50

Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade, Ministry of Industry, Investment, and Commerce, and
Jamaica Exporters Association.
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We find that the Jamaican economic elite lack the motivation to develop
transnational ties. There is a disconnect between regional matters and the need for their
involvement. Gaining information from the private sector and proper communication
among elites across member states are major problems (Witter, 2004). The Jamaican
economic elite is under the impression that when decisions are made at this level, that
information will either not be made available or be made available long after a regional
meeting. Thus, their reduced interest. When the economic elite do attend regional
meetings their influence is still limited. This is on account of CARICOM’s formal
structure, which does not lend itself to elite participation outside of government officials
and technocrats (IDB, 2005).
Given the formal structure of CARICOM, the Jamaican government/political elite
was motivated by economic benefits and local political and social pressures, and it
spearheaded the negotiations with other CARICOM member states that determined the
institutional design of the CCJ. Once the Jamaican position was determined at the
national level,51 interstate negotiation and bargaining were conducted with the smaller
CARICOM states through The Conferences of the Heads of Government and
PREPCOM.52 Given that heads of government are influenced/informed by members of
outer circles53 to a minimal degree. The constraints of transnational interaction and
negotiations between Jamaica and the other member states reflected the relative
51

See the domestic dynamics below. In summary, the national government took recommendations from the
legal fraternity, bureaucrats, opposition, the economic elite, and the knowledge elite. They gauged these
recommendations against changes in the international environment, the potential benefits of establishing a
regional enforcement mechanism to ensure the country’s economic gains, and to a lesser degree, mass
perceptions.

52
53

A group of Attorneys-General that outlined the structure and design of the CCJ.
Economic and knowledge elites.
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bargaining power of member states and their desire to overcome shared problems (See
Figure 5).
Through the Conference of the Heads of Government mechanism, Kenny
Anthony, former Prime Minister of St Lucia and the Grenadines, recalls that in 1997,
the governments of Jamaica and Barbados proposed that what was then styled the
‘Caribbean Supreme Court’ be renamed the Caribbean Court of Justice in
recognition of the fact at the court would be invested with both an original and
appellate jurisdiction. In effect, then, Jamaica has been intimately involved with
shaping of the court as an institution from the very beginning and at very
fundamental levels (Anthony cited in Franklyn, 2005, p. 283).
The name change was adopted by political leaders at the Nineteenth Conference of the
Heads of Government held in St Lucia and the Grenadines in 1998 (CARICOM
Secretariat, 1998). Even though the WIC suggested a regional court with both
jurisdictions in 1992, drafts for the Caribbean Supreme Court previously focused on the
appellate jurisdiction. The name change and the adoption of an original jurisdiction found
its way into the subsequent 1998 draft CCJ agreement (Pollard, 2004). Changes to the
agreement (1) reflected the name change (Article III § 5); (2) clearly expressed that there
are two jurisdictions (Article III § 1a and 1b) and outlined the role and operation of each
jurisdiction (Original Jurisdiction – Part II [Articles XI – XXIV] and Appellate
Jurisdiction – Part III [Article XV]); and (3) the need for judges to have background in
international law, particularly international trade law (Article IV § 1).

118

119

Details of the substantive bargaining, that is the potential concessions and/or
threats among the CARICOM states, could not be determined due to the denial of access
to the minutes of the Conferences of the Heads of Government. However, the degree of
influence from the Jamaican government cannot be denied given that the suggestion
made by it and Barbados was unanimously voted for by the Conference, (Boxill, 1997;
Gilbert-Roberts, 2013; Lewis, 2002; Payne, 1980; Payne, 2008). The bargaining did lead
to a new institutional choice of a regional court that would not only oversee the region’s
criminal and civil cases, but one that would interpret and enforce the RTC.
Concerning Preparatory Committee on the Caribbean Court of Justice
(PREPCOM), Jamaica again dominated. PREPCOM membership consisted of six out of
the fifteen member states of CARICOM – Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, Barbados,
Guyana, St Kitts and Nevis, and St Lucia and the Grenadines. The former four states are
designated as MDCs, while the latter two are considered LDCs. As a consequence, one
calculates that the larger and/or wealthier states had an approximate sixty-seven percent
influence on the CCJ structure. Jamaica held the Deputy Chair position on this committee
and oversaw a number of the drafts when the Chair was unable to attend committee
meetings.54 Accessibility to these drafts was denied, which limits my ability to more
precisely determine the substantive bargaining and more specifically Jamaica’s influence
in these meetings. However, the degree of influence from Jamaica has been recognized
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In a parliamentary speech on May 9, 2003 then Attorney General of Jamaica, A.J. Nicholson, noted that
the agreement establishing the CCJ went through eight drafts (Nicholson in Franklyn, 2005, p. 223).
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because eighty percent of the CCJ Agreement reflected the submissions provided by the
Jamaican elites (Pollard, 2004).55
It is suggested that there was general collaboration and healthy debate among the
PREPCOM representatives on what the final structure of the CCJ should be (Pollard,
2004). Duke Pollard (2004, p. 38) remarked that PREPCOM took an inclusive approach
to the development of the Agreement establishing the CCJ. A member of PREPCOM
supported that point stating, “Jamaica was the deputy chair of the preparatory committee.
Barbados was the chair…The other AGs on the committee were from Guyana, Trinidad
and Tobago, St Kitts Nevis, St Lucia and Barbados. We all learnt a lot from each other
and talked it out…It [the final structure of the Agreement establishing the CCJ] was the
idea of all of us within PREPCOM” (JM18, Interview, July 31, 2012). But given that
most of the suggestions from Jamaica ended up in the final document, the inclusive
argument seems illusive. Inclusiveness should have amounted to a more balanced
document that reflected a more equal representation from both MDC and LDC
representatives.
Regional Dynamics: Discussion. Neo-functionalism maintains that the economic
elite and interest groups should be at the center of regional integration process. However,
if neo-functionalism on its own was to have explained negotiations and bargaining
surrounding the development of new institutions there should have been the opening up
of the regional arena to all types of elites. It was expected that transnational ties between
Jamaican and other member state’s economic and knowledge elites would develop as
they become more aware of regional rules and compete and coordinate with one another
55

For the specific suggestions provided by the Jamaican elite refer to Table 6.
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resulting in “incremental [and strategic] economic reform along the line of least
resistance” (Hooghe & Marks, 2008, p. 4). However, while this was true for the Jamaican
knowledge elite, who had established links through the regional university – The
University of the West Indies, this was not so true for the economic elite. There were
attempts at transnational ties, but the links were weak and their regional influence was
limited. Therefore, liberal intergovernmentalism is the superior theory in explaining
Jamaica’s path towards greater integration with other CARICOM member states and the
establishment of the CCJ. National preference formation, interstate negotiation and
bargaining, and Jamaica’s reasons for/against a move towards the transfer of sovereignty
to a regional organization (the CCJ) can be traced through the available documentation.
Jamaica’s high degree of influence is on account of its size. Its size accounts for
the state’s ability to train and secure skilled personnel who would help to develop,
promote, and provide alternative proposals for the development and structure of the CCJ
(Braveboy-Wagner, 2003; Buddan, 2001). Conclusively, the greater the expertise and
experience of the personnel, the more powerful and influential the state. This increases
the state’s likelihood of participating in and influencing regional negotiations and
bargaining.
Smaller states would be faced with a narrow range of institutions and more
centralized governments (Buddan, 2001). Consequently, these states would be less likely
to offer resources and services that would provide the experience and expertise needed to
provide the best proposals for the CCJ’s institutional design. The experience and
expertise would be limited to a few persons within the central government or would have
likely migrated to other foreign countries where they would be better compensated.
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Therefore, the LDCs may be more dependent on an external actor, in the form of
Jamaica, “to supplement…and compensate for their relative incapacity” (Buddan, 2001,
p. 15). One interviewee spoke about the differences in skill and expertise between
Jamaica and the smaller Eastern Caribbean countries. A former head of the JMA stated
“we try to give [small Eastern Caribbean countries] ideas because Jamaica has gone
through things…They are a few years behind us, not necessarily economically but their
government agencies are behind. And when you go down to those countries to do
business you show them what we have done and help them to avoid some of the problems
we have had” (JM20, Interview, August 8, 2012).
An added explanation for Jamaica’s high degree of influence at the Conferences
and PREPCOM may be on account of its domestic politics. Throughout this whole
process Jamaica had single party majority governments. This meant that the political
leadership and its agents were very powerful given the security their party held locally.
This would have translated into their aggressiveness during regional negotiations. This is
discussed further in the domestic dynamics section of below.
In sum, Jamaica’s large allotted CARICOM contributions to CARICOM, its
designated economic status, its large size, domestic politics, and the Eastern Caribbean’s
dependence on the Jamaican market (CARICOM Secretariat, 2005) are determining
factors that result in the country’s high degree of influence on decisions made affecting
all CARICOM member states. This confirms Jacqueline Anne Braveboy-Wagner’s
(2003, p. 45) observation that “within the region, relative size (Jamaica) and wealth
(Trinidad and Tobago) are significant: they translate into greater regional influence, and
the assumption of strong global and hemispheric roles on behalf of the region.”
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The discussion now moves to the domestic level of analysis in order to explain
how Jamaica’s local elites’ negotiations and bargaining defined national preference on
the structure of the CCJ.
DOMESTIC DYNAMICS OF REGIONAL INTEGRATION
Theory. Domestic dynamics involve the interaction between the state and society.
Neither is mutually exclusive, and events and actions in one dimension will affect the
other. The state addresses the laws and policies formulated, the structure of government,
and the politicians that manage the state. The society addresses the rights and
opportunities citizens garner based on the demands they make on the state. Society entails
civil society and individual participation and influence. Civil society is a set of
associations people create and act through the public sphere outside of the household. It
acts as “a sphere of action that is independent of the state and is the counterweight to the
state” (Buddan, 2001, p. 107).
Democracy, defined as a system “for arriving at political decisions in which
individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the
people’s vote” (Schumpeter, 1947, p. 269), provides the political system with the rules of
the game that structure behavior and interaction among human beings. In the context of
the Anglo-Caribbean, democracy is practiced through the Westminster Parliamentary
Model (Verney, 1959).
The main features of the Westminster parliamentary system consists of the
following: the role of the head of state is separate from that of the head of government,
the executive is drawn from the assembly and is directly responsible to it, and the leader
of the party that commands the support of government becomes the Prime Minister and
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forms the government (Derbyshire & Derbyshire, 1991). The main principle that governs
the system is parliamentary supremacy and sovereignty.
In the Westminster system, citizens using individual action or civil society may
influence state policy through three avenues. The first avenue is through their local
member of parliament (Derbyshire & Derbyshire, 1991; Shugart & Carey, 1992; Weaver
& Rockman, 1993). The second avenue is by way of the state bureaucracy. The third
avenue is via the executive (Sartori, 1994; Weaver & Rockman, 1993). However, given
the executive dominance associated with the parliamentary system, a citizen or group
would effectively try to approach the cabinet members in the first instance (Derbyshire &
Derbyshire, 1991).
The effectiveness of a civil society group in affecting policy via the above
avenues depends on three factors – civil society’s organization, its values, and the
environment (Association of Development Agencies [ADA], 2006; Witter, 2004).
Organization relates to the group’s composition, size, stability, and resources. Values
reflect whether an interest group practices and promotes democracy and tolerance, is
accommodating, and can organize others around the same issues (Putnam, 1993). The
environment covers the political, social, and economic culture and circumstance of a
country and the established relationship between civil society and government. Policy
will, therefore, be affected by the domestic political, economic, socio-cultural elites and
the public.
Effectiveness is further determined by the structure, form, and mode of the
relationship between state and citizen. According Michael Witter (2004, p. 7), structure is
the “set of arrangements for facilitating participation… [that are] not left to chance or to
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ad hoc personal contacts.” These arrangements are made through contracts signed
between the state and the civil society group, public bodies that consist of both the state
and civil society representatives, and/or the state assigning an official to oversee
coordination between the two groups. Form is the process by which the arrangement is
carried out (Witter, 2004). This includes but is not limited to civil society’s recurring
meetings with and regular consultations from state officials and the submission of reports
to the state and the media. Mode is the “type of participation… [that ranges] from passive
observation to active voting on decisions” (Witter, 2004, p. 7-8). It also includes offering
expert advice.
Background. In the Jamaican context, the relationship between the state and civil
society is affected by two conditions – the condition of colonization and the condition of
slavery. The condition of colonization refers to the historical fact that Jamaica had been
governed by and in the interest of a mother country and not for the local people (BarrowGiles, 2002; Buddan, 2001; Johnson, 2011; Mills, 1997; Ryan, 1999). The condition of
slavery is the degree to which the legacy of slavery had undermined the conditions for a
free and politically active society (Barrow-Giles, 2002; Buddan, 2001; Johnson, 2011).
The condition of colonization saw Jamaica adopting a form of the Westminster
parliamentary system called the Whitehall model.56 In conjunction with the legacy of a
Crown Colony Government (CCG) it produced limited representation with authoritarian
and anti-democratic features in the form of charismatic leadership and Caribbean styled
patronage politics (Buddan, 2001; Barrow-Giles, 2002; Munroe, 1999; Ryan, 1999). It
56

It contained all of the features of the British parliamentary system but also included a written
constitution, an official Leader of the Opposition, the nomination of Senators to the Senate and a Bill of
Rights that constrains parliament (Mills, 1997; Ryan, 1999).
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further used a single-member district plurality (SMP) electoral formula that results in the
“candidate who receives the most votes, whether a majority or plurality, [being] elected”
(Lijphart, 1999, p. 146). This led to a stable two party system and produced single party
majority governments (Barrow-Giles & Joseph, 2006; Emmanuel, 1992). During the
period of investigation, governments in Jamaica tended to be majorities from one
political party or the other.
Table 4
Electoral Outcomes in Jamaica from 1980 – 2002
Year

Political Party

1980

JLP
PNP
JLP
PNP
JLP
PNP
JLP
PNP
JLP
PNP
JLP
PNP

198357
1989
1993
1997
2002

Number of Seats Won in the
House of Representatives
(T=60 seats)
51
9
60
15
45
8
52
10
50
26
34

Percentage of Seats Won in
the House of Representatives
(T=100%)
85
15
100
25
75
13
87
17
83
43
57

Note. Adapted from General Elections & Voting in the English-Speaking Caribbean 1992
– 2005, (pp. 115-116), by C. Barrow-Giles and T. Joseph, 2006, Kingston, Jamaica: Ian
Randle Publishers.
However, the public has still been able to influence governmental decisions due to
the country’s relative small size (Munroe, 1999; Witter, 2004). Political elites are in
regular contact with the public through numerous formal and informal familial and social
circumstances. Additionally, Jamaica is known for its “proliferation of Talk Shows on
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The PNP did not contest this election.
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radio and television, [from which] leaders are forced to hear the voices of citizens
throughout the day” (Witter, 2004, p. 10; Johnson, 2011; Munroe, 1999).
Whether or not they listen to the public rests largely on the political elite’s
discretion. It was found that between the period of emancipation and the start of the
nationalist movement in the 1930’s, Jamaican society was paternalistic (Taylor, 1999).
Persons identified with their immediate locality and paid no attention to, had little
knowledge of, and seldom spoke about politics. They also did not have the ability to
influence policy. There was low black self-esteem, deference to leaders, and the
acceptance of white authority and colonial/Eurocentric values (Buddan, 2001). During
the nationalist period to the 1960s, there was the rising middle class, the promotion of
Caribbean and Jamaican identities, and the growth of local power through the founding of
new political parties, the establishment of trade unions, and the acquisition of voting
rights that led the movement towards self-government. The foreign interest political elite
continued to ignore the public but negotiated and collaborated with the newly-formed
local political parties and labor unions so as to maintain order within the Jamaican society
(Johnson, 2011; Witter, 2004). Any protest was coordinated by the political parties and
labor unions. In recent years, however, when the public is ignored and it has resulted in
civil unrest. Since the late 1980s the Jamaican public has been more active in affecting
policy. The most notable instance was the April 1999 gas riots that spread across the
country after Prime Minister PJ Patterson announced a 31% increase on the price of
gasoline (The Jamaica Gleaner, April 28, 2009).58
58

The Prime Minister was initially defiant and suggested that there would be no rolling back of the tax;
however, he had to backtrack when the people would not let up in their protest. It was only when he
established a committee consisting of the business elite and other civil society members that the disquiet

128

Jamaican civil society has been identified as professional organizations, trade
unions, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), academia, religious organizations, the
private sector, political parties and community-based organizations (ADA, 2006; Buddan,
2001; Johnson, 2011; Witter, 2004). The Jamaican civil society saw its genesis with the
end of slavery and the establishment of free villages by Jamaican Baptist and Moravian
missionaries without the assistance of and with hostility from the Jamaican state (ADA,
2006; Buddan 2001; Johnson, 2011; Witter, 2004). With free villages came the
development of professional associations to organize and train professional, commercial,
industrial, and agricultural workers (ADA, 2006; Buddan, 2001; Johnson, 2011; Witter,
2004).
By the nationalist period, civil society groups found purpose in constructing a
new order towards self-government. They became more politically oriented, which later
blurred the lines between the state and civil society. To begin, trade unions took on a
political character by becoming arms of the political parties in the 1950s.59 Second,
through Norman Manley, leader of the PNP, with support from the private sector, who
formed numerous volunteer and civic organizations under Jamaica Welfare in 1937,
which later became a government-owned entity (ADA, 2006).

ended. The committee made recommendations on how to lower the tax increase and resolve the impasse
(The Jamaica Gleaner, April 28, 2009; Johnson, 2011; Witter, 2004). It is from this experience that the
modern Jamaican political elite has aimed at balancing its authoritarian tendencies with greater
participation from the public.
59

Trade unions (The Bustamante Industrial Trade Union (BITU) in 1938, The Trade Union Congress
(TUC) in 1942, and The National Workers Union (NWU) in 1952) and political parties (The People’s
National Party (PNP) in 1938 and The Jamaica Labour Party (JLP) in 1943) arose due to social unrest in
the country. The BITU, established in the 1938, was headed by Alexander Bustamante, who was also
leader of the JLP. The NWU was formed by the PNP to counter the BITU in 1952 (ADA, 2006; Johnson,
2011).
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In the post-independence era, particularly in the 1970s under the PNP’s center-left
democratic socialist government, Jamaica saw many civil society groups being funded by
the state (Barrow-Giles, 2002; Buddan, 2001). The late 1980s saw a fall in state funding
to civil society groups with the introduction of SAPs. This led to a rise in groups seeking
to challenge the state on the negative effects of these SAPs on welfare and development
as well as a rise in independent groups that focused on post materialist issues such as
democracy, human rights, women rights and environmental issues (ADA, 2006; Buddan,
2001; Johnson, 2011; Witter, 2004).
With this history, the relationship between civil society and the state in Jamaica
can best be described as swinging between eras of cooperation and conflict. The 1960s
and 1970s saw more cooperation and the blurring of the lines between the two. By the
1980s the decline in financial support from the state saw less collaboration and more
conflict as civil society began to challenge the state’s handling of the economy under its
voluntary adoption of the tenets of neoliberalism. The 1990s saw the re-emergence of
collaboration between some interest groups and the state, which Michael Witter (2004, p.
14) attributes to government’s recognition of “the legitimate role of civil society as a
partner in governance, in large part because of its regional and international
commitments” (p. 14). This essentially demonstrates that Jamaican political leaders and
civil society do not interact in a vacuum as their interactions are also affected by foreign
commitments and adopted foreign worldviews.
Domestic Elite Influence.
Political Elite Influence. My research shows that both political parties in Jamaica,
which are located close to the center moderately to strongly favored regional integration
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and its supporting institutions. Six members of the right of center party, the Jamaica
Labour Party (JLP),60 and four members from the left of center party, the People’s
National Party (PNP),61 were interviewed. It was found that all members of the PNP
supported further economic integration and the CCJ wholeheartedly (both the original
and appellate jurisdictions), while three of the six from JLP members rejected further
economic integration. All six JLP respondents supported the CCJ’s original jurisdiction
but not its appellate jurisdiction. Hence, the court of original jurisdiction is supported by
both parties and they all see great potential for this court as it begins to hear more cases in
this jurisdiction.
The left of center political party has supported regional integration and its
institutions more than the right of center party; however, this did not entirely prove the
cleavage theory of party positions on integration. The expected vast differences between
various types of parties and ideologies on the issue of regional integration, as seen in
Europe, are negligible in Jamaica. Also, it should be mentioned that given that the centerleft PNP had been in power for the development stages and establishment of the CCJ
(1989-2005), the position of government remained consistent during that time and any
objections from the center-right JLP did not hinder the effort to any significant degree
(See Table 4). Governments in Jamaica tend to consist of single party majorities. Thus,
the political leadership wields a lot of power in policymaking given this majority and the
security garnered in the individual leader’s position within his/her party.

60

The Jamaica Labour Party (JLP), which also espouses welfarism, is more conservative in its approach
and is representative of a right of center political party.

61

The People’s National Party (PNP), built on the ideals of social democracy, is representative of the left of
center political party.
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My research suggests that the greater ideological influence on the
individual/government is the ideology of nationalism (largely espoused by the JLP)
versus the ideology of regionalism (largely espoused by the PNP). These two ideologies
are not mutually exclusive. According to Ian Boxill (1997, p. 29), an ideology of
regionalism will allow for the “commonality of perception, explanation and action in
relation to regional integration among the people of the region.” It will exist when there is
a strong sense of community among the participants due to a perceived regional identity,
and when the action towards and explanation for regional integration is identical for said
participants. Such an ideology will shape the political, economic and social institutions
necessary to perpetuate regional integration while establishing a process that will
disseminate ideas, beliefs, attitudes and values to support the integration process.
The ideology of nationalism promotes a distinct identity and social differentiation
and tends to exist when there is limited interaction and divergent economic goals and
political systems with other states. Nationalism is inwardly directed. An ideology of
nationalism will resist anything that tries to rise above the power and authority of a state.
It does so by setting restrictions on the development of supranational organizations and a
regional identity. It seeks to limit supranational institutions so that there is very little
intervention in how a state exercises its sovereignty (Bolles, 1963; Kacowicz, 1998). The
ideology of nationalism and the ideology of regionalism will always coexist, but that
which is most dominant is dependent on the actions of the political elite because they are
the source of ideation and ideology. The ideology to which they throw their greatest
support will be the dominant ideology.
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In this sense, historical events (such as the failure of the West Indies Federation)
and a leader’s attachment to and affection for other CARICOM countries have dictated
party position on regional integration and its institutions. There is no formal position on
integration in the parties’ manifestoes or other official documents. It stems from the
position held by the founder of each party and said position has been carried down to
each new leader. Norman Manley, founder of the PNP, was one of the main Caribbean
negotiators during consultations between the British Government and the new and
emerging Caribbean leaders. These negotiations produced the federal formula named the
West Indies Federation. Norman Manley stated the Federation was “the shortest road to
our political ambition of nationhood in the West Indies” (Mordecai, 1968, p. 42).
Alexander Bustamante, founder of the JLP and an agitator for self-government
prior to the establishment of the Federation, stated that the Caribbean colonies were given
a federation instead of self-government, which they advocated for, and as such it was
doomed to failure (Padmore 1997, pp. 6-7). Bustamante later played upon Jamaica’s
isolation from the rest of the Anglo-Caribbean and campaigned for Jamaica’s withdrawal
from the West Indies Federation, while Manley believed and hoped Jamaicans would
continue to support the Federation. This resulted in a highly politicized referendum in
1961 that led to Jamaica leaving the West Indies Federation. The final results saw 54% of
the votes supporting withdrawal and 46% wanted to remain in the Federation (Neita, June
23, 2011; The Jamaica Gleaner, June 14, 2000).
Since this era, subsequent party leaders and senior party members have continued
along the trend of the parties’ founders. All of the PNP party leaders have continuously
supported strengthening regional integration. Jamaican political scientist Terri-Anne
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Gilbert-Roberts (2013, p. 231) noted that PNP leaders “Norman Manley, Michael
Manley, and PJ Patterson are among those counted as stalwarts of the integration
movement.” Michael Manley, one of the founders of CARICOM, had been described as
being one of the biggest advocates among the Anglo-Caribbean political leaders for the
common market proposal that would later transform CARIFTA into CARICOM in 1973
(Gilbert-Roberts, 2013; Payne, 2008). Additionally, he is credited as being a part of the
new wave of interest with his re-election to Prime Minister in 1989. It is recorded that he
had “pledged once more to involve Jamaica more fully in the activities of the region”
(Payne, 2008, p. 263).
PJ Patterson, PNP leader and Prime Minister during the CCJ negotiations and
establishment, pushed fervently for its ratification in the Jamaican parliament as a show
of Caribbean unity and the removal the last vestiges of the colonialism (Franklyn, 2005;
Ryan, 2001). The current PNP leader and Prime Minister, Portia Simpson Miller,
continues to reaffirm Jamaica’s commitment to CARICOM and has had her government
table legislation to have the CCJ’s appellate jurisdiction ratified (The Jamaica Gleaner,
October 28, 2013).
JLP leaders, on the other hand, have more often than not called for Jamaica to go
on its own or limit the power of CARICOM’s supranational institutions. With Seaga,
“[the] region was left with no doubt that during the 1980s CARICOM matters were a
much lower priority in Kingston than the question of Jamaica’s dealings with
Washington” (Payne, 2008, p. 259). Additionally, as JLP leader and Prime Minister, he
fought other proposals that sought to integrate regional security and health and establish a
regional parliament (Payne, 2008, p. 262). By the 1990s and 2000s, Seaga was an ardent
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opponent against CARICOM moving towards an economic union that would become a
reality under the full realization of the CSME. He proposed that CARICOM adopt
strategies that would result in economic cooperation as opposed to economic integration
so as to restrict CARICOM’s influence over Jamaica’s economic policy (Gilbert-Roberts,
2013; Seaga, 2004, 2006). Recently, Gregory Mair, Opposition Spokesman on Industry,
Commerce and Energy, has stated that “[p]robably we should start putting Jamaica
first…this arrangement with CARICOM, what has been the advantage, the benefit for the
people of Jamaica?” (The Jamaica Gleaner, April 23, 2012). The current leader of the
JLP, Andrew Holness, has stated he did not believe Jamaica’s economic interests were
being served by CARICOM and supported his spokesman’s call for a temporary
withdrawal from the economic integration pillar of CARICOM (The Jamaica Gleaner,
August 2, 2013).
An even more pronounced determinant than the ideologies of nationalism and
regionalism is the influence of partisanship. It is the party leader’s position on the issue
that dictates the stance of the party. This is on account of the high discipline associated
with political parties in parliamentary systems. This feeds into the ongoing opposition for
the sake of opposition, which dictates Caribbean politics. Jamaica is known for its
political tribalism that divides both government and society into two camps under the
auspices of the PNP and JLP. This undermines trust between the camps and solidifies
divisiveness in the country, which further frustrates long-term policy development and
continuity when there is a change in government (Anderson-Manley, April 23, 2007).
On occasion, even when parties agree on a policy direction, the opposition party
will resist said policy; however, once this party regains power it will ‘reimagine’ it and
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present it as its own. One jurist criticized the political parties because “[when] one party
is in power they are pushing the CCJ as a good thing but once they are out of power they
say something different and I think that is the type of intellectual dishonesty that needs to
come out and especially where you have strong tribal politics” (JM03, Interview, July 19,
2012). A senior JLP member and jurist extends this view to include all CARICOM
member states. He/she notes “that the fierce competition amongst political forces have
been a hindrance to the development of the CARICOM region. Politicians unfortunately
behave like dons. They want their own turf and a lot that could be accomplished have
been hindered because one country is of the view that we’re not going to do that” (JM07,
Interview, July 24, 2012).
A prime example of this is that both parties supported the idea of a Caribbean
Court throughout different times in history. One junior academic with a specialization in
Caribbean politics remarked,
Hugh Shearer62 in 1970, Prime Minister of Jamaica, proposed something like a
CCJ that would have been consistent with the development of regionalism
and…settle disputes at the Caribbean level. By 1974, Seaga became leader of the
JLP and…The idea sort of fell away, ironically, at a time when CARICOM was
formed because the JLP’s position was that the CCJ was a way of returning to
federation through the back door. And, that phrase “federation through the back
door” became a consistent phrase used by the JLP right up to the end of Seaga’s
period. (JM01, Interview, July 17, 2012)
However, by the 1987, Seaga was one of the first prime ministers who supported
Trinidad’s pitch for a Caribbean Court of Appeal (Payne, 2008, p. 262). As the
opposition throughout the 1990s and the early 2000s, he reverted to his original position
and became an ardent opponent of the Court on the bases of Jamaica’s economic
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Leader of the JLP from 1967- 1973 and Prime Minister of Jamaica from 1967-1972.
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uncertainty, the potential lack of independence of the Court, and the desire to remain with
the Privy Council (Payne, 2008; Ryan, 2001; Seaga, 2004).
In all, the idea that ideological cleavages predict policy is modest as best. It is
more a matter of degree than a black and white scenario. The explanation is more
complex and less stark. While it is more obvious that one party throughout its history is
more nationalist and the other maintained a more regional outlook, I found that the
political parties’ disagreement on furthering regional integration rests largely on
partisanship. What you have is grandstanding, the pursuit of ambitions, and the desire to
win votes that politicizes issues to suit the party. This feeds into the political party, in this
case the JLP, playing up nationalism for political ends and downplaying the Caribbean as
an identity among its allies. This results in a lack of support among followers for the
strengthening or establishment of more supranational institutions that would further tie
Jamaica to other CARICOM states. For them, CARICOM acts as a secondary factor in
Jamaica’s development.
The opposite is also true as the other political party, the PNP, plays up
regionalism for political and economic ends because it believes that through a closer
political and economic union Jamaica can best serve its citizens. For them, CARICOM
does act in a secondary role but complements the national agenda. Thus, interest in the
CCJ and regional integration remains positive, but staggered, and is based on the
discretion of the party leader and his/her influence over others in pursuit of this agenda.
Economic Elite Influence. The economic elite should be among the key
stakeholders as early preferences towards CARICOM were largely economic. By
extension, this ought to have improved the organization of and the unity of mind among
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all economic elites, which would have led to their greater influence on the political elite
towards furthering economic integration; however, this did not occur in its entirety. As
previously revealed, economic elite groups influenced Jamaica into joining CARIFTA
and many local businessmen supported the formation of CARICOM (JMA, 2008; JM11,
Interview, July 26, 2012; Payne, 2008). However, by the 1980s, the tide turned and the
local economic elite remained silent on regional integration issues. To this effect, a
member of the opposition and former foreign affairs and foreign trade minister argued
that during the development of the CCJ in the late 1990’s there was “[no] collaboration
with any economic or sociocultural elite. There were outside collaborations with a few
politicians talking to the legal fraternity…there was this informal [opposition] committee
set up [to review the proposed CCJ]” (JM05, Interview, July 20, 2012). A trade specialist
and former head of a Pan Caribbean multinational company agreed as he/she recalls, “I
worked for two years with the Attorney-General and his CCJ committee. I stayed the
whole two years and I was the only private sector member on it” (JM17, Interview, July
31, 2012).
As previously disclosed the lack of economic elite involvement in regional
integration has been a result of neoliberal policies under Seaga and the corresponding
changes in the international environment. This changed the composition of the group.
Jamaica, like the rest of the CARICOM region,63 became saturated with merchants and
traders as opposed to industrialists, manufacturers, and producers. A senior academic
who specializes in Caribbean politics and integration observed that the “economic elite
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that has the most influence is not the productive elite but the merchant elite, the ones that
import. A lot of the protectionisms come from there” (JM22, Interview, August 16,
2012). One manufacturer and former government official recalled that under the WTO
Agreement,
…the fledgling producer has to compete with a producer from a first world
country…and it was more competitive. So, the local manufacturer had to go out
of business and…went into the business of importing. And, once they saw where
it was more lucrative to import and get rid of all the hassles with machines…more
people followed and the manufacturing community just shrank… it was 22% of
GDP at one stage and now is just around 12%. (JM19, Interview, August 2, 2012)
Jamaica’s interest in Caribbean integration was maintained through the few local Pan
Caribbean manufacturing businesses that remained and the subsidiaries of other
CARICOM multinational corporations (McDonald, 2005; Pollard, 2004). A senior
academic of international business opines, “if you didn’t have the Grace Kennedys,64 the
Goddard Group,65 the Neal and Massys,66 and have these people doing things and getting
things integrated, nothing is going to happen” (JM21, Interview, August 15, 2012).
Consequently, the majority of the local economic elite did not exert much
influence on national government representatives (the political elite) in support for
greater regional economic integration, with the exception of large Pan Caribbean
economic elites, until they experienced losses or increased competition in international
and traditional markets.67 Members of the Jamaican economic elite sought to take
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GraceKennedy is a Jamaican owned Multinational Corporation. It is the largest of its kind in the
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The Goddard Enterprises Limited is a Barbadian owned Multinational Corporation.
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advantage of the market that garnered the greater economic gains, which at the time was
primarily the US market (McDonald, 2005). This dynamic divided the economic elite
forming the outward focused economic elite, which primarily consists of merchants and
traders, and the inward focused or Pan Caribbean economic elite, which is composed
principally of Jamaican manufacturers and CARICOM multinational corporations (JM19,
Interview, August 2, 2012; McDonald, 2005). As trade patterns changed for the worse in
traditional markets, the outward focused economic elite did aggressively turn their
attention to the already established regional market they had ignored. This was done in
order to realize the greatest possible returns. They supported the establishment of new
regional institutions that favored their economic goals and protected their interests.
This support, however, was less in the form of direct involvement in the
development of the CCJ’s original jurisdiction,68 but more in indirect support for its role.
The Jamaica Observer conveyed that “[the] business sector said it fully supported the
regional Caribbean Court of Justice (CCJ) as a trade court, except for a minor concern
over the issue of interpretation that it said could undermine the role of the court” (Henry,
March 27, 2005). It also included a statement from the PSOJ that declares
[as] business, we require foreseeability and credibility in a regional justice
system, which will seek to safeguard our rights and uphold our responsibilities as
laid out in the Treaty of Chaguaramas…The court…was essential to the
furtherance of the objectives of the Treaty of Chaguaramas and, in particular, the
development of the CSME as a purveyor of important benefits and advantages to
businesses throughout the region. (Henry, March 27, 2005)
Knowledge Elite Influence. The knowledge elite show greater consensus on the
benefits of regional integration and the need to strengthen associated organizations, like
68
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the CCJ, to ensure CARICOM’s success. All seven members of the knowledge elite69
recognize that CARICOM has found success in functional cooperation areas such as
health, education, and foreign policy, but lacks the same success in trade and economic
integration.
The knowledge elite influence is limited for some, but very open for others. From
interviews with the seven members of Jamaica’s knowledge elite, those with limited
influence mainly write papers and articles on the subjects of regional integration, regional
and national policies, and the CCJ, for which no direct link can be made as to whether
these points were received by the political elite and/or forwarded to PREPCOM. One
junior academic with a specialization in Caribbean politics pointed out that “I teach and
publish on the subject [of the CCJ] and hoped some of the ideas filtered through.” He
further noted that influence is limited because
governments of the region were not taking enough advantage of the resources of
UWI and that is a result of an absence of mechanisms for governments to know
what those resources are to access the research and findings from the different
departments, and be guided by the different recommendations. (JM01, Interview,
July 17, 2012)
For other members of the knowledge elite, they have been called on to sit on
committees, formulate working papers for government officials, and/or represent their
country at CARICOM gatherings or CARICOM at an international forum, thus, being
active on two levels - policy development and initiatives and in research (JM10,
Interview, July 25, 2012). The difference between these two groups is seniority, which is
based on the academic’s years of research and/or his/her holding a diplomatic or political
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position at one time or another. This was deduced from the interviewees’ responses and
status in and outside of UWI. Of the seven members of the knowledge elite, four were
senior academics, while three were junior academics. All four fit at least one of the
criteria for direct influence on policy, while the remaining three were restricted to the
simply teaching and publishing in newspapers, books, and journals on the topic.
There still exists an unevenness in the direct influence of the knowledge elite.
Another senior academic and administrator observed:
We have dozens of people making commentary and producing proposals on
regional policies…they act as consultants to governments and…they sit on
statutory boards within groupings in CARICOM. We send our experts to stand in
those meetings…scholars use their intellectual capacity whether wanted or
unwanted. A lot have been written but we don’t know how it has been taken…
There is a communication problem. Even if you write people and they don’t
respond you feel frustrated. People work with people they know. They may be
better at networking and been around longer” (JM15, Interview, July 30, 2012).
With specific reference to the local committee established to provide PREPCOM
with Jamaican submissions, no member of the knowledge elite sat on this committee. It
consisted of four members of the political elite and one member of the economic elite.
Influence of Mass Public Opinion. There were a few public education exercises
carried out in Jamaica before and after the signing of the CCJ Agreement. I was unable to
determine whether these exercises influenced the political elite or merely served as a
forum for the public to learn about the role of the Court.
The methodology used by the WIC and a very few surveys done among ordinary
citizens on the topic during the period under investigation confirm that CARICOM and
other researchers and pollsters focused most of their attention on and questioning to the
elite members of society. The WIC held five public consultations in Jamaica – two in
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Kingston, and one in Mandeville, Montego Bay, and Port Antonio, respectively.
However, according to Appendices E and F of the WIC Report, most of the Jamaican
submissions to the commission came from representatives from the government and
opposition, UWI academia, civil society groups, and the media. Like the public education
program, I was unable to determine whether these meetings influenced the political elite.
This is due to a lack of access to these records.
Any survey or poll conducted before or after the signing of the CCJ Agreement
centered on hotly debated or divisive aspects of the appellate jurisdiction of the Court.
However, the responses to these surveys do provide insight into the ordinary man’s view
of the Court, which can be telling for the public’s degree of involvement in the
structuring of the Court. In an unpublished survey conducted between May and June
2003, entitled Draft Report on Jamaican Perceptions of Regional Integration, 1581
Jamaicans from all walks of life were questioned about their knowledge of institutions
associated with regional integration. When asked about the CCJ, the researchers found
that unprompted, only 6.9% of the respondents associated the CCJ with regional
integration; however, when prompted this figure increased to 57.7% with 35.4% having
no knowledge of the link between the two (SALISES Research Team, 2003, p. 3).
Table 5 shows responses from 1577 respondents who were asked additional
questions about the CCJ.
Table 5
Jamaicans’ Responses to Questions Asked by the SALISES Research Team about the CCJ
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(N=1577)
Question
Have you heard about the CCJ?
Is the CCJ a regional court of justice?70
Is the CCJ a court to settle disputes from the CSME?
Should the CCJ be final court of appeal only for matters of regional
disputes?

Yes
77.8%
39.5%
10.5%
70.5%

No
22.2%
60.5%
89.5%
29.5%

Note. Adapted from Perceptions of Regional Integration (May/June 2003 Survey) (pp. 45) by the SALISES Research Team, 2003, Kingston, Jamaica: Unpublished.
These responses show that the public education programs did not work in Jamaica
as the public was unable to recognize the original jurisdiction role of the Court. It also
shows there is a high probability that the public did not contribute to the structure and
establishment of the CCJ’s original jurisdiction. The lack of knowledge on original
jurisdiction could be a result of the very public focus and debate on the appellate section
of the Court, and whether Jamaica should remain with the Privy Council.
The public was bombarded with a proliferation of newspaper editorials and
articles71 and discussions on public talk radio and in parliament72 on the CCJ. The debate,
however, was among highly skilled professionals, tertiary educated individuals, and the
middle to upper class members of society. Groups, such as the Jamaicans for Justice
(JFJ), contended Jamaica was being hasty in leaving the Privy Council and joining the
CCJ (Franklyn, 2005; Ryan, 2001). They labelled it the ‘hanging court’ and suggested
that a step towards joining the CCJ was a step back for human rights (Franklyn, 2005;
Ryan, 2001). Additionally, the JFJ, the JLP, and the Jamaica Bar Association (JBA)
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71

No less than fifty written in the Jamaica Gleaner, The Jamaica Herald and the Jamaica Observer between
the years 1999 to 2005 by politician and attorney Delroy Chuck, representatives from the Jamaica Bar
Association, political scientists Robert Buddan, Rosalea Hamilton, and Steven Vasciannie, columnists
Ricky Singh, David Jessop and Sir Ronald Sanders, and human rights activist Jamaicans for Justice.
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called for updating the local justice system before any consideration be made to join the
appellate section of the CCJ (Pollard, 2004; JBA, 1999, 2000; Ryan, 2001). One JLP
member, Delroy Chuck, even went as far as to suggest the country have its own final
court of appeal, while Opposition Leader Edward Seaga ardently supported the retention
of the Privy Council (Ryan, 2001). By extension, these and other civil society groups,
mainly trade unions and professional organizations, demanded there be a referendum to
allow the public to choose whether or not Jamaica should join the CCJ’s appellate
jurisdiction (Pollard, 2004; Ryan, 2001; The Jamaica Gleaner, November 29, 2000). The
JFJ believed that without a referendum there was “an erosion of people's rights and
freedoms…We hold as fundamental our right as citizens to participate in the process of
our governance…the people, not the Government are the highest law of the land” (The
Jamaica Gleaner, November 29, 2000).73
The citizenry was well aware of the discussions on the CCJ’s appellate
jurisdiction as The Jamaica Gleaner Don Anderson poll conducted among 1,000
Jamaicans of voting age between May 9 and May 19, 2003 found that 51.6% of the
people were in support of establishing the court as a final court of appeal (The Jamaica
Gleaner, May 28, 2003). It also noted that 63.4% of persons polled were in favor of
holding a referendum. Surprisingly, Don Anderson observed that the “strongest support
for this referendum comes from the young voters 18-24 and from persons in the lower
socio-economic groups” (The Jamaica Gleaner, May 28, 2003). The debate had captured
the imagination of even the lowliest.
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The idea was eventually struck down by the PNP government as it noted that the constitution gave it a
right to adopt the CCJ’s appellate jurisdiction with a simple majority in the two houses of parliament
(Franklyn, 2005).
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The lack of knowledge about original jurisdiction was initially suspected to be
originate from the subject political culture prevalent in Jamaica. Yet, this is not the case.
While the ordinary person is more concerned with his material interests, Jamaica’s
struggling economy, and the high incidence of crime and corruption in the country
(Powell, Bourne, & Waller, 2007; Ryan, 2002), it was found that the citizen will pay
attention to issues that are hotly debated, namely, the CCJ’s appellate jurisdiction. The
CCJ’s original jurisdiction did not become a reality to Jamaicans until the favorable
ruling in the Shanique Myrie vs Barbados case on October 4, 2013.74 Jamaicans have
since been made aware of their rights under the RTC and now know they have an
objective advocate in the CCJ.
Varying Degrees of Domestic Elite Influence. Most respondents, who are
members of the economic and knowledge elite, noted they were not consulted on the
original jurisdiction of the CCJ; however, they declared they had put their support behind
it.75 Only a few could confirm there was limited consultation. A former head of the PSOJ
recalled “that various business organizations like the PSOJ’s Trade and Policy
committee, JCC, JEA were consulted in the process of planning for the CCJ. I don’t
know of the specific suggestions” (JM06, Interview, July 23, 2012). It was also found
there were members of the socio-cultural elite that submitted specific proposals. An
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Shanique Myrie, a Jamaican, on March 14, 2011 was denied entry into Barbados and endured inhumane
treatment before being deported to Jamaica the next day. It was found that Barbados breached her right as a
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advocacy group, JFJ, submitted proposals calling for proportionality in the selection of
judges and the creation of two courts with one jurisdiction instead of one regional court
with two jurisdictions (Ryan, 2001).
The legal and political elites, on the other hand, were approached and proved very
influential. Most of the submissions from the JBA, the JLP, and the AG committee were
accepted by PREPCOM. The JBA was extremely influential on decisions taken by
PREPCOM and many of their suggestions made their way to the Final Agreement.76
According to Duke Pollard (2004), a former CCJ Justice and legal advisor to CARICOM,
“approximately 80 per cent of the proposals of the Jamaican Bar Council77 were
addressed and accommodated in the text of the Agreement. If some were rejected this
may be attributed to the consensus approach adopted for the exercise. For, in the ultimate
analysis, the Agreement was intended to be a regional instrument reflecting a regional
consensus” (p. 29). Pollard further recalls that the JBA’s degree of influence is a result of
their response to the drafts of the Agreement. The drafts were sent to the Presidents of
CARICOM member states bar associations and that the JBA was the only one of these
organizations to provide official recommendations to the Jamaican Attorney-General.
The response was as masterly in its activity as it was resoundingly resonant in its
protracted quiescence…To its credit, The Jamaica Bar Association did
submit…commendable proposals to amend the texts of the Draft Agreement
Establishing the Caribbean Court of Justice and the Draft Enabling Bill. The
majority of the proposals were accommodated in the texts of these instruments
which were considerably enhanced as a result. (Pollard, 2004, p. 38-39)
The JLP has also been considered very influential on the structure of the final CCJ
Agreement. Many of the suggestions came from concerns that arose years before the
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formation of PREPCOM and the signing of the CCJ Agreement. It is noted that at the
Ninth Conference of Heads of Government held in Antigua and Barbuda in 1988, Edward
Seaga, Prime Minister of Jamaica, shared his concerns about the independence of the
Court from political sway (CARICOM Secretariat, 1988; P.J. Patterson cited in
Franklyn, 2005, p. 4; Robert Pickersgill cited in Franklyn, 2005, p. 98). Seaga, in a
parliamentary speech made in May 2003, stated,
[in] the original model of the CCJ, as discussed in 1988, there was no provision to
insulate the appointment of judges from political influence. This was the original
objection voiced by me at the time…and, overtime new proposals have been
incorporated by which seemingly non-political procedures have been introduced
for selecting members of the Regional Legal Services Commission which will
regulate the Court of Justice. (Edward Seaga cited in Franklyn, 2005, p. 16)
Another formula that came out of this concern was the independence in the
financing of the Court outlined in Agreement establishing the CCJ Trust Fund. Though
the original concern from the Jamaican Prime Minister bred the Trust Fund idea, I found
that throughout the draft process, the PREPCOM representatives from Barbados, St
Lucia, and Jamaica,78 were very influential in the final design of Article 28 and the
Agreement for the CCJ Trust Fund.
Those JLP proposals that were rejected centered on positions held on the structure
of the Court. The JLP wanted a court similar to the ECJ and US Supreme Court, but one
that was free from political influence. Courts from the UK and Hong Kong were also
considered (JM07, Interview, July 24, 2012). Additionally, the JLP demanded
proportionality in the selection of judges who sat on the bench (JM07, Interview, July 24,
2012). Those in support of the proportionality position think it is unfair to have judges
78
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who do not understand Jamaican culture sit and preside over Jamaican issues. They
believe it important there be a Jamaican judge as Jamaica contributes twenty-seven
percent to the Trust Fund and because of its large population and land size.79 PREPCOM
rejected this proposal because it wanted the best judges to sit on the court (Pollard, 2004).
Other proposals related to the appellate jurisdiction of the Court, which this research is
not investigating (Ryan, 2001).
Trade unions80 did not provide proposals for submission to PREPCOM. However,
like the economic and knowledge elites, they offered support for the institutions. Prior to
the signing of the CCJ Agreement, the Jamaica Gleaner reported, “Member unions of the
Jamaica Confederation of Trade Unions (JCTU) are in favor of a Caribbean Court of
Justice (CCJ) operating as a commercial court, prior to any decision to move on to a full,
final appellate court” (The Jamaica Gleaner, December 14, 2000).
The structure of the relationship between the government and an elite member or
group81 as it relates to submission of CCJ proposals came in the form of a joint
government committee. The form of participation was the irregular submission of reports
and informal discussions. The mode of participation was to supply technical information.
There was a local CCJ Committee that included the Attorney-General and four other
individuals. It consisted of four members of the political elite and one member of the
economic elite (JM17, Interview, July 31, 2012). These five persons read submissions
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from other political, economic and socio-cultural groups (JM17, Interview, July 31, 2012;
JM18, Interview, July 31, 2012). Ten of the twenty-four Jamaican respondents had direct
influence and submitted proposals on the structure and design of the CCJ. Of the ten
respondents, eight are part of the political elite, one was a member of the economic elite82
and one was from the knowledge elite. Of the remaining fourteen, they all recall their
own support for the Court’s original jurisdiction and the support provided by the local
economic and socio-cultural elite were informal discussions that came in the form of
editorials and interviews in the local media. The outcome from consultation in Jamaica is
listed below in Table 6.
Domestic Dynamics: Discussion. From the arguments I can rank political leaders
(the government and the opposition), the economic elite, the knowledge and the extended
socio cultural elite, and the general public in order of importance and influence on CCJ
development. The ranking is consistent with an Association of Development Agencies
Table 6
Proposals that were Accepted and Rejected from the Jamaican Contingent
Specific positions accepted and in the various
agreements establishing the CCJ
 All cases presented and legal documents
submitted to the court must be in English
(economic elite member on the AG’s
submission committee).
 Articles 5 – 7 - Independence of the court
through the establishment, composition
and role of a Regional Legal Services
Commission in charge of appointing
judges and Article 28 and Agreement for
establishing the CCJ Trust Fund CCJ Trust
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Specific positions rejected







Proportionality (based on population and
size) in the judges sitting on the court
(JLP, JFJ).
Create a court similar to the US Supreme
Court, The Hong Kong Supreme Court,
the UK Supreme Court or the ECJ (JLP).
The court should be established in
Jamaica (JLP).
Separating the court by separating
jurisdiction (JLP, JBA, and JFJ).

This economic elite member was the only private sector representative on the Attorney General’s CCJ
committee. The other members were from the political elite. He would be one of 5 persons that read
submissions from other political, economic and socio-cultural groups.
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fund to eliminate political influence (JBA
and JLP).
Opening up the pool for choosing judges
from the entire Commonwealth (JBA).
Article 4 - That judges must have a
background in trade and international law
(Attorney-General).
The wording of the Articles (JBA).
The private right of action so that private
individuals could bring matters before the
court (JBA).
Be an itinerant court (JLP).
Article 3 - The name of the court (The
Prime Minister).
Manner for withdrawal from the Court
(JBA).
Dividing the Agreement/Instruments into
3 distinct parts – general part and 2 parts
addressing original and appellate
jurisdiction separately (Solicitor-General).



Appoint fewer judges and when you are
meeting you invite a few chief justices
and/or court of appeal judges to sit with
you so that in the beginning if you
appointed five instead of nine or even
seven then you could always invite a
couple of chief justices from another
territory that the case was not coming
from to sit with you so as to blend the
experience right around the Caribbean as
a second tier court (JLP).
Changing the name of the court from the
CCJ (JBA and JLP).

(ADA) (2006, p. 27) study on power and influence of different Jamaican civil society
groups.83 The influence of an elite member or group, as noted earlier, is determined by
civil society’s organization and values, and the structure, form, and mode of the
relationship between the state and the group. Like the findings of Witter (2004) and the
ADA (2006), I found that those groups who consulted with government or public who
supported the CCJ’s original jurisdiction were highly organized with a constitution, held
elections, conducted frequent reporting and specialized subgroupings, were well-financed
and headed by middle to upper class members of society. Most notable of these groups
were the Private Sector Organization of Jamaica (PSOJ), The Jamaica Exporters
83

This list will only include those groups and elites under investigation in this dissertation. Those with the
most power and influence included political parties, the legislature, parliament, business leaders, trade
unions, the private sector, medium and small business operators, and the US. Those with average power
and influence included CARICOM, the EU, church organizations, and tertiary institutions. Those with the
least power and influence included senior citizens, children, farmers, and advocacy civil society
organizations.
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Association (JEA) and The Jamaica Manufacturers Association (JMA), who represent the
economic interest, the Jamaica Chamber of Commerce (JCC), who represents Jamaica’s
professionals, and Jamaicans for Justice (JFJ), who advocate for human rights and anticorruption. It was also observed that those groups that had longevity and connections
with the two major political parties, that is the BITU and NWU, were also vocal on the
subject. Given their composition, status and resources, it is obvious the groups constitute
elite members of society. Most of these groups were consulted by or influential on
national government to one degree or the other as it relates to the CCJ.
The economic and socio-cultural elite influence was limited to what was
submitted to the local CCJ committee, which may or may not have filtered through to
PREPCOM, and/or public statements issued after the formal signing of the Agreement
establishing the CCJ. One interviewee, a senior academic of international business,
argued that “they [the economic and socio-cultural elite] didn’t have much say or they
chose not to have much involvement until it started shaping up and becoming a reality”
(JM21, Interview, August 15, 2012). Where there were diverting views, it centered
around differences of opinion on the appellate jurisdiction of the Court, which this
research is not investigating, or where technical portions of the submissions to
PREPCOM were rejected.
Therefore, when speaking about the influence on this particular regional
institution, it was noted that “[the] drivers towards the CCJ was (sic) the politicians. It
was a political monument” (JM02, Interview, July 19, 2012). The political elite was
found to be the most influential, followed by the economic elite, the knowledge elite and
the public.
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Given the overview of the degree of influence from these groups and individuals,
my initial presumption about inner and outer circles also proved correct. The inner circle
does consist of political leaders in government and the opposition and a limited number
of economic leaders, bureaucratic technocrats, and academics. Attorneys and jurists who
were not included in the initial assumption were also a part of the inner circle. The outer
circles in order of influence consisted of junior opposition members of parliament, the
private sector and non-governmental organizations, the knowledge elite, the media and
the general public.
I found that the discussions by members of the outer circles helped, to a limited
degree, shape the context in which decisions are made in the inner circle at the regional
and national levels. The political elite did depend more on the opinions of the economic,
knowledge and other political elites outside of government than the opinions of the
public. All avenues ended with the national executive members having a direct influence
on the further expansion of regional integration institutions. It was the Jamaican
government and/or its representative who defined its economic interests based on current
circumstances, the national leader’s ideology and personal preferences, and previous
decisions and institutions. The government would later negotiate and bargain the state’s
position at the regional level on the structure of the new institutional framework, the CCJ
and the CSME, to ensure economic development. (See Figure 6).

CONCLUSION: LESSONS LEARNED
I investigated three levels of analysis. At the international level, my findings
confirmed both hypotheses. First, the data verify that “increased global trade intensifies
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the desire for regional economic integration which results in the demand for the judicial
governance of the latter activity” (H1a). This was confirmed as Jamaica’s international
trade grew but only at a marginal rate, which encouraged Jamaica to review its position in
the regional market and throw its support behind economic integration and the creation of
the CCJ that would elicit a stable regional environment in order to ensure national
development.
By extension, my research also confirms that “increased regionalization in the
Americas and Europe will renew GCSS’ interest in regional trade and supporting regional
institutions” (H1b). It was Jamaica’s fall in exports to the US with the formation of
NAFTA and its leading role in stalling FTAA negotiations as well as the EEC adoption
of the SEA that made the local political elite take the creation of the CSME and the CCJ
more seriously as means of preparing CARICOM states for trade liberalization on a
larger scale.
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At the regional level, the hypothesis that the “largest and/or wealthiest within the
bloc will have the greatest influence in the promotion of/negotiation for regional
integration and its institutions” (H2) was also confirmed. Jamaica’s size (population,
land, and market), status, and contributions to CARICOM are factors that contribute to its
great influence. It used its influence to first support the proposal for a regional court and
later as a member and deputy chair of PREPCOM. The state’s size resulted in skilled and
experienced personnel who developed and provided proposals for the structure of the
CCJ. So much so that eighty percent of the final CCJ Agreement reflected Jamaica’s
submissions. Interestingly, domestic politics, that is Jamaica’s single party majority
government, made its political leadership and agents more forceful and influential at the
Conferences and in PREPCOM.
At the domestic level, I was not surprised that the hypothesis H3a: “the decision
to promote/negotiate for new regional institutions rests almost entirely on the political
elite” was confirmed. The literature and CARICOM institutional design establishes the
political elite as the initiators and interlocutors of regional policy. Additionally, the
political system and culture dominant in the Caribbean breed authoritarian personalities
who dictate the ideology and make political decisions without the input of the public. The
political elite, however, did not ignore the opinions of others. They took interest in the
opinions of the elites in the formulation of the CCJ. This confirms another hypothesis that
elite public opinion rather than mass public opinion will influence the political elite’s
decision to promote/negotiate for regional integration and its institutions (H3b). Jamaica
had established a temporary local CCJ committee that included economic and political
elites and accepted written submissions for various legal, political, economic and socio-
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cultural elites. The public remained largely ignorant of the original jurisdiction of the
CCJ. As a country that is viewed as being largely isolated and at times more nationally
minded, the aggressive approach to an institution that would oversee and ensure the
proper function of the RTC and the CSME is refreshing.
Also, the hypothesis that proposed that the left of center political parties will
support regional integration and its institutions more than right of center parties (H3a(i))
could not be confirmed because even though the two main parties varied in support for
regional integration, they held the same position on the original jurisdiction of the Court
and agreed that Jamaica should remain a part of CARICOM. Where there was contention,
it was restricted to differing positions about the structure of the Court and whether
Jamaica should join the appellate jurisdiction of the Court.
Finally, it confirmed that better organized economic and knowledge elite have
greater influence on the political decision makers (H3b(i)). This is on account of their
greater access to government offered to those groups that were highly organized with a
constitution, held elections, did frequent reporting, had specialized subgroupings, were
well-financed and headed by middle to upper class members of society, namely the JMA,
PSOJ, JEA, JFJ, and the senior UWI academics. It should be noted that while these
groups have greater access to the political elite such meetings are infrequent.
With what was learned about Jamaica in this chapter, I will now turn my attention
to hypothesis testing, analysis, and discussion for the case of Trinidad & Tobago.
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CHAPTER 5:
TRINIDAD & TOBAGO

INTRODUCTION
Like the previous chapter, this chapter discusses the factors that determined the
degree of influence Trinidad had on the formation and establishment of the CCJ. It
follows a similar structure and addresses the same literature/theories. That is, the
discussion will focus on three levels of analysis: the international, the regional, and the
national/domestic levels by addressing:
1. Trinidad & Tobago’s experience with changing international trends through the
application of the literature/theories on the effects of neoliberal globalization,
large state/small state influence on small state foreign policy, and the domino
effect of rising economic blocs on a state’s desire to deepen its region’s economic
integration;
2. the effects of Trinidad & Tobago’s status as a relatively wealthy state on its
influence on the CCJ Agreement negotiations through the utilization of theories of
regional integration; and,
3. Trinidad & Tobago’s domestic elite and mass influences on regional integration,
and more specifically, the CCJ’s development and structure.
OVERVIEW
The Republic of Trinidad & Tobago is at the southernmost tip of the Lesser
Antilles. It gained independence from the British in 1962. The Republic had maintained a
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one party parliamentary system from 1956 until 1991 that has since switched to a stable
two party system that regularly alternates between the longstanding, largely AfroTrinidadian supported, People’s National Movement (PNM) and the relatively new, and
largely Indo-Trinidadian supported United National Congress (UNC). It also maintains a
mixed economy with petroleum and manufacturing being its main foreign exchange
earners.
Trinidad has always played an integral part in the Anglo-Caribbean integration
movement. During the nationalist movement of the 1920s and 1930s, Captain Andrew
Ciprani of Trinidad sought regional integration through federation. This was followed by
Eric Williams’ participation in negotiations that resulted in the West Indies Federation
and his and subsequent Trinidadian prime ministers’ proposals of varied regional
integration formulas to ensure Anglo-Caribbean unity.
INTERNATIONAL DYNAMICS OF REGIONAL INTEGRATION
Background. Trinidad faced economic challenges resulting from the changing
international environment much later than most CARICOM countries. As a petroleum
producer and exporter, it benefitted from the increase in world oil prices during the two
oil shocks in the 1970s. However, by the early 1980s with the fall in oil prices and
demand, the country began experiencing balance of payments problems, a shrinking
economy, and increased debt (Braveboy-Wagner, 2008; Mullerleile, 1995). The
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) recorded an
“economic contraction of 33 per cent between 1983-1989, with unemployment doubling
over the same period. External debt grew somewhat less precipitously, from under 10 per
cent of GDP in 1980 to about 30 per cent in 1988” (1995, p. 9). Trinidad, in order to
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address these problems, had to undertake neoliberal reforms from the mid-1980s into the
1990s (ECLAC, 1995). In 1986, Trinidad approached the IMF and signed on to a standby
arrangement (Braveboy-Wagner, 2008; Trinidad and Tobago Newsday, November 18,
2010). It again approached the IMF in 1988 for foreign exchange assistance (Hintzen,
2003).
The SAPs, under the standby arrangement, resulted in Trinidad becoming more
open to and competitive on the international market. It is noted that Trinidad’s state of
preparedness and strong commitment to neoliberal reform accounts for this (ECLAC,
1995). The prescribed devaluation of the dollar, considerable cuts in public spending,
public asset divestment, and the removal of trade barriers in the mid-1980s resulted in the
country’s high degree in trade openness at almost one hundred percent trade to GDP
ratio, “one of the highest ratios in the Western Hemisphere” (Jessen & Vignoles, 2004, p.
2; Hintzen, 2003). While Trinidad saw an increase in exports and revenue from trade, the
economy continued to decline until 1989. The country faced a recession due to a fall in
real income, an increase in unemployment and poverty levels, and a rise in inflation that
made goods more expensive in the local market (Mullerleile, 1995; Ryan, 1989). In all,
efforts at market liberalization under the IMF agreement have been credited for
Trinidad’s rebound in the mid-1990s onwards.
Like Jamaica, Trinidad endorsed the Nassau Understanding and the Grand Anse
Declaration. It did the former so that “structural adjustment [would] bear fruit, [and]
intra-regional trade should be re-activated” (Mullerleile, 1995, p. 51). The latter was
endorsed because of the vision of its Prime Minister, ANR Robinson. In a paper entitled
“The West Indies Beyond 1992”, presented at the Heads of Government Meeting in
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Grand Anse, he reviewed the changes in the world environment and the need for
CARICOM to adopt open regionalism.
The International Environment’s Influence on CCJ Development.
The Neoliberal Globalization Effect. There is a similar pattern of increased
international trade as seen in Table 2 in the previous chapter. Figures from the US
Department of Commerce and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) show the
country’s monetary increases in imports from and exports to its main trading partners –
the United States, the European Union (EU), and CARICOM. It is interesting to note that
exports to the US increased at a similar rate to imports from the same. Unlike Jamaica,
exports to the US exceeds imports into Trinidad. This is on account of petroleum exports
amounting to nearly ninety percent of all exports to the US (ECLAC, 1995; Jessen &
Vignoles, 2004). Trade with the EU fared worse. Though imports from and exports to the
EU increased at almost the same rate, Trinidad went through cycles of inconsistent export
levels to the EU. Trade with CARICOM shows an almost opposite mirror image to that
of Jamaica. The import bill from CARICOM states remained stagnant, while Trinidad’s
exports to CARICOM states increased significantly over the period.
According to the IDB, Trinidad’s share in merchandise exports to the US under
the period of investigation started from a high of 53.9% in 1990 to 57.4% in 2001 (Jessen
& Vignoles, 2004, p. 42). For the EEC/EU the share was 9% in 1990, and ended at 9.7%
in 2001 (Jessen & Vignoles, 2004, p. 42). CARICOM also experienced an increase from
11.6% in 1990 to 19.9% in 2001 (Jessen & Vignoles, 2004, p. 42).
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Figure 7. Trinidad's Trade with the US in $US Millions, 1985 – 2001. Note. Adapted
from figures from the United States Census Bureau database. The exchange rates existing
at the time are used to convert to U.S. dollars.
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Figure 8. Trinidad's Trade with the EU in $US Millions, 1990 – 2001. Note. Adapted
from the Inter-American Development Bank database in A. Jessen and C. Vignoles.
2004. Trinidad and Tobago: Trade Performance and Policy Issues in an Era of Growing
Liberalization, pp. 42-44.
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Figure 9. Trinidad's Trade with CARICOM in $US Millions, 1990 – 2001. Note. Adapted
from the Inter-American Development Bank database in A. Jessen and C. Vignoles.
2004. Trinidad and Tobago: Trade Performance and Policy Issues in an Era of Growing
Liberalization, pp. 42-44.
Trinidad & Tobago adapted to neoliberal globalization in the following ways. It
increased trade to and from Trinidad but more importantly, exports outpaced imports
with the exception of trade to the EU. The faster rate of increase in exports is attributed to
Trinidad’s preparedness for increased competition in trade beginning in the 1970s and the
adoption of neoliberal principles in the mid-1980s (ECLAC, 1995; IDB, 2005; Jessen &
Vignoles, 2004).84

84

Unlike other CARICOM states, the Trinidadian government, through the use of petrol dollars, was able
to encourage an enabling economic environment that developed a strong private sector that showed
considerable interest in the regional and international trade and effectively contributed to the country’s
national and regional trade positions. Like Newly Industrialized Countries (NICs) of East Asia, Trinidad
protected selected manufacturing industries and nurtured them through export subsidies and subsidized
credit, steering firms toward new forms of production, setting export targets and rewarding those firms that
met or surpassed them (Harris, 1997; IDB, 2005).
Adopted neoliberal principles, discussed in the Background, included two prescribed devaluations of the
dollar, considerable cuts in public spending and public sector wages, decreased pecuniary support for the
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Increased competition and trade is also attributed to the reduction in global tariffs.
Trinidad, like other CARICOM states, had enjoyed preferential access to the EU and the
US until the mid-1990s (Jessen and Vignoles, 2004). Since the restructuring of the global
economy under the Uruguay Round of the GATT and the WTO, both the EU and the US
altered this relationship. However, unlike other CARICOM states that experienced great
financial and trade shortfalls with the loss of preferential access, Trinidad was not as
negatively affected by this change because of its unique economic structure. Its primary
industry is the natural gas, petroleum and petrochemical industry, which amounts to
eighty percent of the country’s earnings with manufacturing and agriculture being a close
second and third (World Travel and Tourism Council, 2012). For the rest of CARICOM,
states garner their highest earnings from traditional agriculture and mining industries and
the growing tourism industry.
The reduction in tariffs on petrol products have since led to increased purchases
and earnings for Trinidad as opposed to a reduction in tariffs on traditional products such
as banana, sugar, and apparel, which have been the worse hit industries under the new
regime (IDB, 2005; WTO, n. d.). In the latter, Trinidad saw only minimal damage as the
government had restructured and minimized dependence on the dwindling agricultural
industry in the mid-1980s (Financial Times, March 7, 1985, p. 44). With that, Trinidad
sought to expand its service industry, particularly air travel, so as to participate in the
fastest growing export market in the world (IDB, 1995; Jessen & Vignoles, 2004). So far,
the Trinidadian government, since privatizing British West Indies Airways (BWIA), now

private sector, public asset divestment, the removal of subsidies, the desertion of state projects, and the
removal of trade barriers (Jessen & Vignoles, 2004; Hintzen, 2003).
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named Caribbean Airlines, has seen an eighteen percent annual increase in its share of the
earnings (Jessen & Vignoles, 2004).
Trinidadians have viewed neoliberal globalization as promoting Caribbean
regional integration as a means for both convergence and competition in the international
economy. Former Prime Minister Patrick Manning recalled that the “region cannot refute
the irreversibility of globalization and trade liberalization which were making small
island states more vulnerable in a rapidly changing global environment…[a] Caribbean
Single Market85 represents that indispensable mechanism for ensuring the future survival,
security and prosperity of our region” (Caribbean Media Corporation, June 28, 2006).
From my small sample, nine out of the twelve Trinidadian interviewees agree that
CARICOM, in the context of globalization, is a means by which to prepare the region,
and more specifically Trinidad, to better integrate/trade with third countries. A trade
specialist, describes
regional integration as one step to prepare ourselves for free trade and what we
need to do regionally is look to regional integration preparing us for the inevitable
global free trade, global village, however you want to define globalization.
Because if we just throw ourselves into that kind of environment we can’t
compete with these giants out there. (TT26, Interview, September 4, 2012)
Like Jamaica, Trinidadian elites viewed the effects of neoliberal globalization as
prompting their decision to strengthen regional economic integration. They also
considered another international factor – the post-Cold War/ Liberal Multilateralism.
The Post-Cold War World/Liberal Multilateralism. Trinidadian Prime Minister
ANR Robinson, in his presentation at the Tenth Conference of the Heads of Government

85

A Single Market would move CARICOM from an imperfect common market towards an economic
union, thus deepening regional integration.
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in 1989, acknowledged that the world was becoming multipolar. He attributes the need
for the revitalization of Caribbean integration to changes in the global environment. He
accounts for the dissolution of the USSR and the end of the Cold War as contributing to
the diminished importance of the Anglo-Caribbean and the need to alter the CARICOM
design from the protectionist model implemented in 1973 to one that embraced open
regionalism (Gilbert-Roberts, 2013; Payne, 2008; Robinson cited in Hall, 2001; Hall,
2003a, 2003b). If not, “[against] this background of historical change and historical
appraisal the Caribbean could be in danger of becoming a backwater, separated from the
main current of human advance into the twenty-first century” (Robinson cited in WIC,
1992, p. 3). It was through this speech that the West Indian Commission (WIC) was
proposed to prepare CARICOM states for survival in this brave new world (Payne,
2008).
In this new multipolar world, it was expected that multilateralism would replace
the region’s favored bilateralism with third states. However, as stated before the effect of
the formation of the WTO did not have as a significant effect on Trinidad as it did on
CARICOM countries given its already strong economy and preparedness for competition
as well as its minimal focus on traditional products. The desire to strengthen regional
integration rested more with CARICOM being Trinidad’s second largest market behind
the US (ECLAC, 1995; Jessen & Vignoles, 2004).
While global changes did not inspire Trinidadian elites towards strengthening
regional integration as much as it did Jamaican elites, there was the influence of powerful
states and organizations, namely the EU and the US.
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EU Influence and Support. The EU has influenced Caribbean regional integration.
Trinidadian politician, Winston Dookeran (May 30, 2012) acknowledges that the EU in
all its previous forms has resulted in what Avery (1973) called ‘extra regional echoing’86
with some minor alterations. Former Prime Minister ANR Robinson, in 1989, also
attributed his desire to see CARICOM economic integration strengthened due to the fact
that the EU had gathered tremendous steam and was pushing ahead drastically towards a
Single Market and Economy (Gilbert-Roberts, 2013; Payne, 2008; Robinson cited in
Hall, 2003a; Hall, 2001). Later, former academic at the UWI St Augustine Vaughn Lewis
(2008), attributed Trinidad’s and the wider CARICOM’s move to adopting stronger
regional arrangements and institutions to the EU desired transition from the
Lomé/Cotonou Agreements to the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPA) as laid out
in its 1996 Green Paper.87
The loss of preferential access to the EU and its evolution towards an economic
union has been credited with CARICOM not just pursuing the deepening of economic
integration but also enlarging the region’s trade bloc. On the former, Prime Minister
Robinson explained, “The decision of the EC to follow up the Single Europe Act with a
single European market by 1992…calls for a heightened sense of urgency from
Caribbean governments in the face of the challenges that already confront them” to which
he called for greater Caribbean unity (Journal of Commerce, December 9, 1988, p. 1A;
The Globe and Mail, December 5, 1991).
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Extra regional echoing describes European integration as “a major stimulus for similar endeavors in other
regions and…the model for most integration efforts” (Avery, 1973, p. 550).

87

For more details, see the EU influence section in Chapter 4.
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On the latter, Trinidadian economist and former CARICOM Secretary-General,
Sir Edwin Carrington, maintained that the Association of Caribbean States (ACS), a trade
bloc comprised of CARICOM and thirteen other Latin American and Caribbean
countries, was expected to offer a coordinated approach to international negotiations with
the EU and NAFTA (Carrington cited in the Journal of Commerce, August 17, 1995, p.
3A).
Since 1986, EU financial support to Trinidad for regional integration and
cooperation has amounted to over € 100 million (Delegation of the European Union to
the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago, n.d). As the base for the CARICOM Agency for
Crime and Security (IMPACS), Trinidad received € 800,000 to improve the region’s
institutional capacity to thwart illegal drug activity (Delegation of the European Union to
the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago, n.d). With Barbados, Belize, and Guyana, Trinidad
& Tobago received € 13.2 million for the construction of a Regional Weather Radar
Warning System that would reduce the region’s vulnerability to adverse weather
conditions (Delegation of the European Union to the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago,
n.d). Finally, the EU earmarked € 1.3 million to the CCJ to ensure the rule of law and the
sustainability of the Court (Lilla, 2008). More specifically, these funds were to be used
for “strengthening the capacities of the Law Library, enhancing the ICT development,
building the public awareness capacity of the CCJ and facilitating cooperation with the
European Court of Justice” (Lilla, 2008; p. 126).
Trinidadian economist and former CARICOM Secretary-General, Sir Edwin
Carrington, further emphasized the importance of EU’s support for CARICOM and the
CCJ. In 2007, he acknowledged,
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Without the CCJ, the CSME88 would not be effective in the role that is envisaged
for it. It would be remiss of me if I fail to acknowledge the important role the
European Union plays, as the largest and most important donor in terms of
regional programs to the Caribbean. I am indeed deeply grateful to the EU for this
expression of confidence in the CCJ and the Region as a whole. (Carrington cited
in CARICOM Secretariat Press Release, August 21, 2007)
US Influence and Support. US influence and support also affected Trinidad’s
desire to deepen Caribbean economic integration and adopt regional institutions. Where
Jamaica focused on US preferential treatment and support, which resulted in waning
support for Caribbean integration, Trinidad did not experience a similar decrease in
support for integration for several reasons. First, in the neoliberal globalization section of
the chapter. Second, its petroleum industry did not attract preferred access as the free
zones and the apparel industry had in other CARICOM states under the CBI (ECLAC,
1995; IDB, 2005; Jessen & Vignoles, 2004). The US, an energy dependent country,
placed and continues to place most of its foreign direct investment (FDI) into Trinidad’s
petroleum industry (ECLAC, 1995; IDB, 2005; Jessen & Vignoles, 2004). As Trinidad’s
largest US export it continues to benefit from ever increasing sales to the US. Even when
Trinidad experienced an economic slowdown in sales to the US in the mid-1980s, it
continued to experience increased intra-regional exports (Mullerleile, 1995). This, while
not compensating for the losses in the US market, proved beneficial to the Trinidadian
economy, which more than quadrupled its exports to CARICOM by the end of 2001.
Between 1985 and 1989, Trinidadian exports, including petrol sales, to the US fell by
38.9% from US$1258.7 million to US$768.1 million until it rebounded by 32.8% to
US$1019.9 million the next year (U.S. Census Bureau, Foreign Trade, n.d.). For the same
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CARICOM Single Market and the Economy.
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period, there was no change in the value of Trinidad’s intra-regional exports at US$231
million. However, the Financial Times maintained that there was a spike in exports
between 1987 and 1988 before reverting to the initial value of US$231 million in 1989. It
records that Trinidad had “been helped by the improvement in trade among Caricom
members last year when the value rose to Dollars 364 m, 14.6 per cent higher than 1987.
This followed an 8 per cent increase for 1987 which ended the five-year decline,
including a 32 per cent fall in 1986” (Financial Times, August 1, 1989, p. 6). All the
same, Trinidad saw the potential for future losses in profits and market share with the
introduction of NAFTA. Like Jamaica, Trinidad, as an individual country and as part of
CARICOM, formally asked to be listed as eligible for membership of NAFTA (Journal of
Commerce, April 18, 1994, p. 5A).
US support and influence steered Trinidad towards strengthening regional
integration at the beginning of negotiations for the proposed NAFTA and later the FTAA.
Trevor Baldeo, then manager of investment promotion for the Trinidad & Tobago
Industrial Development Corporation, was quoted as saying, “We are concerned [about
NAFTA]…but when taken in the context of what's happening globally, you have to see it
as an opportunity. I was actually happy to hear that the sentiments expressed at this [Sixth
Caribbean Basin Business Conference] are leaning towards a quick [Caribbean]
integration process” (Journal of Commerce, September 5, 1991, p. 4A).
Additionally, NAFTA also spearheaded Trinidad’s support for the development of
another regional bloc – The Association of Caribbean States (ACS). It even campaigned
for and was selected as the seat of this organization. Edwin Carrington, Trinidadian
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diplomat and former Secretary General of CARICOM, at the inaugural summit of ACS
noted that it provided the region with
new opportunities for the pursuit of collective initiatives by as many as 40 states,
countries and territories, comprising some 200 million people, united by the
waters of the Caribbean. The ACS will have an estimated gross national product
of $ 500 billion, and an annual trade volume of about $ 180 billion. The ACS has
the potential to create a trade bloc bigger than all except for the European
Economic Area, Nafta and the Association of South East Asian Nations (Asean).
(Journal of Commerce, August 17, 1995, p. 3A)
As revealed in the previous section, Carrington also argued it would provide a united
front among Latin American and Caribbean countries in international negotiations with
the EU and NAFTA (Journal of Commerce, August 17, 1995, p. 3A). To corroborate this
point, Norman Girvan, a Jamaican economist who headed the Trinidadian based ACS at
its inception, said “that the bargaining challenge posed by NAFTA is beyond the capacity
of the CARICOM group and requires a wider grouping” a role the ACS was expected to
fill (The Ottawa Citizen, September 10, 1992, p. A13).
FTAA negotiations concerned Trinidad because trade liberalization under the
agreement would have affected market access for eighty percent of its goods to the US,
Latin America, the Caribbean, and Canada (Jessen & Vignoles, 2004, p. 54; IDB, 2005;
WTO, n.d.). The possibility of an erosion in exports to Latin America and CARICOM
renewed Trinidad’s determination to have the CSME and the CCJ realized so that
CARICOM states would be better prepared from the competition that would come from
the US, Canada, and Latin America (IDB, 2005).
Prime Minister Patrick Manning in 2002, proclaimed,
given the fact that we no longer exist in a bi-polar world, the effects of
globalization, pose a threat to smaller economies such as ours. This situation is
further aggravated when the Free Trade Area of the Americas becomes a reality in
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2005. Mr Chairman, the establishment of the CARICOM Single Market and the
Economy (CSME) is paramount…in an increasingly globalized world…Trinidad
and Tobago stands ready to play its part in this process [as] evidenced by our role
as host of the Caribbean Court of Justice. (Manning cited in Hall, 2003a, p. 814)
His predecessor, Basdeo Panday, made a similar proclamation a year earlier (Hall,
2003a).
Influence and support from the US and the EU provided evidence of international
trends towards the development of regional economic blocs.
The Domino Effect. Literature from Trinidad does not speak directly to the
domino effect of regionalization, however, speeches from Prime Ministers ANR
Robinson, Patrick Manning, and Basdeo Panday acknowledge that closer union of the EU
under SEA and the formation of NAFTA provided the incentive for region on a whole to
adopt ‘open regionalism’ (Hall, 2003a). Trinidadian scholars only focused on the WIC
findings that “international and regional integration would necessitate a search for new
institutional forms for managing these processes. These forms had to be appropriate to
the character of the trends” (Lewis, 2008, p. 2). From the small n of twelve interviewees,
six acknowledged this domino effect. A CEO of a Pan Caribbean Company, recalls the
Trinidadian government realizing “that the world is changing and that Europe is coming
together, NAFTA is forming, Mercosur forming” (TT27, Interview, September 5, 2012).
He added that they recognized “we needed to come together but we don’t have a
mechanism or framework. They said, ‘Let’s improve the framework.’ I think this is what
they were looking around and saw that the world was advancing, we are not” (TT27,
Interview, September 5, 2012).
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International Dynamics: Discussion. The evidence suggests external factors,
particularly international trade driven by neoliberal globalization, have played a great part
in intensifying Caribbean regional integration from Trinidad’s perspective. Its influence
was more subtle than what had occurred in Jamaica because its main markets do not align
with the more traditional markets found in Jamaica; however, its move towards
deepening integration is still an example of the influence of a powerful state and/or
organization policy on the foreign policy of smaller dependent states with respect to its
petroleum market being dependent on the US demand and world energy prices, and the
NAFTA and FTAA negotiations.
Additionally, the neoliberal policy endorsed by the IMF and the promotion of
regionalism by Western Europe and the US propelled Trinidad’s recognition of the need
to strengthen regionalism and adopt new institutions as a means of competing and
conforming to new economic policy regimes and survival within and beyond the regional
level. Trinidad’s Prime Minister ANR Robinson in recognizing Trinidad as the bloc’s
largest exporter and as a prominent importer understood the relevance of open
regionalism, which pushed him to promote it as a means for economic development
within each CARICOM state that is created within a stable environment and conforms to
the greater paradigm shift in the world economy.
The reason behind this transformation is mixed, displaying features of both the
bargaining and dependency models.89 Trinidad’s regional policy shows some reliance on
EU economic assistance and US support and influence on specific issues, namely its
petrol industry, and adherence to WTO rules. In these instances, long-term dependency
89
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has inevitably determined policies that reflect the perceptions and interests developed by
the dependent relationship. For instance, EU economic influence and support have
shaped and/or directed the structure of CARICOM regional organizations as the EU is the
largest donor and supporter of these organizations (Carrington cited in CARICOM
Secretariat Press Release, August 21, 2007). The 1996 Green Paper and the move to end
the Lomé Convention changed the structure of EU funding to Trinidad and the rest of
CARICOM. Trinidad, like the rest of CARICOM, in seeking to maintain their
longstanding structural relationship and continued funding thought it necessary to
conform to this new vision. While considered wealthy, Trinidad is still a capital
importing state that is dependent on external funding and trade, which makes is compliant
in the asymmetrical relationship between it and a larger state/organization. Trinidad, it
has been argued, only signed the CARIFORUM-EU Economic Partnership Agreement
because the European Commission threatened it with a higher tariff of its manufactured
goods in the EU market (Caribbean Net News, April 16, 2010). In addition, Trinidad has
adopted and internalized the values of the more powerful state/organization. The adoption
of neoliberalism through the SAPS and the reliance on US FDI for the local energy
industry resulted in the shared thinking between the developed and developing states.
Nonetheless, Trinidad can still bargain on certain issues. It has sought to act
strategically so as to maximize its national benefits, namely to ensure economic growth,
increase efficiency, and to signal to third parties that the country was a sound investment
option. In other words, policy makers from Trinidad have taken the actions and promises
of large states and international organizations into consideration and then made choices
that reflected their self-interests as much as possible. This was mainly evident by the
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manner in which Trinidad and the rest of CARICOM handled NAFTA/FTAA and EPA
negotiations. While Trinidad took a similar stance and united with Jamaica in its efforts
to ensure greater parity for CARICOM states in order to join the NAFTA/FTAA, like
Jamaica, it applied separately to become members of NAFTA (Journal of Commerce,
April 18, 1994, p. 5A). During the EPA negotiations, Trinidad actively funneled its
position through the Caribbean Regional Negotiating Machinery (CRNM), which
negotiated the deal on behalf of CARICOM (Caribbean Media Corporation, September 2,
2008).
The discussion now moves to the regional level of analysis in order to determine
how Trinidad’s background and regional elite behavior affected its bargaining position on
the creation and structure of the CCJ.
REGIONAL DYNAMICS
Country Background. Trinidad & Tobago is one of the most influential member
states of CARICOM. It has been at the forefront of every attempt at closer integration
within the region.90 It has been “less concerned about loss of autonomy because it has
both the financial and human resources to influence the direction of the regional
integration movement quite significantly” (IDB, 2005, p. 14). Thus, its influence is based
on this historical fact, its classification, and its wealth and contributions to CARICOM
(Braveboy-Wagner, 2003; CARICOM Secretariat, 1973). CARICOM classifies it as a
More Developed Country (MDC) based on its land size, and its economy’s size and
diversity (CARICOM Secretariat, 1973). Trinidad has a mixed economy with its primary
industries as follows: the natural gas, petroleum and petrochemical industry amounts to
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See introduction to the chapter.

175

45% of GDP (and 80% of the country’s earnings), manufacturing and agriculture 12% of
GDP, and tourism 3.7% of GDP, which is in contrast with other CARICOM states that
depend mainly on agriculture and services, such as tourism and offshore banking
(Braveboy-Wagner, 2008; World Travel and Tourism Council, 2012). This has resulted
in Trinidad being the bloc’s largest exporter of intra-regional goods and services
amounting to 60.2% of total export contributions in 1990, and 79.2% by 2000, as the
other CARICOM states are heavily dependent on its oil products and manufactured
goods, such as beverages, food products, and cement (CARICOM Secretariat, 2005, p. 4;
CIA Factbook, 2011).
Petrol sales both regionally and internationally have made Trinidad wealthy. It
has consistently had the highest GDP per capita and lowest debt to GDP ratio in the
region. The last recorded levels of GDP per capita saw Trinidad & Tobago with GDP per
capita PPP at Int$ 19,980.765 in 2010 (IMF, 2012). Its debt to GDP ratio amounted to
36% as of 2012 (Dookeran, 2012, p. 4). Also, its wealth has allowed it to maintain a
stabilization fund that buffers the country against negative economic events (Dookeran,
2012, pp. 5-6). Such wealth has also made Trinidad the unofficial lender and aid donor to
other CARICOM states (IDB, 2005; Mullerleile, 1995). Upon the formation of
CARICOM, the increased prices in oil during the 1973 oil shock resulted in the country
being a benefactor to other CARICOM states and it “supplied more than $400 million (or
TT$1 billion at TT2.40=US$1.00, the rate at the time) to Caricom during the oil boom”
(Braveboy-Wagner, 2008, p. 125). Since then, it contributes to the Regional Development
Fund and had established the Caribbean Trade Support Program that “provides interest
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free loans to Caribbean firms…for the purpose of procuring technical assistance and
consultancy services for training and business development projects” (IDB, 2005, p. 12).
Since CARICOM uses these measures and population size to determine a state’s
financial contribution to the bloc, Trinidad has consistently been the largest contributor to
CARICOM’s regional organizations. Presently, Trinidad’s contribution to the CARICOM
Secretariat stands as 25% of the total and Trinidad alone contributed US$31.6 million of
the US$100 million designated to the trust fund used for the financing of the CCJ (IDB,
2005, p. 41).
Trinidad & Tobago’s regional influence on CCJ development. Cooperation
and collaboration has not been fully realized among various elites at the regional level.
There have been attempts at transnational ties but the links made were weak and their
regional influence limited. The Trinidadian knowledge elite has established links through
the regional university – The University of the West Indies. The political elite has
collaborated through various intergovernmental meetings at the CARICOM level.
However, the economic elite has not been able to maintain regional ties. This slows the
economic integration process and its complementary institutionalization and governing
complexity.
Of the twelve members of the Jamaican elite interviewed, six economic elite
members and one political elite member recalled that economic elites tried and failed to
increase regional collaboration. They noted that the Caribbean Association of Industry
and Commerce (CAIC) was an attempt at creating a Pan Caribbean business lobby.91
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Please review the Regional Dynamics section of chapter 4 for further details on the CAIC.
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They lamented its failure and wished for the region’s private sector to cooperate like that
again. One trade specialist acknowledged,
We tried to with CAIC…but really and truly when we in the Caribbean try to
participate through this process regionally…Barbados may have representation
there, [and] Trinidad may have representation there…the CAIC is really now a
defunct operation…So we need something to be in…if there was a collaborative
effort like how heads of government officials meet every so often we would have
that kind of collaboration. (TT26, Interview, September 4, 2012)
However, the Trinidadian private sector continues to attempt to build transnational ties
with their CARICOM counterparts. A former head of the Trinidad and Tobago
Manufacturers Association (TTMA), stated that he knew “of some manufacturers that
have taken the bull by the horn and have met with other regional manufacturers and
suppliers and have become a group to assist one another…They link one another with
each other’s products and become a stronger group. So they buy and sell with each other
but this is very few” (TT25, Interview, September 3, 2012). This drive is on account of
the Trinidadian private sector, unlike those in other CARICOM member states, being
strong and well organized. The symbiotic relationship between the state and the private
sector, Trinidad’s financial resources, and the private sector’s dependence on regional
trade have provided them with a wealth of knowledge about trade issues that affect their
businesses and better positioned them to influence the formulation of regional policy and
assist their counterparts (Braveboy-Wagner, 2008; IDB, 2005; McDonald, 2005).
The Trinidadian economic elite has been able to acquire and/or start many
businesses and financial institutions in other CARICOM territories, keeping a pulse on
the region’s demands. For instance, in 1992 Neal and Massy Ltd, the Caribbean’s largest
Pan Caribbean Company acquired 93% of another Pan Caribbean company, Jamaica’s T.
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Geddes Grant, to become “the regional transnational firm with the largest turnover” in
sales and profit for that year (Mullerleile, 1995, p. 72). The Trinidad Cement Ltd (TCL)
Group runs eight subsidiaries across Anguilla, Barbados, Guyana, Jamaica, and Trinidad,
while Guardian Life of the Caribbean Ltd provides insurance and financial services
across Barbados, the Dutch Caribbean, Jamaica, and Trinidad (Guardian Group, 2013;
TCL Group, n. d.).
The success of these businesses region wide has made Trinidadian traders, service
providers, and manufacturers highly motivated to influence regional economic policy.
For instance, the “TTMA attends all regional meetings…because manufacturers in
Trinidad & Tobago want to be informed…Most times when I am at these meetings I
speak on behalf of the manufacturers in Trinidad” (TT26, Interview, September 4, 2012).
Additionally, executive members and trade specialists from the Trinidad and Tobago
Chamber of Industry and Commerce (TTCIC) and the Trinidad and Tobago Coalition of
Services Industries (TTCSI) attend CARICOM level meetings regularly (TT29,
Interview, September 17, 2012; TT31, Interview, September 21, 2012).
While the economic elite attends these regional meetings, their influence is still
limited. CARICOM’s formal structure does not lend itself to elite participation outside of
government officials and technocrats (IDB, 2005). A CEO of a major Pan Caribbean
Corporation remarked,
the heads of governments make the decisions and we are expected to accept it as
it is. We don’t even have an official seat around the table for COTED92. It’s just
the ministers of trade and they can do what they want…It’s like parliament with
no Opposition…I can only speak when I have been invited by the Trinidad and
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Tobago government asking whether or not you’d like to make a comment and
then they tell you to keep quiet (TT27, Interview, September 5, 2012).
Another economic elite member added,
Fortunately, or as some would say unfortunately, we do live in a state centric
society…We, the traders, don’t shape policy, we inform policy [emphasis added].
So, when you go to CARICOM, like at a COTED meeting, it’s government
officials who are there, not private sector people. We shape the process by
informing our ministers and our trade officials what we want from the process but
at the end of the day its government officials making decisions for the
stakeholders [emphasis added]. (TT26, Interview, September 4, 2012)
Given the formal structure of CARICOM, Trinidadian political elites have been
motivated by economic benefits and local political and social pressures as the country
spearheaded negotiations with other CARICOM member states that determined the
institutional design of the CCJ. Once the Trinidadian position was determined at the
national level93, interstate negotiation and bargaining through The Conferences of Heads
of Government and PREPCOM94 followed. Given that the heads of government are
minimally influenced/informed by members of regional outer circles95 due to constraints
to transnational interaction and CARICOM’s formal structure, negotiations between
Trinidad and the other member states reflected the relative bargaining power of member
states and their desire to overcome shared problems (See Figure 10).
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See the domestic dynamics below. In summary, the national government held public consultations with
various elites. They gauged these recommendations against changes in the international environment, the
potential benefits of establishing a regional enforcement mechanism, and, to minimal degree, mass
perceptions.
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The Preparatory Committee for the Establishment of the Caribbean Court of Justice. A group of six
Attorney-Generals, who outlined the structure and design of the CCJ. It consisted of Jamaica, Trinidad and
Tobago, Barbados, Guyana, St Kitts and Nevis, and St Lucia and the Grenadines. The former four of these
states are designated as MDCs, while the latter two are considered LDCs.
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and knowledge elites at the regional level. While this is true for Trinidad, the economic elite has a greater
potential to influence the political elite at the regional level. See explanation in previous paragraphs.
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For instance, in 1987, at the Eighth Conference of the Heads of Government,
ANR Robinson proposed a Caribbean Court of Appeal in order to “reinforce a feeling of
togetherness, sincerity and common destiny…which could serve to gradually deepen the
integration process” (Robinson cited in Hall, 2003a, pp. 875-876). This proposal was
endorsed by the Jamaican government. In 1989, it was his speech entitled “The West
Indies Beyond 1992” at the Tenth Meeting that laid the foundation for the Grand Anse
Declaration, which was responsible for setting up the WIC96 that later supported his
proposal for a Caribbean Court of Appeal vested with not only an appellate jurisdiction
but also an original jurisdiction (Gilbert-Robert, 2013; Hall, 2003a, 2003b; Payne, 2008;
Pollard, 2004).
Prime Minister Patrick Manning actively sought to have the seat of the CCJ in
Trinidad and at the Fifteenth Meeting the “Member States of the Caribbean Community
appeared to have accepted in principle that the seat of the Court would be located in
Trinidad and Tobago” (Pollard, 2004, p. 201). By the 20th Meeting and the Seventh
Intersessional Meeting, Prime Minister Basdeo Panday informed attendees that his
government had identified the location where the CCJ would be housed (Panday cited in
Hall, 2003a). Details of the substantive bargaining could not be determined; however,
given the suggestion made by this MDC was unanimously voted for by the Conference,
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the degree of influence from the Trinidad government cannot be denied. Bargaining led
to the consideration of a regional court and Trinidad as the seat of the CCJ.
Trinidad, however, did not dominate PREPCOM negotiations. It was one of four
MDCs on the committee, which gave the larger and/or wealthier states approximately
sixty-seven percent influence over the CCJ structure. The degree of influence from the
Trinidadian government was limited as eighty percent of the CCJ Agreement reflected
the submissions provided by the Jamaican political elites (Pollard, 2004).97 Nevertheless,
Trinidadian PREPCOM member Attorney-General Ramesh Maharaj did insist the
Agreement include the clause that CCJ candidates be of “high moral character,
intellectual and analytical ability, sound judgment, integrity, and understanding of people
and society” (Pollard, 2004, p. 33; Article 4§11). He further provided the impression
there was general collaboration among the PREPCOM representatives on the final
structure of the CCJ. On the independence of the judges, Maharaj remarked that “we have
tried to put safeguards [in place] in order to ensure that the judges would be independent;
that no politician would be able to dictate to the judges how they should decide cases [in
order] to ensure that the public will have confidence in the judges” (Rawlins, 2000, p.
32). His remark seems to validate Pollard’s (2004) observation that PREPCOM took an
inclusive approach to the development of the Agreement establishing the CCJ.
On the other hand, given that most of the suggestions from Jamaica ended up in
the final document, the inclusive argument seems misleading. Inclusiveness should have
amounted to a more balanced document that reflected a more equal representation from
all the representatives. Further, the impression of inclusiveness and collaboration took a
97
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hit years later when Maharaj knocked the CCJ as a tribunal and questioned its relevance.
He criticized the very judicial safeguard he once promoted as being a “watered-down
version of what was originally intended and…questioned the selection of CCJ judges,
[calling] on them to resign and [reiterating]…that the court could be subjected to political
interference” (BBC Caribbean, April 18, 2005). This reads as Trinidad being on the
losing end of the substantive bargaining or political anger at an adverse decision.
While it is difficult to ascertain the degree of influence Trinidad had over the
Agreement establishing the CCJ, it would have had greater influence over The Caribbean
Court of Justice (Original Jurisdiction) Rules, 2006, and The Caribbean Court of Justice
(Original Jurisdiction) (Amendment) Rules, 2006, with a Trinidadian as President of the
CCJ and another seated as a Justice among the group of seven Justices. The former
document was drafted by legal technocrats of the Legal Affairs Committee and the
CARICOM Secretariat. This document was eventually thrown out by the CCJ Justices.
The final document was modified and formulated by the CCJ Justices. The amendment
document was also entirely devised by the Justices (Pollard 2004; TT28, Interview,
September 12, 2012; TT30, Interview, September 19, 2012; TT34, Interview, September
25, 2012).
The Justices reviewed the Privy Council Rules, the Ordering Council (for
procedures for going to the Privy Council), the Rules of the Court of Appeal from
Trinidad and Tobago, the WTO, the International Court of Justice and the ECJ rules for
inspiration (TT28, Interview, September 12, 2012; TT30, Interview, September 19, 2012;
TT34, Interview, September 25, 2012). They, however, maintained that the process was
collaborative and could not remember the specific ideas put forward by individual judges.
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One CCJ Justice recalls, “I don’t think I can take credit for introducing any particular
rule. It was a joint effort” (TT30, Interview, September 19, 2012). Another CCJ Justice,
corroborated this position. He recollects “it was very collaborative. The seven of us sat
down for months, every day. We had rules of other courts that are kind of similar and we
had the [Revised] Treaty and the Agreement establishing the Court and on the basis of
those documents we crafted our own rules. It was very slow deliberate going” (TT34,
Interview, September 25, 2012). Given these responses it is difficult to determine the
substantive bargaining that would have taken place at these meetings; nevertheless, the
fact the President of the CCJ was Trinidadian places Trinidad in a position to have the
final word on the Rules of the Court.
Regional Dynamics: Discussion. Neo-functionalism maintains that the economic
elite and interest groups should be at the center of regional integration process. However,
CARICOM’s formal structure and the lack of transnational ties and cooperation among
the CARICOM economic elite in pursuit of “economic reform along the line of least
resistance” (Hooghe and Marks 2008, 4) so as to foster added institutionalization and
governing complexity limits this argument. This makes neo-functionalism an inadequate
theory to explain Caribbean integration and the CCJ development. Liberal
intergovernmentalism is, therefore, preferable in explaining Trinidad’s path towards
greater integration with other CARICOM member states and the establishment of the
CCJ. National preference formation, interstate negotiation and bargaining, and Trinidad’s
reasons for/against a move towards the transfer of sovereignty to a regional organization
(the CCJ) can be traced through the available documentation.
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It was expected, like in the case of Jamaica, that Trinidad with its relative wealth
would have had a high degree of influence. While its heads of government actively
lobbied for a regional court and for the seat of the CCJ, it seemed to take a step back in
providing independent submissions for the Agreement establishing the CCJ. BraveboyWagner (2003) and Buddan (2001) assumed that given its wealth, the state’s ability to
train and secure skilled personnel would help to develop, promote, and provide
alternative proposals for the development and structure of the CCJ and, thus, make the
state more powerful and influential in regional negotiations and bargaining. However,
Trinidad was relegated to accepting the concerns of the JBA and supporting their
proposals for the Agreement.98 Such a stance is best explained by two factors: the
historical relationship among the CARICOM states and domestic politics.
There has been a sense of rivalry between MDCs and LDCs that has amounted to
“jealousy and the tendency to protect national turf… [which] has slowed the movement
toward greater unity” (The Globe and Mail, December 5, 1991). There have been
instances where smaller states were not compliant with the desires of the larger states.
Differences in development between CARICOM MDCs and LDCs in the 1960s and
1970s led to some actors within the LDCs opposing the deepening of the integration
process and it also affected collaboration with similar actors in MDCs in subsequent
years (Payne 1980, 46). Therefore, so as not to reignite such rivalries and invective
against itself, Trinidad would have downplayed the relative power its wealth would
provide in order to see the regional court it envisioned come to life.
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Details on a lack of independent submissions are addressed in the Domestic Dynamics section of this
chapter.
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With regards to domestic politics, Trinidad had a single party majority
government between the years of the proposed regional court and the formation of
PREPCOM. This allowed the political leadership and/or his/her agents to wield
unmitigated power when representing state affairs. However, once the PREPCOM was
formed, Trinidad had a coalition government, which may have diminished some of the
power of the political leadership and/or his/her agent due to continuous consultations
between parties in the coalition. This would have tempered the agent’s response in
PREPCOM. This factor is further discussed in the domestic dynamics section of this
chapter.
The discussion now moves to the domestic level of analysis in order to explain
how Trinidad’s local elites’ negotiations and bargaining defined national preference on
the structure of the CCJ.
DOMESTIC DYNAMICS OF REGIONAL INTEGRATION
Background. Trinidad & Tobago was one of the later acquisitions of the British
Empire. With the abolition of the slave trade and emancipation of slaves, the plantations
had lost the free labor of the African slaves and as such, the plantation owners were
forced to hire indentured servants from India and, to a lesser extent, China, to work the
plantations. The influx of indentured servants led to the East Indians and Africans being
the largest ethnic groups. The almost equal number of Africans and East Indians and the
large mixed race population have made race a factor in people’s perceptions and it has a
great effect on politics and society. For many years, sectors within society were
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dominated by race. The “Whites”99 dominated the private sector, the “Blacks”, who were
concentrated in urban area, dominated politics and the public sector, and the “Indians”,
who were found mainly in the rural area, dominated agriculture (Hintzen, 2003; Ryan,
1999).
Like Jamaica, the condition of colonization saw Trinidad & Tobago adopting a
form of the Westminster parliamentary system called the Whitehall model and a singlemember district plurality (SMP) electoral formula. It was influenced by the legacy of a
Crown Colony Government (CCG). However, these factors did not lead to a stable two
party system and consistent majority governments as it did in Jamaica (Barrow-Giles &
Joseph, 2006; Emmanuel, 1992). Instead these factors and Trinidad’s ethnic composition
produced a rotation between coalition and majority governments and the calling of
elections in rapid succession either due to members of parliament ‘crossing the floor’ or a
previous deadlocked election that did not produce an outright majority. Additionally, like
Jamaica, all these factors and traditions also produced limited representation with
authoritarian and anti-democratic features in the form of charismatic leadership and
Caribbean styled patronage politics (Buddan, 2001; Barrow-Giles, 2002; Ryan, 1999).
Civil society groups were born out of the labor unrest of the 1930s (Barrow-Giles,
2002; Buddan, 2001). This gave birth to the trade union movement that, like Jamaica,
was headed by the black and “coloured” educated professionals, who demanded a share
of political power (Hintzen, 2003; Ryan, 1972). The labor movement and British
acceptance of its demands gave rise to the formation of political parties in the 1950s,
99

This group included descendants of the French and Spanish planter class, who occupied Trinidad before
British rule, the British, and Syrian and Lebanese immigrants.
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Table 7
Electoral Outcomes in Trinidad and Tobago from 1981 – 2002
Year

Political Party

Number of Seats won in the House
of Representatives (T=36 seats)

1981

PNM
UNC/ULF
Other Parties and
Independents
PNM
NAR
PNM
NAR
UNC/ULF
PNM
NAR
UNC
PNM
NAR
UNC
PNM
NAR
UNC
PNM
NAR
UNC

26
10
2

Percentage of Seats won in the
House of Representatives
(T=100%)
53
15
32

3
33
21
2
13
17
2
17
16
1
19
18
18
20
16

32
66
45
24
29
47
6
47
44
3
53
50
50
56
44

1986
1991
1995100
2000101
2001102
2002

Note. Adapted from General Elections & Voting in the English-Speaking Caribbean 1992
– 2005, (pp. 120-122), by C. Barrow-Giles and T. Joseph, 2006, Kingston, Jamaica: Ian
Randle Publishers.
which were led by “a black and coloured intellectual and professional elite and…East
Indian and white businessmen and professionals” (Hintzen, 2003, p. 400). In 1956, the
Democratic Labour Party (DLP) was formed by Hindu Indo-Trinidadians, white
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This was a deadlocked election. The UNC formed a coalition government with the NAR.
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The UNC government was dissolved within the year because of factionalism with the party and the
Trinidad and Tobago President’s refusal to appoint a number of defeated UNC members as members of the
Senate and/or as junior ministers (Barrow-Giles & Joseph, 2006; Ryan, 2003).
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This was another deadlocked election. After negotiations among the PNM, the UNC, and the President
of Trinidad & Tobago, the President invited the PNM to form the government. The UNC, however, was not
pleased with his decision and made governability impossible, thus, forcing the PNM to call early elections
(Barrow-Giles & Joseph, 2006; Ryan, 2003).
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businessmen and the white planter class (Ryan, 1972). The People’s National Movement
(PNM) was formed and headed by the multi-racial elite, which later became
predominantly Afro-Trinidadian with the promotion of creole nationalism (Ryan, 1972).
With the PNM forming the government in 1962, access to the government and
bureaucracy and the distribution of resources became increasingly race-based and elite
driven. Percy Hintzen (2003) remarked that while isolating the Hindu Indo-Trinidadians
and some segments of working class Afro-Trinidadians,
the middle-class elite developed strong ties with the local business elite and the
multiracial group of professionals, managers and skilled and technical labor. It
recruited white businessmen to advisory positions in government, giving them
considerable influence over economic policy. All these became linked to party’s
middle strata of black and coloured workers in the public sector in a new
constellation of elite interests. (p. 407)
This structure eventually led to an attempted revolt from some working class AfroTrinidadians and an alliance between working class Afro-Trinidadians and rural Hindu
Indo-Trinidadians to address this disparity in groups such as the United Labour Front
(ULF) (Ryan, 1999). Alliances and access to the government fluctuated as the PNM
began to lose support in the late 1970s and early 1980s. With this history, the relationship
between civil society, that is, the knowledge and economic elites, and the state cannot be
described as swinging between eras of cooperation and conflict as in Jamaica but as one
of continued conflict due to changing alliances and access to resources.
Civil society, politics and the state have changed in recent years. They have
become more heterogeneous, first, with a mixed civil service, and a greater mix within
parliament and the executive since the 1980s and second, with an influx of IndoTrinidadian businessmen into manufacturing and commerce and racially based
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organizations, such as trade unions and manufacturing associations, having since
amalgamated (Hintzen, 2003; Meighoo, 2003; Meighoo & Jamadar, 2008; Ryan 1999,
2003). Trinidadians have worked to develop power-sharing models of governance in the
public and private sectors, and civil society in order to promote better organization and
greater inclusiveness, and to combine the country’s limited resources (Buddan, 2001;
Ryan, 1999). The country has also established joint committees with representatives from
the public and private sectors and/or other civil society groups in most government
ministries. They meet on a regular basis with the respective government minister advising
him/her on policy decisions (WTO, n.d.).
Domestic Elite Influence.
Political Elite Influence. The parties of relevance to CCJ development and
establishment, the People’s National Movement (PNM),103 the National Alliance for
Reconstruction (NAR),104 and the United National Congress (UNC) are all center-left
political parties (Ryan, 1999). Trinidadian political parties, which are located close to the
center, had moderate to strong favor for regional integration and its supporting
institutions. Thus, the expected vast differences between the various types of parties and
ideologies on the issue of regional integration, as seen in Europe, are negligible. Also, it
should be noted that given that the UNC, with the help of the NAR, had been in power
during the negotiation stages of PREPCOM (1995-2001) and the signing of the CCJ
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The PNM is a very unique case. It has swung between center-left and center-right since its inception in
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The NAR lost much of it support after losing the 1991 general elections. Many former members have
since either joined the PNM or the UNC, run as an independent or formed their own party (Ryan 1999).
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Agreement (2001), the position of government remained consistent during that time. Any
objections from the major opposition party, the PNM, did not hinder efforts to any
significant degree. However, the coalition between the UNC and the NAR may have
tempered the aggressiveness of the UNC political leadership who would have consult
with its minor partner on matters of importance (Ryan, 2003). The differences between
these two parties again is negligible given that they were both left of center parties.
Unlike Jamaica, the ideology of nationalism as opposed to the ideology of
regionalism is not a good indicator for support for regional integration and the CCJ. The
Trinidadian political elite support for regional integration efforts have been largely
consistent. This is due to Trinidadian leaders embracing a more regional outlook (GilbertRoberts, 2013; Hall, 2003a; Mullerleile, 1995; Payne, 2008). More specifically, this is on
account of Trinidad not having a strong Opposition for much of its post-independence
history. The PNM exercised uninterrupted rule from 1956 until 1986 and Mullerleile
states that this led to the government of “Trinidad and Tobago…[playing] a less
nationalistic role” than in countries like Jamaica on issues relating to regional integration
(1995, p. 188). Eric Williams, founder of the PNM, was one of the main Caribbean
negotiators during consultations between the British Government and the new and
emerging Caribbean leaders, which later produced the West Indies Federation. Even after
the failure of the federation, Williams continued to support the idea of a political union
among Anglo-Caribbean states until his death in 1981. He saw it as a means of
developing a Caribbean identity around which the various ethnic groups in the Trinidad
& Tobago could converge (Gilbert-Roberts, 2013, p. 43). His most notable proposals
came in the form of a 1973 essay entitled, “A New Federation for the Commonwealth
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Caribbean”, and the 1974 establishment of a Caribbean Task Force on Integration
(Mullerleile, 1995; Payne, 2008). In his essay, he had proposed that there be a Federal
Court, a full 20 years before the WIC’s similar recommendation. The taskforce report
recommended a gradual move towards a political union among Antigua, Barbados,
Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, St Kitts and Nevis-Anguilla, St Lucia, St Vincent, and
Trinidad & Tobago.
His PNM successor, George Chambers, like Jamaica’s Edward Seaga, showed
little interest in regional integration. This position was due not to disinterest in the
movement but to two factors: the economic stagnation faced by Trinidad as a result of a
fall in oil prices and demand, and the growing ‘invective’ the country faced from other
CARICOM states (Braveboy-Wagner, 2008; Hall, 2003; Mullerleile, 1995). The
economic downturn meant that Trinidad had to decrease donor funding to its fellow
CARICOM states and undertake market reform so as to put Trinidad’s interests before
CARICOM (Braveboy-Wagner, 2008; Mullerleile, 1995). The ‘invective’ resulted in
Trinidadians reacting “to this vilification [by] re-assessing its costs and
benefits…[and]…their willingness to make sacrifices for CARICOM [which] has often
been rewarded with a studied lack of appreciation, with malice and with abuse”
(Chambers cited in Hall, 2003a, p. 794). In 1985, Chambers responded by imposing
import restrictions on goods from CARICOM states and declared that his administration
would not adhere to the agreement made under the Nassau Understanding, a decision he
reversed a year later (Financial Times, March 21, 1985, p. 6; Mullerleile, 1995, pp. 5354).
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Under the leadership of Prime Minister ANR Robinson, founder of the NAR,
came renewed interest in regional integration. It was his administration that proposed a
Caribbean Court of Appeal at the 1987 Heads of Government meeting, which was
supported by the Jamaican government (Hall, 2003; Payne, 2008, p. 262). He is further
credited for other regional initiatives such as the formation of the WIC and the Caribbean
Regional Economic Conference (Hall, 2003a; Gilbert-Roberts, 2013; Mullerleile, 1995;
Payne, 2008).
Patrick Manning, upon leading his PNM administration from 1991 to 1995 and
from 2001 to 2010, supported the establishment of a Caribbean Court after reading the
preliminary WIC Report and he suggested Port of Spain as host of the CCJ (JM24,
Interview, August 16, 2012; Mullerleile, 1995; Pollard, 2003). Additionally, he proposed
the Manning Initiative, which sought to establish a confederation among Barbados,
Guyana, and Trinidad & Tobago (Barrow-Giles, 2002).
Finally, Basdeo Panday, founder of the UNC and Prime Minister from 1995 to
2001, showed continued support for regional integration and the CCJ. His administration
endorsed both jurisdictions, identified the future residence of the CCJ, provided a
PREPCOM member, and signed the final agreement establishing the CCJ (Hall, 2003a;
Payne, 2008; The Jamaica Observer, January 23, 2004).
Partisanship has had less of an effect on support for regional integration overall.
However, Trinidad has had its share of partisanship affecting support for the CCJ. It is
not as pronounced as in Jamaica and largely affected support for the appellate jurisdiction
of the Court, which is not the focus of this dissertation. The UNC government had fully
endorsed both jurisdictions. At the Twelfth Intersessional Heads of Government meeting
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held in February 2001, Panday unequivocally proclaimed that “Trinidad and Tobago's
continuing commitment to and support for the establishment of the Caribbean Court of
Justice. Indeed, the temporary Headquarters of Port-of-Spain for the Court will be ready
for occupancy by the end of April 2001” (Panday cited in Hall, 2003a, p. 837). He did so
under the argument of engendering constitutional reform to Trinidad (Hinds, 2005; Ryan,
2001).
Panday, during his time as prime minster, had only once backtracked on this
position. This occurred when he considered rescinding the offer to have Port of Spain be
the seat of the CCJ due to his government’s contemplation of only partial acceptance of
the appellate jurisdiction for criminal cases. He reneged after consultations with the
Opposition and the Law Association of Trinidad & Tobago (LATT) (Trinidad Express,
February 22, 2001 cited in Ryan, 2001, p. 193). From this, it can be concluded that the
Opposition PNM was unwavering in its support for the full implementation of the CCJ
(Lilla, 2008).
Once the UNC became the Opposition in 2001, it resisted the complete ascension
to both jurisdictions of the CCJ. It stated it would not supply the two-thirds majority
needed to pass the CCJ bill unless there was constitutional reform in Trinidad (Hinds,
2005; The Jamaica Observer, January 23, 2004). Panday alleged that “[without]
constitutional reform the court could be very dangerous [and] with a Government like the
PNM in office and in power one has to be extremely careful in setting up that court”
(Trinidad Express, April 14, 2004 cited in Hinds, 2005, p. 11). After calls from Prime
Minister Manning to put partisan politics aside, the UNC remained unmoved, even going
as far as abstaining from a parliamentary vote to enact the CCJ as the court of first resort
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(Hinds, 2005, p. 11). Given the unwavering stance of the UNC, the PNM government
withdrew the bill shortly thereafter. One former Attorney-General, Keith Sobion,
questioned this position as “you had a government who signed an agreement and now
saying that they are not going to support the legislation to implement the
agreement…You cannot, for example, say that I sign an agreement to establish a
Caribbean Court and because I am in opposition that the agreement is bad. Why did you
sign it? If it had technical flaws why did you sign it?” (The Jamaica Observer, January
23, 2004). The UNC’s stance came as a result of the President of Trinidad, ANR
Robinson, declaring the PNM victor in the 2001 deadlock election. This angered Panday
and led to repeated roadblocks to governance by the UNC (Hinds, 2005; Ryan, 2003).
Economic Elite Influence. Early preferences towards CARICOM were largely
economic. The local Trinidadian economic elite has always exerted much influence on
national government representatives (the political elite) in support for greater regional
economic integration. This is on account of the country experiencing a windfall during
the oil shocks of the 1970s, which motivated private sector undertakings to expand their
market to the wider CARICOM area (IDB, 2005; Mullerleile, 1995). Unlike Jamaica,
these circumstances had allowed for Trinidad to be dominated by industrialists,
producers, and manufacturers (IDB, 2005; Mullerleile, 1995; JM17, Interview, July 31,
2012; TT25, Interview, September 3, 2012). The private sector, in the form of small and
large Pan Caribbean corporations, has been known to develop strong ties with other
CARICOM states through the acquisition of local businesses and financial institutions
(IDB, 2005; JM17, Interview, July 31, 2012). In addition, Trinidad’s government and
private sector are heavily dependent on one another due in part to “the private sector
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financing investment proposals for themselves and for the country” (Dookeran, January
31, 2012, p. 7; Braveboy-Wagner, 2008).
As key stakeholders in the process, the economic elite has affected the Caribbean
integration process through its symbiotic relationship with the government. A trade
specialist describes the relationship as “a nice template that we work with the government
and I know it’s not the template of the Caribbean. We have that kind of relationship
because we developed those kinds of frameworks, a road map. So, no matter if the
personnel changes once we follow the road map all is well” (TT26, Interview, September
4, 2012). This framework comes in the form of joint committees – The Standing
Advisory Committee on Trade and Related Matters and The Technical Coordinating
Committee (TCC). The former is driven by the private sector and “advises the Minister of
Trade and Industry on trade policy formulation” (WTO, n. d., p.17; TT25, Interview,
September 3, 2012; TT26, Interview, September 4, 2012; TT31, Interview, September 21,
2012), while the latter is “headed by the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Trade
and Industry…comprising representatives from the public and private sectors and civil
society, [and] advises the Minister of Trade and Industry on trade policy issues taking the
national perspective into account” (WTO, n.d., p. 17; TT26, Interview, September 4,
2012).
One trade development specialist addressed how both committees work. He
states,
at the Ministry of Trade we have TCC…Once a month we try to meet to bring the
stakeholders together to shape policy…Likewise the TTMA105 is the chair of what
we call the standing committee where the private sector and…some government
105

Trinidad and Tobago Manufacturers Association

197

representatives…pull key stakeholders from the business
community…and…come together to discuss topical issues that we want
government to take care of. Not necessarily national, it could be regional as
well…The minister gives us his ear. The minutes from that meeting goes directly
to the minister…So, from the government perspective you have the TCC and
from the Private sector you have the standing committee. So from two ends we try
to tackle to problems and try to shape policy and inform policy. (TT26, Interview,
September 4, 2012)
Knowledge Elite Influence. The knowledge elite, like those in Jamaica, show
greater oneness of mind on the benefits of regional integration and the need to strengthen
associated organizations, like the CCJ, to ensure CARICOM’s success. The knowledge
elite’s influence is limited for some but very open for others.
As was the case in Jamaica, Trinidadian academics primarily conducted lectures,
participated in interviews, and wrote papers, books, reports, and articles on the subjects
of regional integration, regional and national policies, and the CCJ, for which no direct
link can be made as to whether these points were received by the political elite and/or
forwarded to PREPCOM. For instance, Selwyn Ryan, a senior academic at the University
of the West Indies, St Augustine, used his columns in the Trinidad Sunday Express to
discuss his views on Trinidad’s role in regional integration and the CCJ. He even
published a book entitled The Judiciary and Governance in the Caribbean that
summarized the region’s views of Caribbean jurisprudence and the CCJ appellate
jurisdiction. Beyond that there is no record of him sitting on committees, formulating
working papers for government officials, and/or representing his country at CARICOM
gatherings on the subject.106
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See the list of his professional activities listed on the Sir Arthur Lewis Institute of Social and Economic
Studies website at http://sta.uwi.edu/salises/RyanProfessionalActivities.asp.
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There were other senior academics, such as Trinidadian economist Lloyd Best and
Jamaican born Norman Girvan, who have acted as technocrats for the Trinidadian and
other Caribbean governments (Mullerleile, 1995, p. 168). Girvan, a former Secretary
General of the Association of Caribbean States (ACS), has written numerous reports on
Caribbean integration and the CCJ and has attended many CARICOM level meetings.
His large volume of work is well read among political, economic and knowledge elites
across the region and it has influenced their positions on a number of issues. Much of his
work is also readily available and has informed Caribbean leaders of his views on
particular Caribbean policies (Girvan, n.d.).107
Influence of Mass Public Opinion. Like Jamaica, a few public education and
consultation exercises on the CCJ and regional integration were conducted, however, it
could not be determined whether these exercises influenced the political elite or merely
served as a forum for the public to learn about the role of the Court. For example, the
WIC noted in its Time for Action Report that it held four public consultations in Trinidad
& Tobago – two in Port of Spain, and one in Tobago, and San Fernando, respectively.
However, according to its Appendices E and F, most of the submissions to the
commission from Trinidad & Tobago came from representatives of the government and
opposition, UWI academia, civil society groups, and the media. Another instance of
public consultation was held in 1999 and attended by the Attorney-General, high ranking
members of the military, police, and the coast guard, and trade and manufacturing
associations’ representatives. Attorneys and future CCJ justices were also in attendance.
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Mass public opinion in these instances was limited as most attendees were members from
the middle and upper classes.
Where there were a few newspaper editorials and articles108 and discussions in
parliament109 on the topic, the debate was still restricted to highly skilled professionals,
tertiary educated individuals, journalists and the middle to upper class members of
society. Again, the focus was on the appellate jurisdiction (Lilla, 2008; Ryan, 2001). Like
the JBA,110 LATT suggested reforming the local justice system before any consideration
be made in joining the appellate section of the CCJ (Pollard, 2004; Ryan, 2001). In
parliament, then Prime Minister Basdeo Panday debated whether Trinidad would ascribe
to the CCJ’s appellate jurisdiction only in criminal matters while maintaining the Privy
Council for civil cases (Trinidad Express, February 22, 2001 cited in Ryan, 2001).
Panday also maintained he considered withdrawing Trinidad’s offer of Port of Spain as
the seat of the Court but reneged on this proposal only after consulting with the
Opposition and LATT (Ryan, 2001).
Surveys performed among ordinary citizens on the topic during the period under
investigation confirm that researchers and pollsters focused most of their attention and
questioning on elite members of society. Similar to Jamaica, polls on the topic occurred
around the time of the establishment of the CCJ and/or centered on the hotly debated and
divisive aspects of the appellate jurisdiction of the Court. Some of the responses to these
108
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polls do provide insight into the public’s view of the Court and their possible
involvement in the structuring of the Court. In a 2008 survey commissioned by the CCJ
entitled “Promoting the Caribbean Court of Justice as the Final Court of Appeal for States
of the Caribbean Community,” 500 Trinidadians from all walks of life were questioned
about their knowledge of the CCJ’s original and appellate jurisdictions. Table 8 shows
their specific responses about the CCJ and regional integration.
Table 8
Trinidadians’ Responses to Questions about the CCJ (N=500)
Question
Do you know about the Caribbean Court of Justice?
Do you know that the CCJ is two courts in one?
Do you know what the CSME is?111

Yes
73.2%
22%
10.5%

No
26.8%
78%
89.5%

Note. Adapted from Promoting the Caribbean Court of Justice as the Final Court of
Appeal for States of the Caribbean Community (pp. 77-84) by M. Lilla. 2008, Trinidad:
The Caribbean Court of Justice.
As it relates to the questions, most respondents could not identify the CCJ unless
prompted by the interviewer (Lilla, 2008). Of those respondents, he noted that the
majority associated it with being a final court of appeal (Lilla, 2008, p. 77). He found that
not many respondents associated the CCJ with regional integration. According to Michael
Lilla, only a few respondents “thought it was a CARICOM court as such, [with] its
business to handle purely CARICOM trade and commercial matters” (Lilla, 2008, p. 77).
From those respondents, most were either lawyers or businessmen with a small number
of well-informed working class individuals (Lilla, 2008, p. 79). He further observed that
only a handful of persons were able to recognize the CSME and associate it with the CCJ
(Lilla, 2008, p. 84). Those who did had direct involvement with the CSME through their
111
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participation in the free movement of the skilled individuals.112 Thus, it was not
surprising the CCJ Agreement was not based on public opinion.
Aside from surveys, mass public opinion on the issue was represented by the
“man-in-the-street interviews reported in the newspapers, or on television usually giving
the opinions of five or six people on the instant topic,” which does not provide enough of
a salient mass opinion (Lilla, 2008, p. 76). Additionally, the responses demonstrated the
lack of knowledge about either jurisdiction of the CCJ. As late as 2008, The Trinidad
Guardian asked people on the street their views about whether the CCJ was fulfilling its
role. One response suggested, “No. Because they are not solving simple problems like
crime, food and shelter. They can’t solve basic things” (The Trinidad and Tobago
Guardian, April 28, 2008 cited in Lilla, 2008, p. 90). The discussions during the period,
therefore, did not provide the public with a comprehensive picture of the role and benefit
of the CCJ. Trinidadian academic, Lloyd Best, described the image portrayed of the CCJ
as being “a mere vehicle for the death penalty or worse, a place where trade and
investment disputes are settled between and among governments and corporations…there
is little concern about how the Courts functioned to deliver justice in the different
jurisdictions” (The Trinidad Express, February 25, 2001 cited in Ryan, 2001, p. 194).
These responses also show the public education programs did not work in
Trinidad as the public was unable to recognize the original jurisdiction role of the Court.
Accordingly, it shows there is a high probability the public did not contribute to the
structure and establishment of the CCJ’s original jurisdiction. Like Jamaica, the lack of
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knowledge on the original jurisdiction could be a result of the focus being on the
appellate section of the Court and whether Trinidad should remain with the Privy
Council. Unlike Jamaica, there was very little discussion about the CCJ outside of that
among the political, knowledge, and economic elite. LATT is cited as simply stating it
could not support the CCJ’s appellate jurisdiction at the time and the private sector was
said to raise concerns “though it is not clear what these were” (Ryan, 2001, p.192). The
most vocal civil society group on the issue was not even a local one. In the local media,
Amnesty International referred to the CCJ as the “hanging court,” which “could impact
its ability to uphold international judicial standards in contentious cases” (Trinidad
Express, February 17, 2000 cited in Ryan, 2001, p. 172).
The lack of knowledge of original jurisdiction can be attributed to the subject
political culture prevalent in Trinidad & Tobago. Public opinion and the public at large
are directed by the elites due to the weak and passive nature of citizens towards political
institutions (Almond & Verba, 1963). The ordinary Trinidadian is more concerned with
his material interests, the high incidence of crime and corruption in the country, and the
country’s underlying ethnic and racial tensions (Lilla, 2008; Ryan, 1999, 2001). They
paid little attention to the CCJ issues that were hotly debated.
Varying Degrees of Domestic Elite Influence. Political leaders (the government
and the opposition) have been the most influential on the CCJ’s development. The degree
to which the economic elite, the knowledge elite, and the public had any influence was
more difficult to ascertain. From the records and the recollections of interviewees, I
found that members of the economic and knowledge elite were, more often than not, not
consulted, but put their support behind it. Only one, a director of a private sector
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organization, could confirm that there was limited consultation; however, he/she recalled
that he/she ignored an invitation to the public consultation (TT31, Interview, September
21, 2012).
While Trinidad has a framework for continual consultations with the economic
elite and other civil society groups, the government sought approval after the Agreement
establishing the CCJ was finalized. A trade specialist attached to the Trinidad and Tobago
Manufacturers Association (TTMA) recalls that “what was handed down to us regarding
original jurisdiction, we endorsed” (TT26, Interview, September, 4, 2012). This was also
true for the Trinidad and Tobago Chamber of Industry and Commerce (TTCIC), which as
late as 2012 continued to submit articles to the Trinidad Express and the Trinidad and
Tobago Guardian regarding its endorsement and promotion of the CCJ’s original
jurisdiction.113 Therefore, I was unable to confirm in my study of the CCJ, Witter’s
(2004) and the ADA’s (2006) observations about the interaction between groups or
individuals and the government.
The legal fraternity, on the other hand, was approached and proved not to be as
influential as its Jamaican counterpart. As noted by Pollard (2004), the JBA was the only
one of these legal organizations to provide official recommendations. This was confirmed
by five of the six jurists I interviewed and all six jurists applauded the Jamaican Bar’s
effort and fully supported their proposals and concerns. One Trinidadian jurist recalled,
The Trinidadians were not as organized as the Jamaicans. We had consultations
and people made oral statements but in Jamaica you had people like AJ Nicholson
113
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who had seriously looked into the question and took the time to write criticisms.
The Jamaican Bar wrote a document to which they detailed their criticisms. We in
the Trinidad Bar didn’t have a document but people spoke at the consultations.
(TT30, Interview, September 19, 2012)
He further recalled that at the public consultations he supported two points made by the
JBA – the judicial independence of the Court in the form of the Regional Legal Services
Commission (RJLSC) and the fiscal independence of the Court (The Trust Fund).
Another jurist went as far as to state that, “fortunately the Jamaican Bar Association dealt
with it very responsibly…Jamaica played a really profound part” (TT34, Interview,
September 25, 2012).
The governing UNC proposed that the selection of judges be similar to that of the
US Supreme Court, however, the proposal was rejected (Lilla, 2008) because PREPCOM
desired a court that was free from political influence, which is a major concern for all the
CARICOM member states (Pollard, 2004). However, both it and the Opposition PNM’s
proposal to have the seat of the Court in Trinidad was accepted. The outcomes from
consultations in Trinidad are listed below in Table 9.
To conclude economic and socio-cultural elite influence was limited but some
input made it into the next phase. The legal fraternity was only as influential as its
support for the JBA’s submission. It is the political elite who drove the discussions and
provided proposals that were passed on to PREPCOM.

Table 9
Proposals that were Accepted and Rejected from the Trinidadian Contingent
Specific positions accepted and in the
various agreements establishing the CCJ

Specific positions rejected
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Article 3 and The Agreement
Establishing the Seat of The Caribbean
Court of Justice – The Seat of the CCJ
should be in Port of Spain, Trinidad
(PNM and UNC)
Article 4, Section 11 – criteria for the
judges: “high moral character,
intellectual and analytical ability, sound
judgment, integrity, and understanding
of people and society”(AttorneyGeneral)



Judge selection should be similar to
that of the US Supreme Court (UNC)

Domestic Dynamics: Discussion. Given the overview of the degree of influence
from these groups and individuals, my initial anticipated forecasts about the influence of
the inner and outer circles were correct. The inner circle114 consists of political leaders in
government and jurists who were not included in the initial assumption. The outer circles,
in order of influence, consisted of opposition members of parliament, the private sector
and non-governmental organizations, the knowledge elite, the media and the general
public. It was found that the discussions provided by members of the outer circles had
limited impact on inner circle decisions regarding the CCJ at the regional and national
levels. The political elite did depend more on the opinions of other political elites outside
of government, that is, the opposition and jurists, than the opinions of the economic elite,
knowledge elite or the public. All avenues ended with the national executive members
(the Head of Government and the Attorney General) having a direct influence on the
development of the CCJ. It was the government and/or its representative who defined its
interests based on current circumstances, the national leader’s ideology and personal
preferences, and previous decisions and institutions. The government would later
negotiate and bargain the state’s position at the regional level on the structure of the new
114
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institutional framework, the CCJ that would ensure the predictable environment
necessary for economic development (See Figure 11).
CONCLUSION: LESSONS LEARNED
My study of the development of the CCJ has examined three levels of influence.
At the international level, the data confirmed both hypotheses, that is, H1a: Increased
global trade intensifies regional economic integration, which results in the demand for the
judicial governance of the latter activity; and H1b: Increased regionalization in the
Americas and Europe will renew GCSS’ interest in regional trade and supporting regional
institutions. In the first instance, Trinidad, with a more open economy, had for many
years experienced increased trade in goods both extra-regionally and intra-regionally.
Trinidad’s wealth shaped and prepared both the government and the private sector in
such a manner that placed the local economy in a good position before the economic
downturn in the 1980s. The government’s investment in its human and financial
resources in the 1970s provided for an enabling environment where the private sector
developed its knowledge of trade issues and its implications. So, when the country
experienced a downturn in the 1980s, it was open to neoliberal reform and the further
removal of barriers to interregional trade that quickly brought it out of its slump and
provided the basis for its support for institutions that would encourage economic
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integration. In the second instance, Trinidad’s experience with the NAFTA/FTAA
negotiations and its observation of the evolving EEC made the Trinidadian political elite
take the creation of the CSME and the CCJ more seriously as means of providing a stable
environment for trade and preparing CARICOM states for trade liberalization on a larger
scale.
At the regional level, my findings did not entirely confirm the hypothesis that the
largest and/or wealthiest within the bloc will have the greatest influence in the promotion
of/negotiation for regional integration and its institutions. Trinidad used its influence to
be appointed host for the CCJ, but downplayed the impact its wealth could have had in
the bargaining process in the PREPCOM meetings. It relegated itself to an almost
observer status. This outcome is due to domestic politics. Trinidad’s coalition
government and its desire to create an environment that would not repeat historical
rivalries and jealousies meant that it did not draw on the skill and expertise that should
have made the Trinidadian Attorney-General more forceful and influential.
At the domestic level, my findings confirm the hypothesis that states that “the
decision to promote/negotiate for new regional institutions rests almost entirely on the
political elite.” The literature and CARICOM institutional design establishes the political
elite as the initiators and interlocutors of national and regional policy. The political
system and culture dominant in the Caribbean breed authoritarian personalities who
dictate the ideology and make political decisions without the input of the public. While
this is true, I expected economic and knowledge elites and the public would have been
more involved in the formulation of the CCJ. Economic elite organizations were not
consulted and public sessions were mainly attended by the legal fraternity, who merely
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endorsed the JBA’s submissions. As a country with nationals who are viewed as
regionally minded the tempered approach to an institution that would oversee and ensure
the proper function of the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas and the CSME seemed out of
the ordinary.
Also, my hypothesis that the left of center political parties would support regional
integration and its institutions more than right of center parties could not be confirmed
because all the parties were left of center and supported regional integration to a similar
degree. Where there was contention in the form of partisanship, it was restricted to the
differing views over the appellate jurisdiction of the Court.
The hypothesis that elite public opinion rather than mass public opinion
influenced the political elite’s decision to promote/negotiate for regional integration and
its institutions was partially confirmed. The Trinidadian government has developed a
framework, unique to the region, of regular meetings with the private sector and civil
society on issues of national and regional importance. This is most pronounced at the
Ministry of Trade and Industry where the private sector freely informs the minister and
shapes the state’s economic policy at the national, regional, and international levels.
However, this was not true for the institution of interest, the CCJ, where the economic
and knowledge elites were largely ignored.
Finally, my findings also confirm that better organized economic and knowledge
elites have a greater influence on the political decision makers. This is because of
Trinidad’s unique governance framework. Those groups that were included were highly
organized with a constitution, held elections, did frequent reporting, had specialized
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subgroupings, were well-financed and headed by middle to upper class members of
society, namely the TTMA, TTCIC, and the TTCSI.
With the hypotheses tested, analyzed, and discussed for both Jamaica and
Trinidad & Tobago, the next chapter closes with a summary of what was learned and
outlines the possibilities for future research on this subject.
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CHAPTER 6:
CONCLUSION

OVERVIEW
Through this research, I sought to investigate the impact of elites on the
development and structure of the CCJ’s original jurisdiction. In order to do this, I took a
three pronged approach to the study. First, I addressed the international dynamics that
may have influenced the local Jamaican and Trinidadian economic, political, and socio
cultural elites in their support for or opposition to the deepening of the Caribbean
integration project. Second, I considered the regional dynamics of the process, that is, the
possible development of transnational ties among the various elites and the impact of a
country’s features on the regional negotiations leading to the final original jurisdiction.
Third, I focused on the domestic dynamics so as to determine the influence of societal
and state elites on the local process of negotiation and bargaining for a new regional
institutional framework.
The conclusion takes the following structure: It
1. Reminds the reader of the hypotheses and discusses how each was confirmed or
informed through a comparison of the empirical findings from Jamaica and
Trinidad & Tobago;
2. Discusses what the findings mean for the theories that generated these
hypotheses; and
3. Provides avenues for future research.
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EMPIRICAL FINDINGS
At the international level of analysis, the hypotheses suggested that international
trends may have led to CARICOM member states deepening regional integration and the
establishment of regional judicial institutions. H1a focused on the effect of neoliberal
globalization and proposed that “increased global trade intensifies regional economic
integration which results in the demand for the judicial governance of the latter activity.”
H1b sought to address the impact of developed states and international organizations on
this process; it posits that “increased regionalization in the Americas and Europe will
renew GCSS’115 interest in regional trade and supporting regional [legal] institutions.”
I discovered H1a was broadly confirmed for both Jamaica and Trinidad &
Tobago. The evidence, however, showed that the impact of neoliberal globalization was
somewhat different in each country. Increased global trade greatly affected Jamaica in a
negative way as it increased debt as global prices for traditional goods fell and free trade
became the order of the day. More specifically, Jamaica lost preferential access for its
traditional goods to the US and European markets and thus needed to reorganize its
economy. As a result, it adopted IMF SAPs that hurt rather than helped the economy due
to regressive economic initiatives taken by the government and the country’s economic
structure, which was focused on traditional industries. It, therefore, sought to export its
goods to other markets including to the CARICOM region. Yet, increased exports to
CARICOM did not occur for two reasons: first, because similar Trinidadian goods had
already saturated the region and second, local conditions such as high energy expenses
negated this growth. However, as Jamaica became the region’s number one importer,
115

GCSS are an acronym for geographically close small states.
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some local producers and importers still viewed it as a viable market and demanded that
the government address these issues so that Jamaica could better benefit from the
regional market. Thus, while it was Trinidad & Tobago that proposed a regional court,
Jamaica was the first to second this initiative and later sat as a member on PREPCOM
that formulated the rules governing the regional court.
On the other hand, increased global trade did not negatively affect Trinidad &
Tobago as it did Jamaica. It was already very open and competitive at the regional and
international level due to the structure of its economy, which focused more on energy and
the manufacturing industry, and the reformist economic initiatives taken by the
government and private sector. The downturn due to losses in the petrol market in the
early to mid-1980s led Trinidad to adopt neoliberal policies that further opened the
market and reinvigorated regional trade for the country. With the changing environment,
that is the loss of preferential access and the promotion of free trade, Trinidad continued
to grow its regional trade and called on other CARICOM states to follow suit in order to
become more competitive at the international level. This resulted in the Trinidadian
Prime Minister, ANR Robinson, calling for a regional court to ensure unity and economic
stability within the bloc. Trinidad & Tobago later sat as a member on PREPCOM.
Thus, while the impact of neoliberal globalization was different in each country, it
resulted in the same outcome. My research not only confirmed the hypothesis, but
identified the possible causal paths.
Regarding H1b, the hypothesis was confirmed in both countries. Jamaica
experienced losses in traditional and apparel exports upon the formation of NAFTA,
which renewed calls to revisit regional trade within CARICOM. NAFTA/FTAA
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negotiations further led to the Jamaican Prime Minister, Michael Manley, and his
Venezuelan counterpart setting the course to the formation of Association of Caribbean
States (ACS) so as to help the region negotiate with the US and even the EU on trade
issues. The prime minister also recognized that the changes in the EU called for a
reorganization of CARICOM to weather these changes, which he viewed as a positive
thing (The Financial Times, August 1, 1989; The Financial Post, August 2, 1989; The
Guardian, June 17, 1989). He supported the formation of the West Indian Commission
(WIC), which recommended creating a single market and economy and a regional court
with original jurisdiction to oversee it. These recommendations were accepted by all
member states and resulted in the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas (RTC), the CARICOM
Single Market and Economy (CSME), and PREPCOM.
The NAFTA/FTAA negotiations convinced Trinidad & Tobago that it would lose
approximately 80% of its market share in North and Latin America. This led to its
support for the deepening and widening of economic integration in the form of the CSME
and ACS. The country has recognized the SEA, European Commission support, and the
1996 EU Green Paper as reasons for deepening CARICOM economic integration. In
1989, the changes in the EEC and the Americas prompted the prime minister to make the
‘The West Indies Beyond 1992’ speech, which has been credited for the establishment of
the WIC that later recommended creating a single market and economy and a regional
court with original jurisdiction. Thus, H1b was not only confirmed, but suggests that the
regionalization of the Americas as the primary reason for Jamaica and Trinidad to
demand change. The loss of market share in the region renewed their interest in regional
trade and supporting regional institutions. The regionalization in Europe played a
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secondary role. Changes in the EEC did not generate the same fear that changes in the
Americas did. Instead they served as a blueprint that CARICOM states could follow to
better adapt to the changing international economic environment and improve its regional
endeavors.
At the regional level, I also sought to explain the process of regional negotiations
and the impact of state features on this process. H2 declares that “the largest and/or
wealthiest GCSS will have the greatest influence in the promotion of/negotiation for
regional integration and its institutions.” The hypothesis was confirmed for Jamaica but
only partially confirmed for Trinidad & Tobago. As CARICOM’s largest state in size and
population,116 Jamaica is CARICOM’s second largest contributor, its largest market, and
its number one importer of CARICOM goods. Given its status, Jamaica has been
predictably forceful and active during the Conferences of the Heads of Government.
Most of its proposals relating to a regional court, such as the renaming of the court, were
unanimously supported by other CARICOM member states. This forcefulness and
activity carried over into PREPCOM. Jamaica was extremely influential as 80% of the
suggestions made by the Jamaican contingent made its way into the CCJ Agreement.
Trinidad’s wealth, based on GDP per capita, has made the country CARICOM’s
largest contributor and its number one regional exporter. Like Jamaica, it was forceful
and active during the Conferences of the Heads of Government. Its proposals for deeper
integration and a regional court, such as its substance and location, were also
unanimously supported by other CARICOM member states. However, during the
116

Jamaica is considered the largest state in CARICOM because Haiti, even with its larger population, does
not participate in the CSME, and Guyana, though larger in square footage, has a smaller population than
Jamaica and Trinidad.
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PREPCOM negotiations the country was much less influential and merely supported
proposals provided by the Jamaican contingent.
This leaves me to conclude that population and size are more important than
wealth. Jamaica, with the larger labor force, contributed to the country’s ability to train
and secure skilled personnel who helped to develop, promote, and provide alternative
proposals for the development and structure of the CCJ. Conclusively, the greater
expertise and experience of the Jamaican personnel made it more powerful and influential
than other member states during regional negotiations and bargaining. Trinidad &
Tobago, a country approximately one-fourth of the size of Jamaica but twice as wealthy,
acted as one would expect a member state with significant bargaining power during the
Heads of Government meetings; however, it behaved as a less influential member state
during PREPCOM negotiations. Even with its wealth, Trinidad, a smaller country, has a
much smaller set of domestic institutions and interest groups, and a more centralized
government than Jamaica. Consequently, it was apparently less likely to offer the
services, if not the resources, that provided the experience and expertise needed for the
CCJ’s institutional design. Given that experience and expertise were limited to a few
persons within the central government, Trinidad was more dependent on another regional
actor, in this case Jamaica, “to supplement…and compensate for their relative incapacity”
(Buddan, 2001, p. 15).
Additionally, another causal factor for wealth not being as important as size
during the PREPCOM negotiations was Trinidad’s image. The country faced years of
invectives and jealousies from other member states over its wealth and status. Thus, it is
apparent Trinidad decided to downplay its power in order to be supportive of other
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PREPCOM representatives’ positions so as to see the Court it initially promoted come to
fruition.
At the domestic level of analysis, the hypotheses considered the degree of
influence of various types of elites on the deepening of regional economic integration and
the establishment of a regional judicial organization. H3a maintains that “the decision to
promote/negotiate for new regional institutions rests almost entirely on the political
elite.” H3a(i) argued that “left of center political parties will support regional integration
and its institutions more than right of center parties.” H3b addressed whether the public
had an impact on the process. It asserts that “elite public opinion rather than mass public
opinion will influence the political elite’s decision to promote/negotiate for regional
integration and its institutions.” Finally, H3b(i) sought to determine whether “better
organized economic and knowledge elite have greater influence on the political decision
makers.”
H3a has been confirmed for both countries. In Jamaica, the political leaders’
prerogatives took center stage. There were ad hoc meetings and communications with
other types of elites, which made the Jamaican political elite the initiators and
interlocutors of regional policy. There were consultations with the socio-cultural and
economic elites, and other political elites on the CCJ. The political elite organized a local
PREPCOM committee headed by political, legal and economic representatives, but the
final decision of what was submitted to PREPCOM rested with the Jamaican AttorneyGeneral. In Trinidad, I found that the political leadership still made the final decisions,
but the country had a unique framework that regularly included other types of elite
members in policymaking. However, this framework was not used when determining the
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direction of the CCJ. The economic elite and some members of the knowledge elite
maintained they were not consulted or provided proposals regarding the rules that would
govern the CCJ. Consultations were restricted largely to the political elite and the legal
elite, which overlaps with the political elite, thus, making the Trinidadian political elite
the initiators and interlocutors of regional policy. This is true for all CARICOM policy.117
H3a(i) could only be partially confirmed for Jamaica and not confirmed for
Trinidad & Tobago. While on the surface, the right of center JLP and the left of center
PNP confirm theoretical expectations,118 Jamaica does not have the extreme parties as
seen in the EU to effectively gauge the differences. The differences between the parties
are not based on party ideology but more appropriately on historical circumstances and
the party leader’s vision that sometimes give the impression that one party is more
regionally minded and the other more nationally minded. It is the country’s partisan
politics that causes one party to oppose an initiative for no other reason than to be in
opposition to the other political party. For Trinidad & Tobago, all of the political parties
of interest were left of center parties; they all supported deepening economic integration,
with some leaders proposing political integration with a few CARICOM states. Where
there were differences among Trinidadian political parties on regional institutions, they
had more to do with disagreement on specific aspects of a proposal or partisan politics
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Given that CARICOM operates on the principle of intergovernmentalism, all CARICOM organizations
and agreements are initiated by the political elite. Consultations with other elites within member states vary
depending on the type of organization or agreement formulated. However, it is the political elite uses its
right whether or not to do so. At the regional level, this remains the same other types of elites may be
invited, but they are restricted to make a comment asked and then to remain silent for the rest of the
proceedings.
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The right of center JLP has moderately supported economic integration and does not support political
integration, and the left of center PNP has shown greater support for economic and political integration.
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rather than ideology. This was most evident with the Opposition UNC later rejecting
ascension to both jurisdictions of the CCJ in 2004. It was not because the party did not
believe the Court to be a relevant institution,119 but rather because it demanded that the
local judicial system be reformed before full ascension. In addition, the party leader, in
this instance, played partisan politics as a result of the President of Trinidad declaring the
PNM victor in the 2001 deadlock election. This angered UNC leader Basdeo Panday and
led to the UNC’s repeated roadblocks to governance.
H3b is confirmed for both Jamaica and Trinidad & Tobago. In Jamaica, public
consultation was minimal, and mass public opinion had little impact. When surveyed, the
public did not know about the CCJ’s original jurisdiction, but they were well versed on
the discussion about the appellate jurisdiction. Public consultations were held but
submissions for the CCJ were provided by elites. The legal fraternity’s opinion was the
most influential, followed by the Opposition’s, then the opinions of the socio
cultural/knowledge and economic elites. All provided proposals; however, the economic
elite could not recall their specific contributions. Efforts to retrieve these proposals were
unsuccessful. Nevertheless, the economic elite did note they accepted the original
jurisdiction aspect of the final CCJ agreement. The degree to which the knowledge elite
was consulted could not be determined. In Trinidad, where the CCJ is hosted, mass
public opinion on the topic was also limited. When surveyed, the public did not know
much about the CCJ’s two jurisdictions, and even though the debate in the country
focused on the appellate jurisdiction, the public was largely left out of the discussion.
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A UNC representative sat on PREPCOM and worked with other commissioners in drafting the final CCJ
Agreement.
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Public consultations were elite events. The political elite depended mainly on the
opinions of the legal fraternity who did little more than support their Jamaican
counterpart’s position. The economic elite noted they were consulted only after the final
CCJ Agreement was drafted. They admitted they supported the original jurisdiction
aspect. The degree to which Trinidad’s knowledge elite was consulted could not be
determined, but it almost certainly played little or no role.
Hypothesis H3b(i) was confirmed for both countries. The influence of an elite
member or group, as noted earlier, was determined by the elite group’s organization and
values, and the structure, form, and mode of the relationship between the state and the
group. The Jamaican government held ad hoc consultations with the economic and socio
cultural/knowledge elites, which came in the form of irregular submission of reports and
informal discussions that supplied technical information. Even with Jamaica’s ad hoc
consultations between the political elite and the economic and socio cultural/knowledge
elites, those groups that received more face time with the political elite and possibly
informed policy were highly organized with a constitution, held elections, offered
frequent reporting and specialized subgroupings, and were well-financed and headed by
middle to upper class members of society.
The same is true for Trinidad, which uses its unique societal and state
collaboration. With regular structured meetings between the government and economic
and socio cultural/knowledge elites, the latter were more able to influence policy than
their Jamaican counterparts. Like Jamaica, those groups that had face time with the
political elites have constitutions, run elections, established specialized subgroupings, and
are well-financed and headed by middle to upper class members of society. Hence, my
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research not only confirmed the H3b(i), but also identified the different causal paths of
influence.
THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS
H1a and H1b are informed by neoliberalism, the domino theory of regionalism,
small state foreign policy approach, and the bargaining and dependency models. In the
case of Jamaica, the findings did not conform to James Rosenau’s (1966) or Jacqueline
Braveboy-Wagner’s (2003) small state foreign policy approaches. Rosenau maintained
that the international system will be the most important factor to influence a
small/developing state’s foreign policy; however, he determined there were four other
factors of analysis. In order of relevance these are the relationships among government
actors, the role of the bureaucracy, society (culture and public opinion), and the
individual. Braveboy-Wagner, on the other hand, argued that in the case of Anglo
Caribbean states, the leader/government (the political elite and the leader’s personal
preferences) followed by the international system and finally, society and the bureaucracy
influences policy. In Jamaica’s case, regional policy leading to the deepening of
CARICOM and the establishment of the CCJ was based on international factors followed
by the leader/individual and government (the leadership elite and personal preferences),
the bureaucracy, and finally, the society. My findings diverge from Rosenau and better
reflect Braveboy-Wagner’s conclusions. The latter categorizes the individual and
government as one factor because in the Anglo Caribbean context the political leader in
the parliamentary system is exceedingly powerful. This is due to two factors: 1) the
Anglo Caribbean state’s small size and limited capacity and 2) the culture and tradition it
inherited from its former colonizers (Braveboy-Wagner, 2003).
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As noted in Chapters 3, 4 and 5, Jamaica and Trinidad & Tobago adopted a form
of the Westminster parliamentary system called the Whitehall model120 that perpetuated
the legacy of a Crown Colony Government (CCG).121 This Whitehall model uses a
single-member district plurality (SMP) electoral formula that results in the “candidate
who receives the most votes, whether a majority or plurality, [being] elected” (Lijphart,
1999, p. 146). This tends to lead to two party systems that further produces single party
majority governments (Lijphart, 1999). This is truer for Jamaica than Trinidad & Tobago.
During the period of investigation, governments in Jamaica tended to be
majorities from one political party or the other. Thus, the leader had a lot of power when
he/she had a majority and is also powerful when he/she was secure in his leadership
position within his party. Trinidad, on the other hand, had experienced coalition
governments and a series of elections in rapid succession either due to members of
parliament ‘crossing the floor’ or a previous deadlocked election that did not produce an
outright majority. This affected, though not completely diminished, the power of the
leader.122 So, while both countries have the same institutional rules, they developed
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It contained all of the features of the British parliamentary system but also included a written
constitution, an official Leader of the Opposition, the nomination of Senators to the Senate and a Bill of
Rights that constrains parliament (Mills, 1997; Ryan, 1999).
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The CCG only had contact with and served the white population and the imperial interests of Britain. It
exhibited institutionalized racism. There was little communication between the government and the
governed and by extension most decisions were made by Britain leaving local government inferior to the
metropole. When power was transferred to the local political elite the legacy produced limited
representation with authoritarian and anti-democratic features in the form of charismatic leadership and
Caribbean styled patronage politics (Buddan, 2001; Barrow-Giles, 2002; Ryan, 1999).
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Where loyalty was not offered to political leaders in Trinidad, party members could expect to be
marginalized in the party, forced to resign from ministry positions, and/or be left with no other option than
to cross party lines, form their own party or run as an independent (Ryan, 1999; 2003).The possibility of
these occurrences happening deterred some members from overtly expressing their displeasure with the
leader. Party leaders, thus, could still maintain an iron fist over some of their members. Also, where there is
the possibility of losing the majority gained through plurality or coalition, the political leader has always
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somewhat different party systems, which produced different results. This may explain
why political leadership in Trinidad seems weaker than in Jamaica when it came to the
PREPCOM consultations.
During and after the initial proposition for a regional court (1987-1994), both
countries aggressively promoted and endorsed it. Domestically, both states had single
party majority governments resulting in powerful political leaders who were secure with
his/her majority in parliament and his/her leadership in the political party (see Tables 4
and 7). However, during the PREPCOM years (1995-2001), Jamaica maintained the
single party majority government under the PNP, which Trinidad had formed a coalition
between the UNC and the NAR (See Tables 4 and 7). Therefore, in order to maintain
balance between the interests of the UNC and NAR, the political leadership of the UNC
(who won 17 seats) needed to maintain continual consultation with the NAR (who won 2
seats) on “key and potentially far reaching decisions” (Ryan, 2003, p. 23), which
tempered the government’s response during the PREPCOM years.
Nevertheless, leaders in both countries were aggressive and expected to lead and
the public to follow. The leader was deemed “messianic” and maintained the traits of
being a “people person,” paternalistic and charismatic, and from these traits he/she gained
his/her legitimacy. He/she also dictated the ideology of his party and demanded
unfettered loyalty from his party members in order for the party to act as a cohesive unit
in parliament (Munroe, 1993).123 When the leader formed his/her government there is the

opted to call a snap election in order to campaign and possibly win an outright majority in the upcoming
election (Ryan, 1999; 2003).
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Where loyalty was not offered to political leaders in Trinidad, party members could expect to be
marginalized in the party, forced to resign from ministry positions, and/or be left with no other option than
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centralization of legislative power in his/her cabinet due to the inherited executive
dominance from the British parliamentary system. Circumstances where the prime
minister does not consult his/her peers, it creates a “presidential government” that goes
unchecked by an independent legislature (Barrow-Giles, 2002; Mills, 1997; Munroe,
1993; Ryan, 1999). Hence, the separation between the individual and government cannot
exist in this context.
In Jamaica, international factors played the dominant role in foreign policy
formulation because it exhibited characteristics of an indebted small developing state,
that is, it had poor export performance, inefficiency, dependence, and underemployment.
Neoliberal globalization was expected to aid in overcoming these shortcomings. The
indebtedness resulted in the country adopting the IMF SAPs that further exasperated the
problems previously listed. To combat these problems Prime Minister Seaga promoted
the CBI and subsequent prime ministers supported the CSME and the CCJ’s original
jurisdiction. Thus, Jamaica’s government was reactive, not proactive, to changes in the
international environment when making the decision to strengthen regional integration.
Political leaders had to take into consideration the dictates of international organizations
and developed states given their country’s indebtedness. This is not to say that political
leadership and other elites were not influential, but rather that they took into
consideration the small state’s viability and vulnerability to external factors first, then
infused it with the personal preferences of the political elite followed by the preferences
to cross party lines, form their own party or run as an independent (Ryan 1999; 2003).The possibility of
these occurrences happening deterred some members from overtly expressing their displeasure with the
leader. Party leaders, thus, could still maintain an iron fist over their members. Also, where there is the
possibility of losing the majority gained through plurality or coalition, the political leader has always opted
to call a snap election in order to campaign and possibly win an outright majority in the upcoming election
(Ryan 1999; 2003).
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of the economic and socio cultural elites with minimal input from the public.
Consequently, Jamaica can be added to the list of countries that confirm the effect
neoliberal globalization has on indebted small states.
As a secondary, but complementary note, the evidence for Jamaica demonstrated
both the dependency and the bargaining models in its relationship with
powerful/developed states and international organizations. This provides an opportunity
for scholars to develop a theory that identifies the varying indicators and creates a scale
with the bargaining model on one end and the dependency model on the other. If viewed
as being on a spectrum between these two models, Jamaica would lean more towards the
dependency model with elements of the bargaining model. This dependency again is
based on the degree of its indebtedness; however, Jamaica, even with this high degree of
dependence on a developed state and an international organization was still, on occasion,
able to negotiate and bargain despite the fact that more often than not the outcome still
reflected the preferences of the larger more powerful state/international organization.
For Trinidad & Tobago, the findings did not conform to Rosenau’s small state
foreign policy approach; however, they did confirm Braveboy-Wagner’s (2003) small
state foreign policy approach. The leader/government did play the dominant role because
Trinidad exhibited characteristics similar to those of a Newly Industrialized Country
(NIC), namely, the promotion of a cost effective business environment, a strong export
performance, encouraged competition, and enhanced efficiency. Its ability to adapt to
greater competition allowed the government to steer policy more in line with the political
and economic elites’ preferences, which in the case of Trinidad has always been to
support deepening regional integration from which it experienced extensive economic
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benefits. International conditions play a secondary role because both the political elite
and the economic elite understand that the country’s small size still makes it vulnerable to
external factors. Thus, the elites also had considerable interest in the regional and
international trade and effectively contributed to the country’s national and regional trade
positions based first on their preferences and then on the international environment.
Like Jamaica, it is difficult to classify Trinidad & Tobago as representative of
either the dependency or bargaining model. If viewed as being on a spectrum between
these two models, the country would more likely exhibit equal elements of both models.
It is dependent much for the same reasons as Jamaica, but would be better able to
negotiate and bargain with a more powerful state/organization given its higher economic
status.
Both states conform to Richard Baldwin’s (1997, 2004) “Domino Theory of
Regionalism,” which maintains that the formation of a free trade area (FTA) will induce
non-members to join because of the potential loss of trade and investment. He further
argues that if these non-members are excluded from this bloc, it will induce them to form
their own FTA to redress this discrimination, which will create another round of trade
and investment diversions and exclusions of non-members, which should in turn lead to
even more FTAs. For the Americas, NAFTA induced Jamaica and Trinidad’s desire to
join the bloc because non-membership would lead to the diversion of trade and
investment for them. With the formation of NAFTA, Jamaica lost much of its access to
the US market, particularly for its apparel industry, as most companies moved their
businesses to NAFTA member Mexico. Trinidad, on the other hand, was not a major
loser with the formation of NAFTA, but it saw the potential for future losses in profits
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and market share. As a result, both Jamaica and Trinidad, as individual countries and as
part of CARICOM, formally asked to be listed as eligible for membership of NAFTA
(Journal of Commerce, April 18, 1994, p. 5A). However, as later NAFTA/FTAA124
negotiations began to break down, Jamaica led the charge to form a new free trade area as
a means of rectifying its apparent exclusion from NAFTA/FTAA. This came in the form
of the ACS and the call to establish the CSME and the CCJ.
The ACS improved and broadened CARICOM-Latin American relations as it
increased CARICOM’s market to include twenty-five countries in Latin America and the
Caribbean and 200 million people. The CSME, at the time of the NAFTA’s formation,
was suggested as means of strengthening trade within the CARICOM bloc and the CCJ
was to oversee said trade. This is demonstrative of Baldwin’s notion that if states are
barred from joining a bloc, all excluded countries will then form their own regional
economic bloc (ACS) or strengthen one that was already established (CSME). These
changes created a domino effect as many economic blocs were created or strengthen
within the region. These would include the Mercado Común del Sur (MERCOSUR) that
was formed in 1995, and the Andean Community (CAN) that was formed in 1969, but
extended a FTA among Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, and Venezuela in 1993, and later
launched negotiations in 2000 with MERCUSOR to establish a FTA called the South
American Free Trade Area (SAFTA).
The theory, on the other hand, was not applicable for the regionalization of
Europe. This is due to the fact that neither state desired to join that economic bloc

124

The FTAA was the proposed FTA area that would have encompassed NAFTA and countries in Latin
America and the Caribbean.
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because it was an impossible/improbable option. Jamaica and Trinidad & Tobago instead
perceived the changes in the EU as a blueprint for the establishment of the CSME and the
CCJ. They also recognized that the gradual out phasing of preferential access to the EU
due to pressure from the WTO provided additional reason for the establishment of these
organizations (Journal of Commerce, August 17, 1995, p. 3A).
H2 is informed by neo-functionalism and liberal intergovernmentalism. I found
that given the formal structure of CARICOM, interaction at the regional level was best
explained by liberal intergovernmentalism. For one, the economic elite and interest
groups have not developed longstanding transnational ties to drive the integration
process. Additionally, when the economic elite attended regional meetings it was only at
the invitation of the political elite.
Liberal intergovernmentalism offers an all-inclusive view of Caribbean
integration. It focuses on the big state-driven decisions made regarding integration by
addressing the issue in three phases. First, national preference formation concentrates on
the source of a state’s preferences and is based on the outcome of negotiations and
bargaining between societal (economic and knowledge elites and to a lesser extent the
public) and state (government, opposition, bureaucracy, and the legal fraternity) actors.
All of these interactions were discussed in the Domestic Dynamics sections of Chapters 4
and 5. The second phase focuses on the efficiency and distributional benefits a state gains
after bargaining based on its preferences, which results in either supranational
enterprising or asymmetrical interdependence. Jamaica’s size and Trinidad & Tobago’s
wealth have placed them in a position to receive disproportionate gains in the regional
negotiations and bargaining that created the CCJ, a supranational organization. The third
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phase centers on the reasons for/against a move towards the transfer of sovereignty to a
regional organization. Jamaica and Trinidad & Tobago led other CARICOM members to
take the position to entrust the CCJ with the power to interpret the RTC, enforce
judgments and orders as it relates to the RTC, and support the CSME.
H3a, H3a(i), H3b, and H3b(i) are informed by liberal intergovernmentalism,
theories of party politics and small state foreign policy approach. Neither Jamaica nor
Trinidad & Tobago conformed to the theory of party positions. However, the findings for
Trinidad confirms Braveboy-Wagner’s small state foreign policy approach. Jamaica does
not confirm either Rosenau or Braveboy-Wagner’s theories, which illustrated the degree
to which domestic factors interplayed with international factors in the formulation of
regional judicial policy. All of these interactions were discussed in the International
Dynamics and Domestic Dynamics sections of Chapters 4 and 5.
In addition, liberal intergovernmentalism, particularly its first phase (national
preference formation), addresses how different local actors negotiated and bargained with
the political elite. The national preference is thus dependent on how accessible the
political elite is to the rest of society and how organized local interests are in informing
the state’s position on a particular regional policy.

Table 10
Overview of the Hypotheses and Theoretical Implications
Levels of Analysis
INTERNATIONAL

Hypothesis
H1a: Increased
global trade
intensifies regional
economic
integration which

Trinidad & Tobago
Hypothesis Confirmed
Theoretical implication –
exhibits the effects of
neoliberal globalization on
a NIC. There is a better mix
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Jamaica
Hypothesis Confirmed
Theoretical implication –
exhibits the effects of
neoliberal globalization on
an indebted small

REGIONAL

DOMESTIC

results in the
demand for the
judicial
governance of the
latter activity.

of the dependency and
bargaining models with
neither model taking
prominence. Confirms
Braveboy-Wagner’s small
state foreign policy
approach.

H1b: Increased
regionalization in
the Americas and
Europe will renew
GCSS’ interest in
regional trade and
supporting [legal]
regional
institutions.
H2: The largest
and/or wealthiest
GCSS will have
the greatest
influence in the
promotion
of/negotiation for
regional
integration and its
institutions.

Hypothesis Confirmed
Theoretical implication – It
confirms the domino effect
of regionalism in the
Americas but not in Europe.

H3a: The decision
to
promote/negotiate
for new regional
institutions rests
almost entirely on
the political elite.
H3a(i): Left of
center political
parties will
support regional
integration and its
institutions more
than right of
center parties.
H3b: Elite Public
Opinion rather
than mass public
opinion will
influence the
political elite’s
decision to

Hypothesis Partially
Confirmed – Wealth does
matter in part. T&T was
forceful and active during
the Conferences of the
Heads of Government.
However, during the
PREPCOM negotiations
T&T was less influential.
Theoretical implication –
Confirms liberal
intergovernmentalism as
opposed to neofunctionalism.
Hypothesis Confirmed
Theoretical implication Confirms BraveboyWagner’s perspective on
small state foreign policy
and liberal
intergovernmentalism.

developing state. Jamaica is
more indicative of
dependency model with
elements of bargaining
model. Confirms neither
Rosenau’s nor BraveboyWagner’s small state
foreign policy approach.
Hypothesis Confirmed
Theoretical implication – It
confirms the domino effect
of regionalism in the
Americas but not in Europe.

Hypothesis could not be
confirmed
Theoretical implication –
Does not add to the theory
of partisan positions.

Hypothesis Confirmed –
Size matters more. Jamaica
has been forceful and active
during the Conferences of
the Heads of Government.
This forcefulness carried
over into PREPCOM.
Jamaica was extremely
influential.
Theoretical implication –
Confirms liberal
intergovernmentalism as
opposed to neofunctionalism.
Hypothesis Confirmed
Theoretical implication –
Does not confirm
Rosenau’s or BraveboyWagner’s small state
foreign policy approach. It
confirms liberal
intergovernmentalism.
Hypothesis could not be
entirely confirmed
Theoretical implication –
Does not add to the theory
of partisan positions.

Hypothesis Confirmed
Theoretical implication Confirms BraveboyWagner’s small state
foreign policy approach and
liberal
intergovernmentalism.

Hypothesis Confirmed
Theoretical implication Does not confirm
Rosenau’s or BraveboyWagner’s small state
foreign policy approach. It
confirms liberal
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promote/negotiate
for regional
integration and its
institutions.
H3b(i): Better
organized
economic and
knowledge elite
have greater
influence on the
political decision
makers.

intergovernmentalism.

Hypothesis Confirmed
Theoretical implication Confirms BraveboyWagner’s perspective on
small state foreign policy
and liberal
intergovernmentalism.

Hypothesis Confirmed
Theoretical implication Does not confirm
Rosenau’s or BraveboyWagner’s small state
foreign policy approach. It
confirms liberal
intergovernmentalism.

AVENUES FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
First, access to materials that were denied to me would yield more accurate
information that could better inform my research. Conclusions drawn from the new data
would become part of a book project. This material would include the minutes and notes
from the Conferences of the Heads of Government, the Legal Affairs Committee, and
PREPCOM, the paper archives from the Ministries of Justice, of Foreign Affairs, and of
Industry and Trade in Trinidad and Jamaica, as well as the minutes from public
consultations held, primarily, in Trinidad & Tobago and, to a lesser extent, Jamaica.
These materials could provide greater details about each type of elite’s involvement in
and the political psychology behind the creation of the rules outlined in the CCJ’s
original jurisdiction. Additionally, it would allow me to better trace the source of each
proposal for the Court’s original jurisdiction to determine how it may have been altered,
rejected, or accepted.
Second, I would add more case studies to this research. In the form of a journal
article I would, in the first instance, include all six countries that participated in
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PREPCOM.125 By including all members of the PREPCOM negotiations, one could
examine the differences and similarities between CARICOM MDCs and LDCs’
participation and influence in creating the CCJ’s original jurisdiction rules. This would be
achieved by answering the same questions regarding each country’s elite composition
and participation in the process at the domestic and the regional level and the efficiency
and distributional benefits these states gained during and after interstate bargaining. Also,
by investigating these PREPCOM states over the same period as my current work, I
would be able to gauge changes in elite and state positions over time and determine if this
may have affected the final rules governing the CCJ.
Further, the same hypotheses/questions could be tested for a larger data set and a
regression analysis for all CARICOM member states could be conducted. By statistically
testing all of the independent variables against the dependent variable, I could use the
findings to gauge changes in elite and state positions over time and determine if this may
have affected the final rules governing the CCJ as well as to better predict/forecast local
elite and state behavior in the formation of other CARICOM institutions. The specific
variables would be the same as with this study: levels of economic development,
composition of the economy, elite power and organization, adoption and adaptation to
neoliberal globalization, and size. The analysis would also include the specifics of
institutional design at the national level that were omitted in this dissertation. One of the
unexpected findings of my research was although both Jamaica and Trinidad & Tobago
have Westminster style parliamentary systems, there were different compositions of
government. Therefore, I would include factors that I did not originally hypothesize about
125

Jamaica, Trinidad & Tobago, Barbados, Guyana, St Kitts and Nevis, and St Lucia and the Grenadines.
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for the domestic institutions in two ways: (1) the electoral and political party systems,
and (2) the rules governing public consultations systems, and rules governing the
bureaucracy. Owing to the larger data set, the focus would be on each state’s impact on
decisions made at the Conferences of Heads of Government regarding the CCJ and any
possible CCJ submissions from member states outside of those sitting on PREPCOM.
Third, this dissertation invites similar questions to be asked for other regional
judicial institutions. Factors that led to the development of regional courts with original
jurisdiction such as the European Court of Justice (ECJ), the Common Market for Eastern
and Southern Africa Court of Justice (COMESA Court), and the Economic Community
of West African States Court of Justice (Community Court of Justice – ECOWAS) could
be compared with that of the CCJ. Further investigation on the effects of levels of
economic development, strength of the regional bloc, and political culture on group
dynamics, institutionalism, and policymaking on the Courts’ development would also be
necessary.
Finally, these findings could also serve a more pragmatic, policy oriented
purpose. Future work could include a report that offers recommendations of how
CARICOM can improve accountability and democracy while overcoming its
ineffectiveness at the regional level. The exclusion of local economic and socio-cultural
elites and the public has stalled progress in the bloc. The limited support and participation
from citizens has maintained the status quo – collective decision-making and delayed
enforcement. Politicians, so far, have lacked the initiative to change the present condition
of CARICOM, with the exception of the creation of the CCJ that provides an
enforcement mechanism.
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The CCJ was an exception because the political elite recognized that “[without]
an efficiently functioning judicial system…the stimulation of economic growth…would
not be achieved, much less sustained” (Ryan, 2001, p. 1). In order for economic
integration to operate efficiently, in light of changes in the international environment,
there was need for the uniform interpretation and application of ‘Caribbean Community’
Law. Investors needed to be reassured that there is a mechanism that assures a stable and
predictable macroeconomic environment and provides the greatest possible returns
(McDonald, 2005; Pollard, 2004; Ryan, 2001). This, they argued, could only be assured
if there is legal certainty. Hence, a new judicial organization that 1) clarified the legal
relationship between member states and CARICOM and the rights and obligations among
CARICOM institutions; and 2) acted on complaints against CARICOM measures would
go a long way in promoting investment and economic growth across the region.
CONCLUSION
In all, the findings have asserted that political elites are the drivers of the
Caribbean integration process and the main architects of the CCJ’s original jurisdiction.
The historical overview and the mapping of political, economic, and socio cultural elite
involvement outlined the challenges and opportunities CARICOM and individual
member states faced. The lengthy process towards creating the CCJ’s original jurisdiction
is demonstrative of the stunted evolution of CARICOM, which is best described by
Aimes Caines (The St Kitts-Nevis Observer, July 30, 2010) as prime ministerial,
piecemeal, paper-based, and people-less. Thus, my research brings to the fore the need to
address the inadequacies that are slowing the regional integration process, namely the
lack of organizational, institutional, procedural, and cultural arrangements that encourage
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participation and contributions from outside of the political directorate both nationally
and regionally. As a region that seemingly needs regional integration to survive in this
new international environment, it ought to develop transnational ties among economic
and socio cultural elites and the general public across member states as well as increase
their participation at the regional level.
As a final note, I have a normative bias for deeper integration. Insular states, as
found in the Caribbean, need to form stable, effective, and tightly organized regional
integration support systems in order to overcome the expected limitations that individual
small states face as they relate to neoliberal globalization. Regional integration would
protect CARICOM against exogenous shocks related to international competition,
transnational crime, and natural disasters. With this in mind, deepened Caribbean
integration can only be beneficial.
It is not enough for CARICOM prime ministers and presidents to utter
magniloquence of their commitment to the project. There must to be tangible evidence of
this commitment. CARICOM governments need to reduce their attachment to national
sovereignty. At present, this attachment has resulted in the region not meeting most of its
deadlines. For instance, Havelock Brewster (2003) has expressed that the failure to meet
CSME deadlines were the result of institutional incapacity within the individual states
and a contradiction between the CSME and multiple sovereignties. He asserts,
[t]he Caribbean Community is yet to make the political transition that is
necessitated by the commitments undertaken to create a single market and
economy...The Caribbean Community intends to create a Single Market and
Economy with each Member State retaining maximum national sovereignty. It
intends to do so apparently through a mode of discretionary intergovernmental
cooperation. These objectives clearly are contradictory (Brewster, 2003)
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The EU has been able to balance intergovernmentalism and supranationality by
allowing the regional bloc to successfully strengthen and widen regional integration. The
balance resulted in the EU, as a regional entity, capable of developing long term goals
that are not hindered by short-term visions of member state governments. CARICOM
governments need to better pool sovereignty at the regional level and create institutions
that enhance the balance between intergovernmental and supranational features. Such
efforts should come in the form of passing the necessary national bills, preparing and
adapting the country to changes ensuing from the passage of these bills, harmonizing
rules with other CARICOM governments, and, most importantly, providing more
meaningful and ongoing avenues for the elites and public to weigh in on regional policy.
As it relates to economic and socio-cultural elites, Trinidad has to be applauded
for developing the framework that created better private sector and government
collaboration. Economic interests have informed both national and regional policy. The
Ministry of Trade and Industry’s Technical Coordinating Committee (TCC) that is
headed by the Permanent Secretary and includes public and private sector, and civil
society representatives has, at regular intervals, advised the Minister on trade policy
issues from a national perspective (WTO, n.d., p. 17). This framework needs to include
members of the opposition party to build on bipartisanship. This model should be copied
by other ministries and other member states to effectively begin the process of making
CARICOM more people friendly.
As it relates to the public, the process of arriving at regional policy decisions
needs to be democratized. Ordinary CARICOM citizens need to believe they can
influence regional procedures. While it is understood that CARICOM states have limited
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resources, governments should use available resources to socialize their citizens into
adopting a Caribbean identity in order for democratization to take hold. Hence, the
political elite need to go beyond the present concept of viewing CARICOM as a
“Community of Sovereign States” to one that is a “Community of People and States”.
The experiences of the European Union (EU) could act as an inspiration for this, although
it has to deal with its own so-called democratic deficit.
The EU’s success has been dependent on how well it has been able to bring many
persons together and as such, it has created a Europe that is better off than it was twentyone years ago at the start of the EU. Andrew Heywood (1999, p. 116) made this
observation: “In political terms, European integration offers the advantages of
cosmopolitanism, reflected…in the emergence of a supranational, European political
culture which…incorporates the various national traditions.” By extension, the European
bloc’s adoption of SEA enhanced the legislative role of the European Parliament (EP), a
directly-elected legislature, with the intent of improving democratic accountability to EU
citizens (Bomberg & Stubbs, 2004). This body has been recognized as expressing “the
democratic will of the citizens and…their interests in discussions with other EU
institutions” (European Commission, 2003, p. 10).
The inclusion of ordinary citizens has not been a smooth process. The EU has
been criticized by some scholars and activists as having a democratic deficit (Decker,
2002; Follesdal & Hix, 2006; Neunreither, 1994). It has been plagued with complaints of
a lack of avenues for greater citizen participation and has experienced occasions of fierce
loyalty to national sovereignty. This is evidenced by low voter turnouts for elections
across the region (McCormick 1999, p. 144; Nicoll & Salmon, 2001, p. 94) and citizen
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resistance to the formulation and signing of a European Constitution Treaty on October 9,
2004, because citizens were not involved in the process (Le Blé & Colson, 2004).
Nonetheless, the EU is worlds ahead of CARICOM and is more democratic as it includes
public and elite participation through institutions such as the European Parliament (EP),
the Committee of Regions (CoR), the European Economic and Social Committee
(EESC), and the European Union Ombudsman.
CARICOM citizens already have some form of regional identity. According to the
May/June 2003 Draft Report on Jamaican Perceptions of Regional Integration, Jamaican
citizens desire the strengthening of the regional integration process (See Table 11). A
political union of CARICOM member states, the strongest form of regional integration, is
the preferred form among Jamaicans. Currently, CARICOM operates as a common
market, which is two integration steps short of a political union. This is significant
because it is contrary to the position held by several Jamaican political and economic
elites who do not support a stronger CARICOM. Therefore, improving CARICOM’s
institutional design and the process of regional political socialization would provide a
blueprint for a more successful regional bloc.

Table 11
Support for Jamaica’s Participation in Regional Political Integration
Form of Participation (N=1581)

A political union of CARICOM Member
States
A single CARICOM state
A Federation

Response Strongly
Rate (%) Agree
Or agree
(%)

Strongly
disagree
Or disagree
(%)

Total
(%)

98.7
98.7
98.7

21.0
33.8
33.6

82.9
76.2
70.3
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61.9
42.4
36.7

A Confederation
A Political Union of CARICOM states
without Jamaica
A Political union between Jamaica and
other regional states
A political union with any other country
or countries*

98.5

23.3

44.1

67.4

98.8

11.5

71.1

82.6

98.5

57.2

21.0

78.2

96.5

54.9

45.1

100.0

Note. Adapted from Perceptions of Regional Integration (May/June 2003 Survey) (p. 1)
by the SALISES Research Team, 2003, Kingston, Jamaica: Unpublished.
Presently, the region has an Assembly of CARICOM Parliamentarians, which
have only met thrice since the Assembly held its first session in 1996 (CARICOM
Secretariat, 2002). Presidential and prime ministerial appointees pool sovereignty to
provide the broad guidelines for all policies to be addressed, which at present is only
recommendatory (Pollard, 2003, p. 228). If redesigned as a directly elected parliamentary
institution, it will provide a direct avenue for citizens to ensure that their positions are
heard and enforced.
A move towards democracy and accountability at the regional level will reduce
the levels of insularity, distrust, and prejudice across CARICOM member states. This
advancement would emphasize civic culture, civil society and social capital by
encouraging citizens to take charge of their lives as they speak and organize to improve
democratic life both nationally and transnationally. A system of collective decision
making and the enforcement of these decisions would deepen regionalism and political
adherence.
The economic elite need to maintain regular contact with government officials.
Again, the Trinidadian economic elite has developed its own framework that should be
copied by other economic elites across CARICOM. Alongside the TCC, the Standing
Advisory Committee on Trade, an independent group driven by the private sector, which
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includes a few government representatives and key business stakeholders, meets and
discusses national and regional trade issues and submits regular reports directly to the
Minister of Trade and Industry.
Additionally, the economic elite need to recognize the benefits of regional
integration and motivate themselves to participate in regional economic trade. At present,
many members of this group across multiple CARICOM member states support
“defensive national interests” (Institute of International Relations (IIR), 2011, p. 32);
however, if they take into consideration “offensive regional and international interests”
(IIR, 2011, p. 32), the economic elite would expand their businesses beyond their own
national borders and establish subsidiaries or branches across CARICOM member states.
This should increase competitiveness and develop the transnational ties necessary for the
economic elite to take the helm of economic integration.
The knowledge elite, while it has established transnational ties, need to be more
proactive in providing technical advice on the benefits of deeper regional integration to
the political and economic elites and the public at the national level. This would
neutralize any negative perceptions these groups may have about the process. Academia
cannot wait for these groups to approach them, but rather should develop organizations
similar to Trinidad’s Standing Advisory Committee in order to be in a better position to
inform regional policy.
To this, my work ends with encouragement from the former Prime Minister of
Barbados, Owen Arthur (1998), who states,
[We] are one Caribbean people, one Caribbean family moulded by the
experience…of a distinctive Caribbean way of life…This is still the most
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powerful basis for Caribbean integration at all levels, and the source of our
inspiration…to move the causes and mechanisms of Caribbean integration. (p. 29)

242

LIST OF REFERENCES
Acosta, A. (2004). El “libre comercio” o la vieja práctica de quitar la escalera. In A.
Acosta & E. Gudynas (Eds.), Libre comercio. Mitos y realidades. Nuevos desafíos
para la economía política de la integración latinoamericana (pp. 81-109). Quito:
Abya Yala.
Allison, G. & Zelibrow, P. (1999). Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban
Missile Crisis, 2nd edition. New York: Longman.
Almond, G. & Verba, S. (1963). The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in
Five Nations. New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
Alter, K. (2009). The European Court's Political Power: Selected Essays. New York:
Oxford University Press, Inc.
Alter, K. (2012). The Global Spread of European Style International Courts. West
European Politics, 35, 135-154
Amin, S. (1974). Accumulation on a World Scale. New York: Monthly Review Press.
Anderson-Manley, B. (2007, April 23). Tribal Politics. The Jamaica Gleaner. Retrieved
from http://jamaica-gleaner.com/gleaner/20070423/cleisure/cleisure3.html.
Armstrong, A. (1981). The Political Consequences of Economic Dependence. Journal
of Conflict Resolution, 25, 401-428.
Armstrong, K. & Bulmer, S. (1998). The Governance of the Single European Market.
Manchester: Manchester University Press.
Artana, D., Auguste, S., Moya, R., Sookram, S. & Watson. P. (2007). Trinidad &
Tobago: Economic Growth in a Dual Economy. Retrieved from
http://sta.uwi.edu/salises/pubs/workingpapers/16.pdf.
Arthur, O. (1998). Prospects for Caribbean Political Unity. Journal of
Eastern Caribbean Studies, 23, 27-34.
Association of Development Agencies (ADA). (2006). An Assessment of Jamaican Civil
Society (2006): Two Centuries of Volunteerism Impacted by the Tribal Nature of
Jamaica’s Political Culture. Retrieved from
https://www.civicus.org/new/media/CSI_Jamaicanreport.pdf.
Austin-Broos, D. (1994). Race/Class: Jamaica’s Discourse of Heritable Identity. New
West Indian Guide, 68, 213-233.

243

Avery, W. (1973). The Extraregional Transfer of Integrative Behavior. International
Organization, 27, 549-556
Axline, W. (1979). Caribbean Integration: The Politics of Regionalism. New York:
Nicholls Publishing Company.
Baldwin, R. (1997). The Causes of Regionalism. The World Economy, 20, 865-888.
Baldwin, R. (2004). Stepping Stones or Building Blocs? Regional and Multilateral
Integration (1st Draft). Retrieved from
http://graduateinstitute.ch/webdav/site/ctei/shared/CTEI/Baldwin/Publications/Chapte
rs/Regionalism/SteppingStonesOrBuildingBlocks.pdf.
Baptiste, F. (1998). United States-Caribbean Relations from World War II to the
Present: The Social Nexus. In R. Palmer (Eds.), U.S.-Caribbean Relations: Their
Impact on Peoples and Culture (pp. 7-52). Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers.
Barrett, L. (2013, October 5). 'Speak up for your rights': Shanique Myrie elated at CCJ
ruling; Changes to impact CARICOM nationals. The Jamaica Gleaner. Retrieved
from http://jamaica-gleaner.com/gleaner/20131005/lead/lead1.html.
Barrow-Giles, C. (2002). Introduction to Caribbean Politics. Kingston, Jamaica: Ian
Randle Publishers.
Barrow-Giles, C. & Joseph, T. (2006). General Elections & Voting in the EnglishSpeaking Caribbean 1992-2005. Kingston, Jamaica: Ian Randle Publishers.
BBC Caribbean. (2005, April 18). CCJ knocked as 'tribunal'. Retrieved from
http://www.bbc.co.uk/caribbean/news/story/2005/04/050418_caribbeancourt.shtml.
Bealey, F. (1999). The Blackwell Dictionary of Political Science. Oxford: Blackwell
Publishers Ltd.
Beckford, G. (1972). Persistent Poverty: Underdevelopment in the Plantation
Economies of the Third World. Kingston: The University of the West Indies Press.
Bell, S. (2011). Institutionalism: Old and New. Retrieved from
http://espace.library.uq.edu.au/eserv.php?pid=UQ:9699&dsID=Institutionalism.pdf.
Berg, B. (2001). Qualitative Research Methods for the Social Sciences, 4th edition.
Boston: Allyn and Bacon.
Bernal, R. (2000). Globalization and Small Developing Countries: The Imperative for
Repositioning. In D. Benn & K. Hall (Eds), Globalization: A Calculus of Inequality –
Perspectives from the South (pp. 88-127). Kingston, Jamaica: Ian Randle Publishers.

244

Bernard, D. (2006, May 5). The Caribbean Court of Justice and Its Relationship with the
CARICOM Single Market. Retrieved from
http://www.caribbeancourtofjustice.org/speeches/bernard/05The%20CCJ%20%20the%20CSME.pdf.
Bhagwati, J. (1996). Regionalism and Multilateralism: An Overview. In J. De Melo & A.
Panagariya (Eds.), New Dimensions in Regional Integration (pp. 22-50).
Massachusetts: Cambridge University Press.
Bilal, S. (2004). Can the EU be a Model and a Driving Force for Regional Integration
in Developing Countries? Retrieved from
http://www.ecdpm.org/Web_ECDPM/Web/Content/Download.nsf/0/22194B4795A0
77D5C1256F9E0053FC38/$FILE/Bilal%20%20EU%20model%20of%20RI%20Draft%20rev.pdf.
Black, J. (1997). Oxford Dictionary of Economics. Oxford, London: Oxford University
Press.
Blake, Byron. (2000). Globalization and Regional Economic Integration. In D. Benn &
K. Hall (Eds), Globalization: A Calculus of Inequality – Perspectives from the South
(pp. 128-134). Kingston, Jamaica: Ian Randle Publishers.
Bolles, B. (1963). Residual Nationalism: A Rising Treat to Projected European Union.
Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 348, 102-109.
Bomberg, E. & Stubbs, A. (2004). The European Union: How does it Work? London:
Oxford University Press.
Boxill, I. (1997). Ideology and Caribbean Integration. Kingston, Jamaica: The
Consortium Graduate Studies School of Social Sciences.
Braveboy-Wagner, J. (2003). The English-Speaking Caribbean States: A Triad of
Foreign Policies. In J. Hey (Ed.), Small States in World Politics: Explaining Foreign
Policy Behavior (pp. 31-52). Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
Braveboy-Wagner, J. (2008). Small States in Global Affairs: The Foreign Policies
of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM). New York: Palgrave MacMillan.
Brewster, Havelock. (2003). The Caribbean Single Market and Economy: Is it realistic
without commitment to political unity. Retrieved from
http://www.caricom.org/speeches/csme-politicalunity-brewster.htm.
Buddan, R. (2001). The Foundations of Caribbean Politics. Kingston: Arawak
Publications.

245

Buddan, R. (2004, May 9). Regionalism - the Caribbean's only Future. The Jamaica
Gleaner. Retrieved from
http://jamaica-gleaner.com/gleaner/20040509/focus/focus2.html.
Buddan, R. (2004). GT63B-Caribbean Political Systems II lecture on
Globalization and Regionalism held on April 21, 2004 at UWI, Mona.
Bulmer, S. (1993). The Governance of the EU: a New Institutionalist Approach.
Journal of Public Policy, 13, 351-380.
Bulmer, S. (1998). New Institutionalism and the Governance of the Single European
Market. The Journal of European Public Policy, 21, 349-363.
Bulmer, S. & Lesquesne, C. (2005). The Member States of the European Union. London:
Oxford University Press.
Burgess, M. (2004). ‘Federalism.’ In A. Wiener & T. Diez (Eds.) European Integration
Theory (pp. 25-43). New York: Oxford University Press.
Byron, J. (2000). The Impact of Globalization on the Caribbean. In D. Benn & K. Hall
(Eds), Globalization: A Calculus of Inequality – Perspectives from the South (pp. 135142). Kingston, Jamaica: Ian Randle Publishers.
Caines, A. (2010, July 30). Commentary: Caribbean Integration . . . For Whom? The St
Kitts-Nevis Observer. Retrieved from
http://www.thestkittsnevisobserver.com/2010/07/30/caribbean-integration.html.
Campbell, F. (1991, December 5). When Mr. Federation comes to call WEST INDIES”
A team set up to help Caribbean islanders 'prepare for the 21st century' is talking to
West Indians living in Ottawa, Montreal and Toronto. The idea is inter-island unity,
and whatever form it takes, everyone should be involved in shaping it. The Globe and
Mail (Canada). Retrieved from
http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.fiu.edu/hottopics/lnacademic/?verb=sf&sfi=AC01
NBSimplSrch.
Cardoso, F. and Faletto, E. (1979). Dependency and Development in Latin
America. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Caribbean Court of Justice. (2001). About the Caribbean Court of Justice. Retrieved from
http://www.caribbeancourtofjustice.org/about.htm.
Caribbean Media Corporation. (2006, June 28). Caribbean single market no threat to
smaller members, says Caricom chairman. Retrieved from
http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.fiu.edu/hottopics/lnacademic/?verb=sf&sfi=AC01
NBSimplSrch.

246

CARICOM Secretariat. (1973). Treaty Establishing the Caribbean Community. Retrieved
from http://www.caricom.org/jsp/community/original_treaty-text.pdf.
CARICOM Secretariat. (1984). The Nassau Understanding: Structural Adjustment and
Closer Integration for Accelerated Development in the Caribbean Community.
Retrieved from
http://www.caricom.org/jsp/communications/meetings_statements/nassau_understandi
ng.jsp?menu=communications.
CARICOM Secretariat. (1988). Communique issued at the conclusion of the Ninth
Meeting of the Conference of Heads of Government of the Caribbean Community, 4-8
July 1988, Deep Bay, Antigua and Barbuda. Retrieved from
http://www.caricom.org/jsp/communications/communiques/9hgc_1988_communique.
jsp.
CARICOM Secretariat. (1989a). Grand Anse Declaration and Work Programme for the
Advancement of the Integration Movement. Retrieved from
http://www.caricom.org/jsp/communications/meetings_statements/grand_anse_declara
tion.jsp.
CARICOM Secretariat. (1989b). Communique issued at the conclusion of the Tenth
Meeting of the Conference of Heads of Government of the Caribbean Community, 3-7
July 1989, Grand Anse Declaration, Grenada. Retrieved from
http://www.caricom.org/jsp/communications/communiques/10hgc_1989_communique
.jsp.
CARICOM Secretariat. (1998). Communique issued at the conclusion of the Nineteenth
Meeting of the Conference of Heads of Government of the Caribbean Community, 30
June - 4 July 1998, Castries, St Lucia. Retrieved from
http://www.caricom.org/jsp/communications/communiques/19hgc_1998_communique
.jsp.
CARICOM Secretariat. (1999). Communique of the Seventh Special Meeting of
Conference of Heads of Government of the Caribbean Community, 26-27 October
1999, Chaguaramas, Trinidad and Tobago. Retrieved from
http://www.caricom.org/jsp/communications/communiques/7sphgc_1999_communiqu
e.jsp.
CARICOM Secretariat. (2000). Communique issued at the conclusion of the Eleventh
Inter-sessional Meeting of Conference of Heads of Government of the Caribbean
Community, 13-14 March 2000, Basseterre, St. Kitts and Nevis.
http://www.caricom.org/jsp/communications/communiques/11inthgc_2000_communi
que.jsp.

247

CARICOM Secretariat. (2001). The Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas Establishing the
Caribbean Community including the CARICOM Single Market and Economy.
Retrieved from http://caricom.org/jsp/community/revised_treaty-text.pdf.
CARICOM Secretariat. (2002). Assembly of Caribbean Community Parliamentarians
(ACCP). Retrieved from
http://www.caricom.org/jsp/community/accp.jsp?menu=community.
CARICOM Secretariat. (2005). CARICOM: Our Community – An Introduction.
Kingston: Ian Randle Publishers.
CARICOM Secretariat. (2007, August 21). Financing Agreement signed to support CCJ
Operations. Retrieved from
http://www.caricom.org/jsp/pressreleases/pres191_07.jsp?null&prnf=1.
CARICOM Secretariat. (2008). The Caribbean Community (CARICOM) Official
Website. Retrieved from http://www.caricom.org.
CARICOM Secretariat. (2011). The Caribbean Forum for African, Caribbean and
Pacific (ACP) States (CARIFORUM). Retrieved from
http://www.caricom.org/jsp/community_organs/cariforum/cariforum_main_page.jsp?
menu=cob&prnf=1.
Carstens, A. (2006). Regional Integration in a Globalizing World: Priorities for the
Caribbean. Retrieved from
http://www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2006/050106.htm.
Central Statistical Office (CSO), Ministry of Planning and Sustainable Development.
(2012). Trinidad and Tobago 2011 Population and Housing Census: Demographic
Report. Trinidad and Tobago: Central Statistical Office.
CIA World Factbook. (2011). Jamaica. Retrieved from
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/jm.html.
CIA World Factbook. (2011). Trinidad and Tobago. Retrieved from
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/td.html.
Council of the Jamaica Bar Association. (2002). Suggestions for the Propose Caribbean
Supreme Court. Kingston, Jamaica. Photocopy.
Crane-Scott, M. (2004). The Legal Impact of the CCJ on Fostering International Trade
and Harnessing Regional Intellectual Property Rights. Retrieved from
http://www.caribbeancourtofjustice.org/papersandarticles/ccj-legalimpactcranescott.pdf.

248

CSME Unit, Ministry of Foreign Affairs & Foreign Trade (Jamaica). (2004). Brief
on the CARICOM Single Market and Economy (CSME): Including Status of
Jamaica’s Implementation of Key Elements as at 20 August, 2004. Retrieved from
http://www.jasap-online.org/news/csme.htm.
De la Bastide, M. (2007, February 24). The Role of the Caribbean Court of Justice in the
CARICOM Single Market & Economy. Retrieved from
http://www.caribbeancourtofjustice.org/papersandarticles/role_ccj_csme.pdf
de la Reza, G. (2003). El regionalismo abierto en el hemisferio occidental. Análisis
Económico, 18, 297-312.
De Santos, T. (1970). The Structure of Dependence. American Economic Review, 60,
231-236.
Decker, F. (2002). Governance beyond the nation-state. Reflections on the democratic
deficit of the European Union. Journal of European Public Policy, 9, 256-272.
Delegation of the European Union to Jamaica, Belize, The Bahamas, Turks and Caicos
Islands and Cayman Islands. (n.d.). Jamaica & the EU: Development Cooperation.
Retrieved from
http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/jamaica/eu_jamaica/developement_cooperation/inde
x_en.htm.
Delegation of the European Union to the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago. (n.d.). EU
Cooperation with Trinidad & Tobago. Retrieved from
http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/trinidad/eu_trinidad/tech_financial_cooperation/inde
x_en.htm.
Demas, W. (1965). The Economics of Development in Small Countries with Special
Reference to the Caribbean. Montreal: McGill University Press.
Demas, W. (1974). West Indian Nationhood and Caribbean Integration. Bridgetown,
Barbados: CCC Publishing House.
Demas, W. (1976). Essays on Caribbean Integration and Development. Kingston,
Jamaica: ISER.
Demas, W. (1987). Seize the Time. Towards OECS Political Union. St. Michael,
Barbados: Caribbean Development Bank.
Derbyshire, J. Denis & Derbyshire, I. (1991). Spotlight on World Political Systems: An
Introduction to Comparative Government. Edinburgh: Chambers.

249

Dookeran, W. (2012, January 31). A Future for SMEs in Trinidad and Tobago. Port of
Spain, Trinidad: Unpublished.
Dookeran, W. (2012, May 30). Caribbean Convergence: Revisiting Caribbean
Integration. Port of Spain, Trinidad: Unpublished.
Dookeran, W. (2012). Epilogue: A New Leadership Challenge – Getting the Politics of
Development Right. Port of Spain, Trinidad: Unpublished.
Duncan, N. (Lecturer, University of the West Indies (Mona)), Interview by author.
Jamaica, November 9, 2004.
Ebenau, M. (2012). Regional Integration Processes. Retrieved from
http://wiki.elearning.unibielefeld.de/wikifarm/fields/ges_cias/field.php/Main/Unterkapitel181.
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC). (1995).
Integration and Caribbean Development: Reconciling regional policies with global
trends. Retrieved from
http://www.eclac.org/publicaciones/xml/2/39202/LCARG464.pdf.
ECLAC. (2004). Globalization and Development. Retrieved from
http://www.cepal.org/publicaciones/xml/0/10030/Globalization-Chap11.pdf.
ECLAC. (2008). the CARIFORUM-EU Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA): An
Assessment of Issues relating to Market Access, Safeguards and Implications for
Regional Integration. Retrieved from
http://www.ilocarib.org.tt/trade/documents/understanding_epa/overview/L.181.pdf.
Eden, L. & Hermann, C. (2003, May 31). The New Regionalism in the Americas.
Retrieved from
http://worldroom.tamu.edu/Workshop%20webpages/Eden-Hermannregionalism-talk-May-31-2003.pdf.
Edwards, G., Wattenberg, M. & Lineberry, R. (2005). Government in America:
People, Politics, and Policy, 12th edition. New York: Pearson Longman.
Elazar, D. (1998). Constitutionalizing Globalization: The Postmodern Revival of
Confederal Arrangements. Retrieved from
http://www.jcpa.org/dje/books/conglob-ch1.htm.
Elman, Miriam. (1995). The Foreign Policies of Small States: Challenging Neorealism in
Its Own Backyard. British Journal of Political Science, 25, 171-217.

250

Emmanuel, P. (1992). Elections and Party Systems in the Commonwealth Caribbean
1944-1991. Bridgetown, Barbados: Caribbean Development Research Services.
Encyclopædia Britannica Online. (2013). Association of Caribbean States (ACS).
Retrieved from
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/1521399/Association-of-CaribbeanStates.
European Commission (EC). (1996). Green Paper on Relations between the European
Union and ACP Countries on the eve of the 21st Century: Challenges and Options for
a New Partnership. Retrieved from
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:51996DC0570&from=EN.
EC. (2003). How to the European Union works: A citizen’s guide to EU institutions.
Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities
EC. (2008). Economic Partnership Agreement: between the
CARIFORUM States, of the one part, and the European Community and its Member
States, of the other part. Retrieved from
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2008/february/tradoc_137971.pdf.
EC. (2012). Country Level Evaluation: Jamaica – Final Report, Volume 2, Annexes.
Retrieved from
http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/how/evaluation/evaluation_reports/reports/2013/1314_v
ol2_en.pdf.
EC. (2013). Trade Statistics. Retrieved from
http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/statistics/index_en.htm.
Evans, G. & Newnham, J. (1998). Dictionary of International Relations. London:
Penguin Books Ltd.
Farrell, T. (2001 [1981]). Five Major Problems for CARICOM. In K. Hall (Eds), The
Caribbean Community: Beyond Survival (pp. 8-16). Kingston: Ian Randle Publishers.
Ferris, E. & Lincoln, J. (1981). Latin American Foreign Policies: Global and
Regional Dimensions. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press.
Financial Times (London, England). (1989, August 1). Where Small Can Be Bountiful.
Retrieved from
http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.fiu.edu/hottopics/lnacademic/?verb=sf&sfi=AC01
NBSimplSrch.

251

Follesdal, A. & Hix, S. (2006). Why there is a Democratic Deficit in the EU: A
Response to Majone and Moravcsik. Journal of Common Market Studies, 44, 533-562.
Franck, T. (1968). Why Federations Fail: An Inquiry in the Requisites for Successful
Federalism. New York: New York University Press.
Frank, A. (1968). Development and Underdevelopment in Latin America. New York:
Monthly Review Press.
Franklyn, D. (Ed.). (2005). We Want Justice: Jamaica and the Caribbean Court of
Justice. Kingston: Ian Randle Publishers
Galtung, J. (1971). A Structural Theory of Imperialism. Journal of Peace Research, 8,
81-117.
George, A. & Bennett, A. (2005). Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social
Sciences. Cambridge, MA and London, England: MIT Press.
Gilbert-Roberts, T. (2013). The Politics of Integration: Caribbean Sovereignty Revisited.
Kingston, Jamaica: Ian Randle Publishers.
Girvan, N. (2000a). ‘Creating and Recreating the Caribbean.’ In D. Benn & K. Hall
(Eds.) Contending with Destiny: The Caribbean in the 21st Century (pp. 31-36).
Kingston, Jamaica: Ian Randle Publishers.
Girvan, N. (2000b). Notes on CARICOM, The ACS, and Caribbean Survival. Retrieved
from http://www.reocities.com/CollegePark/library/3954/caribbeansurvival.pdf.
Girvan, N. (2011). Existential Threats in the Caribbean: Democratising Politics,
Regionalising Governance. Retrieved from
http://www.normangirvan.info/wp-content/uploads/2011/05/girvan-clr-james-lecturerevised.pdf.
Gordon, M. 2001. New Challenge: Globalization, Governance and the Future of
American Federalism. New York: Demos.
Grace Kennedy Group. (2013). Companies. Retrieved from
http://www.gracekennedy.com/companies.
Grant, C. (1997). The Association of Caribbean States and the US-Caribbean Relations.’
In R. Palmer (Ed.), The Repositioning of the U.S.-Caribbean Relations in the New
World Order (pp. 27-50). Westport, CT: Praeger.
Grant, C. (2000). U.S.-Caribbean Relations. Foreign Policy: In Focus, 5, 101-104

252

Greenburg, E. & Page, B. 2005. The Struggle for Democracy, 7th edition.
Retrieved from
http://www.ablongman.com.html/productinfo/greenburg7e/GREE_chpt3.pdf.
Guardian Group. (2013). About Guardian Group. Retrieved from
http://trinidad.myguardiangroup.com/about-guardian-group/.
Haas, E. (1968). The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social and Economic Forces 19501957, 2nd edition. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Haas, E. & Schmitter, P. (1964). Economics and Differential Patterns of Political
Integration: Projections about Unity in Latin America. International Organization, 18,
705-737.
Hall, K. (Ed.). (2001). The Caribbean Community: Beyond Survival. Kingston: Ian
Randle Publishers.
Hall, K (Ed.). (2003a). Integrate or Perish: Perspectives of the heads of Government of
the Caribbean Community and the Commonwealth Caribbean Countries 1963-2002,
2nd edition. Kingston: Ian Randle Publishers.
Hall, K. (2003b). Re-Inventing CARICOM: The Road to a New Integration.
Kingston: Ian Randle Publishers.
Hall, M. (2009, July 9). Public Affairs: Whither the Caribbean Community? The Jamaica
Gleaner. Retrieved from
http://jamaica-gleaner.com/gleaner/20090705/cleisure/cleisure2.html.
Hall, P. & Taylor, R. (1996). Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms.
Political Studies, 44, 936-957.
Handel man, H. (2010). The Challenge of Third World Development, 6th edition. New
York: Longman Publishers.
Hansen, P. (2005). Dispute Settlement in the NAFTA and Beyond. Texas International
Law Journal, 40, 417-424.
Harris, D. (1997). Jamaica’s Export Economy: Towards a Strategy of Export-Led
Growth. Kingston, Jamaica: Ian Randle Publishers.
Harris, D. & Azzi, D. (2009). ALBA - Venezuela’s answer to “free trade”: the Bolivarian
Alternative for the Americas. Retrieved from
http://focusweb.org/sites/www.focusweb.org/files/occ3.pdf.

253

Harvey, D. (2005). A Brief History of Neoliberalism. New York: Oxford University
Press.
Haughton, A. (2013, October 23). Debt-to-GDP ratio: An Insurmountable Task. The
Jamaica Gleaner. Retrieved from
http://jamaica-gleaner.com/gleaner/20131023/news/news1.html.
Held, D. (1997). Democracy and Globalization. Global Governance, 3, 251-267.
Heller, C. (1969). Structured Social Inequality: A Reader in Comparative Social
Stratification. New York: The MacMillan Company.
Henke, H. (2000). Between Self-Determination and Dependency: Jamaica's foreign
relations, 1972-1989. Kingston, Jamaica: University of the West Indies Press.
Henry, B. (2005, 27 March)....But business sector wants CCJ as regional trade court.
Jamaica Observer, Retrieved from
http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:niOVgUoOOyYJ:www.jamai
caobserver.com/news/77536_---But-business-sector-wants-CCJ-as-regional-tradecourt+&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us#ixzz2ccjHyTAV.
Heron. T. (2004). The New Political Economy of United States-Caribbean Relations: The
Apparel Industry and the Politics of NAFTA Parity. Burlington, VT: Ashgate.
Heron, T. (2008). Political Advertising and the Portrayal of Gender, Colour and Class in
Jamaica’s General Elections 2007. Gender and Governance Series, Working Paper
No. 5, Institute for Gender & Development Studies (IGDS) Mona Unit, University of
the West Indies. Retrieved from
http://www.academia.edu/406785/_Political_Advertising_and_the_Portrayal_of_Gend
er_Colour_and_Class_in_Jamaicas_General_Elections_2007_.
Hey, J. (1995). Theories of Foreign Policy and the Case of Ecuador in the 1980s. Athens:
Ohio University Press.
Heywood, A. (1999). Political Theory-An Introduction. New York: Palgrave.
Higley, J. (n.d). Elite Theory in Political Sociology. Retrieved from
http://xa.yimg.com/kq/groups/26452858/582250183/name/Teoria%20elites%20Higley
.pdf.
Hinds, D. (2005). Internal Political Tribalism and Regional Integration in the Caribbean.
Retrieved from http://www.as.miami.edu/eucenter/papers/hindsfinal.pdf.

254

Hinzten, P. (2003). Rethinking Democracy in the Post-Nationalist State: The Case of
Trinidad and Tobago. In H. Henke & F. Reno, Modern Political Culture in the
Caribbean (pp. 395-423). Kingston, Jamaica: The University of the West Indies Press.
Hodges, M. (1972). European Integration. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books.
Hodgson, G. (2006). What are Institutions? Journal of Economic Issues, 40, 1-25.
Hoffman, S. (1995). The European Sisyphus: Essays on Europe 1964-1994. London:
Westview.
Hooghe, L. & Marks, G. (2008). A Postfunctionalist Theory of European Integration:
From Permissive Consensus to Constraining Dissensus. British Journal of Political
Science, 39, 1-23.
Hosten-Craig, J. (1992, September 10). Caribbean countries are on the outside looking in.
The Ottawa Citizen. Retrieved from
http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.fiu.edu/hottopics/lnacademic/?verb=sf&sfi=AC01
NBSimplSrch.
Hughes, C. (1954). Power and Responsibility: A Sociological Analysis of the Political
Situation in the British West Indies. In Development towards Self-Government in the
Caribbean. Symposium: The Netherlands Universities Foundation for International
Cooperation at The Hague.
Institute for Court Management. (May 2010). Collection Development for the Caribbean
Court of Justice’s Library. Retrieved from
http://www.ncsc.org/~/media/Files/PDF/Education%20and%20Careers/CEDP%20Pa
pers/2010/Collection%20Development.ashx.
Institute of International Relations. (April 2011). Caribbean Regional Integration:
A Report by the UWI Institute of International Relations (IIR). Retrieved from
http://www.normangirvan.info/wp-content/uploads/2011/06/iir-regional-integrationreport-final.pdf.
Inter-American Development Bank (IDB). (2005). CARICOM Report: No. 2. Argentina:
Institute for the Integration of Latin America and the Caribbean.
International Monetary Fund (IMF). (2012). Report on Selected Countries and Subjects –
Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago. Retrieved from
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2012/01/weodata/weorept.aspx?sy=2010&e
y=2017&scsm=1&ssd=1&sort=country&ds=.&br=1&pr1.x=64&pr1.y=12&c=343%
2C369&s=NGDPD%2CNGDPDPC%2CPPPGDP%2CPPPPC%2CLP&grp=0&a=.

255

IMF. (2013, April 16). Frequently Asked Questions: World Economic
Outlook (WEO). Retrieved from
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/faq.htm#q4b.
Jamaica Bar Association. (1999). Letter to the Editor for the Jamaica Gleaner, the
Jamaica Observer, and the Herald from the Sub-Committee to Consider the Proposed
Caribbean Supreme Court. Kingston, Jamaica: Photocopy.
Jamaica Manufacturers Association (JMA). (2008). Lobby Issues. Retrieved from
http://www.jma.com.jm/index/lobby-issues.
Jamaica Observer. (2004, January 23). Sobion raps J'can, T&T Oppositions for stance on
CCJ. Retrieved from
http://www.jamaicaobserver.com/news/54710_Sobion-raps-J-can--T-T-Oppositionsfor-stance-on-CCJ.
Jamaica Tourist Board. (n.d.). Annual Travel Statistics. 2002 – 2008. Retrieved from
http://www.jtbonline.org/statistics/Annual%20Travel/Forms/AllItems.aspx.
James, C. (1985, March 21). Trinidad stirs a Caribbean storm. Financial Times (London,
England). Retrieved from
http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.fiu.edu/hottopics/lnacademic/?verb=sf&sfi=AC01
NBSimplSrch.
James, C. (1988, December 9). Caribbean Fears reduced access to EC. Journal of
Commerce. Retrieved from
http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.fiu.edu/hottopics/lnacademic/?verb=sf&sfi=AC01
NBSimplSrch.
James, C. (1994, April 18). Caribbean Nations seek membership in NAFTA. Journal of
Commerce. Retrieved from
http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.fiu.edu/hottopics/lnacademic/?verb=sf&sfi=AC01
NBSimplSrch.
James, C. (1995, July 14). Looming shadow of NAFTA spurs CARICOM into action –
As the world moves towards large trade blocs, Canute James finds new haste among
small Caribbean states to set up a common market. Financial Times (London,
England). Retrieved from
http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.fiu.edu/hottopics/lnacademic/?verb=sf&sfi=AC01
NBSimplSrch.
James, C. (1995, August 17). Caribbean Leaders meet to forge Bloc, 25 Nations
represented at Summit. Journal of Commerce. Retrieved from
http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.fiu.edu/hottopics/lnacademic/?verb=sf&sfi=AC01
NBSimplSrch.

256

James, C. & Ӧzdamar, Ӧ. (2009). Modeling Foreign Policy and Ethnic Conflict:
Turkey’s Policies towards Syria. Foreign Policy Analysis, 5, 17-36.
Jessen, A. & Vignoles, C. (2004). Trinidad and Tobago: Trade Performance and Policy
Issues in the Era of Growing Liberalization. Argentina: Institute for the Integration of
Latin America and the Caribbean.
Jessen, A. & Vignoles, C. (2005). Jamaica: Trade, Integration, and the Quest for
Growth. Argentina: Institute for the Integration of Latin America and the Caribbean.
Jervis, R. (1978). Cooperation under the Security Dilemma. World Politics, 30, 167-217.
Johnson, H. (2011). Challenges to Civil Society: Popular Protest & Governance in
Jamaica. New York: Cambria Press.
Jones, P. (2004). Caribbean Court of Justice (CCJ): Caribbean Integration or
Disintegration? Retrieved from http://129.3.20.41/eps/le/papers/0411/0411001.pdf
Jordan, V. (2003). The Caribbean Court of Justice as part of a Wider Integration
Movement. Retrieved from
http://www.caribank.org/titanweb/cdb/webcms.nsf/AllDoc/CE3DE018EB519BC804
25741F004855A4/$File/The%20Caribbean%20Court%20of%20Justice%20as%20par
t%20of%20a%20Wider%20Integration%20Movement.pdf
Jordan, V. (2004). A Critique of the Caribbean Court of Justice: With special reference
to the European Court of Justice. Retrieved from
http://sta.uwi.edu/salises/workshop/csme/paper/vjordan.pdf
Kacowicz, A. (1998). Regionalization, Globalization and Nationalism: Convergent,
Divergent or Overlapping? Oslo, Norway: Unpublished.
Kaplan, S. (1975). The Distribution of Aid to Latin America: A Cross-National
Aggregate Data and Time Series Analysis. Journal of Developing Areas, 10, 37-60.
Kay, D. (1967). The United Nations Political System. New York: John Wiley Publishers.
Keohane, R. (1967). The Study of Political Influence in the General Assembly.
International Organization, 21, 221-237.
Keohane, R. (1986). Reciprocity in International Relations. International Organization,
40, 1-27.
Knight, F. (1996). Race, Ethnicity, and Class: Forging the Plural Society in Latin
America and the Caribbean. Waco, Texas: Baylor University Press.

257

Kuznets, S. (1963). Economic Growth of Small Nations. In A. Robinson (Ed.), The
Economic Consequences of the Size of Nations (pp. 32-36). London: MacMillan
Publishers Ltd.
Lane, J. & Ersson, S. (2000). The New Institutional Politics: Performance and
Outcomes. New York: Routledge.
Le Blé, S. & Colson, V. (2004). The European Constitution: Signing is not enough.
Fenêtre sur l’Europe. Retrieved from
http://www.fentreeurope.com/file/2004/file135.htm.
Lewis, P. (2002). Surviving Small Size: Regional Integration in the Caribbean
Ministates. Kingston, Jamaica: University of the West Indies Press.
Lewis, V. (2008). Governing of Caribbean Region: To What Ends and To What Ways?
Retrieved from
http://www.normangirvan.info/wp-content/uploads/2009/04/lewis-governing-ourcaribbean-region-2008.pdf.
Lijphart, A. (1999). Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in
Thirty-Six Countries. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Lilla, M. (2008). Promoting the Caribbean Court of Justice as the Final Court of Appeal
for States of the Caribbean Community. Retrieved from
http://www.ncsc.org/~/media/Files/PDF/Education%20and%20Careers/CEDP%20Pap
ers/2008/Lilla_CaribJustAsFinalCtAppeal.ashx.
Lindberg, L. (1963). The Political Dynamics of European Economic Integration.
Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Linz, J. & Stepan, A. (1996). Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation:
Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe. Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins University Press.
Loutoo, J. (2013, October 5). CCJ: Barbados guilty. Trinidad and Tobago Newsday.
Retrieved from http://www.newsday.co.tt/news/print,0,184557.html.
Luxner, L. (1991, September 5). Caribbean, Central America Fear Blocs, The
Buzzword is Integration. Journal of Commerce. Retrieved from
http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.fiu.edu/hottopics/lnacademic/?verb=sf&sfi=AC01
NBSimplSrch.
MacGraw, D. (1994). New Zealand’s Foreign Policy under National and Labour
Governments: Variations on the ‘Small State’ Theme? Pacific Affairs, 67, 7-25.

258

Maingot, A. (1994). The United States and the Caribbean: Challenges of an
Asymmetrical Relationship. Boulder: Westview Press.
Mansfield, E. & Milner, H. (1999). The New Wave of Regionalism. International
Organization, 53, 589-627.
Marks, G. & Wilson, C. (2000). The Past in the Present: A Cleavage Theory of Party
Positions on European Integration. British Journal of Political Science, 30, 433-459.
Marks, G., Wilson, C, & Ray, L. (2002). National Political Parties and European
Integration. American Journal of Political Science, 46, 585-594.
Mason, E. (1964). Foreign Aid and Foreign Policy. New York: Harper and Row
Publishers.
McCormick, J. (1999). The European Commission: Politics and Policies. Boulder,
Colorado: Westview Press.
McDonald, S. (2005). The Caribbean Court of Justice: Enhancing the Law of
International Organizations. Kingston, Jamaica: Caribbean Law Publishing Company.
McGowan, P. & Shapiro, H. (1973). The Comparative Study of Foreign Policy: A
Survey of Scientific Findings. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.
McIntosh, S. (2002). Caribbean Constitutional Reform. Kingston, Jamaica: Caribbean
Law Publishing Company.
Meeks, B. (1996). Radical Caribbean: From Black Power to Abu Bakr. Kingston:
University of the West Indies Press.
Meighoo, K. (2003). Politics in a Half Made Society: Trinidad and Tobago 1925-2001.
Kingston: Ian Randle Publishers.
Meighoo, K. & Jamadar, P. (2008). Democracy & Constitutional Reform in Trinidad and
Tobago. Kingston: Ian Randle Publishers.
Mills, G. (1997). Westminster Style Democracy-The Jamaican Experience. Kingston:
Grace, Kennedy Foundation.
Milward, A. (1992). The European Rescue of the Nation-State. London: Routledge.
Mitrany, D. (1966). A Working Peace System. Chicago: Quadrangle Books.
Moon, Bruce. (1983). The Foreign Policy of the Dependent State. International Studies
Quarterly, 27, 315-340.

259

Moravcsik, A. (1993). Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal
Intergovernmentalist Approach. Journal of Common Market Studies, 31, 473-524.
Moravcsik, A. (1998). The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from
Messima to Maastricht. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Moravcsik, A. & Schimmelfennig, F. (2009). Liberal Intergovernmentalism. In A.
Wiener & T. Diez, European Integration Theory, 2nd edition (pp. 67-87). New York:
Oxford University Press.
Mordecai, J. (1968). The West Indies: The federal negotiations. London: Allen & Unwin.
Moser, P. (1997). Reasons for Regional Integration Agreements. Intereconomics, 32,
225-229.
Mullerleile, C. (1995). CARICOM Integration: Progress and Hurdles – A European
View. Kingston, Jamaica: Kingston Publishers.
Munroe, M. (2006). The Birth of CARICOM. Unpublished.
Munroe, T. (1993). Introduction to Politics Lectures for First Year Students. Kingston:
Canoe Press.
Munroe, T. (1999). Renewing Democracy into the Millennium-The Jamaican Experience
in Perspective. Mona: The Press University of the West Indies.
Neita, L. (2011, June 23). One from 10 is Naught. The Jamaica Gleaner. Retrieved from
http://jamaica-gleaner.com/gleaner/20110623/cleisure/cleisure3.html.
Neuman, W. (2003). Social Research Methods: Qualitative and Quantitative
Approaches, 5th edition. Boston, Massachusetts: Pearson Education Inc.
Neunreither, K. (1994). The Democratic Deficit of the European Union: Towards Closer
Cooperation between the European Parliament and the National Parliaments.
Government and Opposition, 29, 299-314.
Nicoll, W. & Salmon, T. (2001). Understanding the European Union. Harlow, England:
Pearson Education Ltd.
North, D. (1997). The New Institutional Economics and Third World Development.
In J. Harris, J. Hunter & C. Lewis (Eds.), The New Institutional Economics and Third
World Development (pp. 17-26). New York: Routledge.
O’Brien, D. (2010). CARICOM: A Novel Approach to Regional Integration? Retrieved
from http://www.juridicas.unam.mx/wccl/ponencias/18/325.pdf.

260

Ohiorhenuan, J. (2000). The South in the Era of Globalization. In D. Benn & K. Hall
(Eds.), Globalization: A Calculus of Inequality – Perspectives from the South (pp. 4052). Kingston, Jamaica: Ian Randle Publishers.
Padmore, O. (n.d.) Federation; the demise of an idea? Photocopy.
Page, S. (2006). Path Dependence. Quarterly Journal of Political Science, 1, 87-115.
Parkin, F. (2002). Max Weber: Revised Edition. London: Routledge.
Patterson, P.J. (2010). Northern Caribbean Collaboration: A [General] Perspective. A
speech given at the Northern Caribbean Conference on Economics and Cooperation
held at the Ritz Carlton Hotel, Grand Cayman on December 17, 2010. Kingston,
Jamaica: Unpublished.
Patterson, P.J. (2012). All Hands on Deck. A speech given at the Book Launch for
“Caribbean Challenges” by Sir Shridath Ramphal held at the Mona Visitors Lodge,
UWI Mona on June 18, 2012. Kingston, Jamaica: Unpublished.
Payer, C. (1974). The Debt Trap: The IMF and the Third World. New York: Monthly
Review Press.
Payne, A. (1980). The Politics of the Caribbean Community 1961-79. Manchester:
Manchester University Press.
Payne, A. (2008). The Political History of CARICOM. Kingston: Ian Randle Publishers.
Peterson, J. (1995). Decision-Making in the EU: Towards a Framework for Analysis.
Journal of European Public Policy, 2, 69-73.
Pierson, P. (1993). When Effects Become Cause: Policy Feedback and Political Change.
World Politics, 45, 595-628.
Pierson, P. (2000). Increasing Returns, Path Dependency, and the Study of Politics. The
American Political Science Review, 94, 251-267.
Planning Institute of Jamaica. (2009). Jamaica’s Competitiveness: Analysis of the Doing
Business Report 2010 & The Global Competitiveness Report 2010. Retrieved from
http://www.pioj.gov.jm/Portals/0/Economic_Sector/Ja.Competitiveness.II.pdf.
Plischke, E. (1977). Microstates in World Affairs: Policy, Problems and Options.
Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute.
Pollack, M. (1996). The New Institutionalism and EC governance: the Promise and
Limits of Institutional Analysis. Governance, 9, 429-458.

261

Pollack, M. (1997). Delegation, Agency, and Agenda setting in the European
Community. International Organization, 51, 99-134.
Pollack, M. (2004). New Institutionalisms and European Integration. In A. Wiener & T.
Diez, European Integration Theory (pp. 137-155). New York: Oxford University
Press.
Pollard, D. (2003). The CARICOM System: Basic Instruments. Kingston, Jamaica:
The Caribbean Law Publishing Company
Pollard, D. (2004). The Caribbean Court of Justice: Closing the Circle of Independence.
Kingston, Jamaica: The Caribbean Law Publishing Company.
Powell, A., Bourne, P & Waller, L. (2007). Probing Jamaica’s Political Culture: Volume
1. Kingston, Jamaica: Centre of Leadership & Governance.
Putnam, R. (1993). Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy.
Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Quill, D. (2006, June 23). A lament for the CCJ. The Jamaica Gleaner. Retrieved from
http://www.jamaica-gleaner.com/gleaner/20060623/cleisure/cleisure4.html.
Ramphal, S. (2012). Caribbean Challenges: Sir Shridath Ramphal’s Collected Counsel.
London: Hansib Publications.
Ramsaran, R. (1989). The Commonwealth Caribbean in the World Economy. London:
MacMillan Publishers Ltd.
Rawlins, Hugh. (2000). The Caribbean Court of Justice: The History and Analysis of the
Debate. Retrieved from
http://www.caribbeancourtofjustice.org/papersandarticles/ccj_rawlins.pdf.
Richardson, N. (1976). Political Compliance and the U.S. Trade Dominance. American
Political Science Review, 70, 1098-1109.
Richardson, N. (1978). Foreign Policy and Economic Dependence. Austin: University of
Texas Press.
Richardson, N. and Kegley, Jr, C. (1980). Trade Dependence and Foreign Policy
Compliance: A Longitudinal Analysis. International Studies Quarterly, 24, 191-222.
Riker, W. (1964). Federalism: Origin, Operation, Significance. Boston: Little Brown.
Ritto, L. (2002). The European Union and the Caribbean: Analysis and Challenges.
Retrieved from http://aei.pitt.edu/8083/1/rittoworkingpaper.pdf.

262

Robinson, W. (2004). A Theory of Global Capitalism: Production, Class, and the State in
a Transnational World. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
Rosenau, J. (1966). Pre-Theories and Theories of Foreign Policy. In R. Farrell (Ed.),
Approaches to Comparative and International Politics (pp. 115-169). Illinois:
Northwestern University Press.
Ryan, S. (1972). Race and Nationalism in Trinidad and Tobago. Toronto: University of
Toronto Press.
Ryan, S. (1989). The Disillusioned Electorate. Trinidad: Imprint Caribbean.
Ryan, S. (1999). Winner Takes All-The Westminster Experience in the Caribbean. UWI,
St. Augustine: ISER.
Ryan, S. (2000). ‘Caribbean Political Thought, from Westminster to Philadelphia.’ In
K. Hall & D. Benn (Eds.), Contending with Destiny: The Caribbean in the 21st
Century (pp. 248-273). Kingston: Ian Randle Publishers.
Ryan, S. (2001). The Judiciary and Governance in the Caribbean. UWI, St. Augustine:
SALISES.
Ryan, S. (2002). ‘Good Governance: Old Wine in New Bottles?’ In S. Ryan and
A. Bissessar (Eds.), Governance in the Caribbean, edited by (pp. 7-10). UWI,
St. Augustine: SALISES.
Ryan, S. (2003). Deadlock: Ethnicity and Electoral Competition in Trinidad & Tobago.
UWI, St. Augustine: ISER.
SALISES Research Team. (2003). Draft Report on Jamaican Perceptions of Regional
Integration (May/June 2003 Survey). Kingston: Unpublished.
Salvatore, D. (2001). International Economics, 7th edition. New York: John Weiley &
Sons.
Sanders, R. (2010, April 16). OPINION: After a year of the EPA with Europe: What
benefits for the Caribbean? Caribbean Net News. Retrieved from
http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.fiu.edu/hottopics/lnacademic/?verb=sf&sfi=AC01
NBSimplSrch.
Sandholtz, W. & Sweet, A. (1998). European Integration and Supranational
Governance. New York: Oxford University Press.
Sartori, G. (1994). Comparative Constitutional Engineering: An Inquiry into Structures,
Incentives and Outcomes. New York: New York University Press.

263

Saunders, A. (2010). A Commentary on the Early Decisions of The Caribbean Court of
Justice in its Original Jurisdiction. International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 59,
761-778.
Schiff, M. & Winters, L. (1998). Dynamics and Politics in Regional Integration
Arrangements: An Introduction. World Bank Economic Review, 12, 177-195.
Schmitter, P. (2004). Neo-Neofunctionalism. In A. Wiener & T. Diez (Eds.) European
Integration Theory, (pp. 45-74). New York: Oxford University Press.
Schumpeter, J. (1947). Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy. New York: Harper.
Scott, N. (1989, June 17). Third World Socialist embraces benefits of Capitalism:
Jamaica will reap rewards from the European Single Market after 1992. The Guardian
(London). Retrieved from
http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.fiu.edu/hottopics/lnacademic/?verb=sf&sfi=AC01
NBSimplSrch.
Seaga, E. (2004). Finding a Fresh Wind. Kingston, Jamaica: The House of
Representatives.
Seaga, E. (2006). Integration vs. Cooperation: CARICOM needs re-thinking.
Kingston: Unpublished.
Seminar on Economic Integration in the Caribbean. (1984). Ten Years of CARICOM:
Papers presented at a seminar sponsored by the Inter-American Development Bank.
Washington, DC: IDB.
Shugart, M. & Carey, J. (1992). Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and
Electoral Dynamics. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Singer, M. (1972). Weak States in a World of Powers. New York: The Free Press.
Singham, A. (1968). The Hero and the Crowd in a Colonial Polity. USA: Vail-Ballou
Press Inc.
Smith, M. G. (1965). The Plural Society in the British West Indies. Berkeley, California:
University of California Press.
Snyder, J. (1991). Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambitions.
Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press.
Statistical Institute of Jamaica (STATIN). (2010). External Sector: Value of Exports and
Imports To Principal Trading Partners. Retrieved from
http://www.boj.org.jm/statistics/econdata/stats_list.php?type=7.

264

STATIN. (2012). Population and Housing Census 2011, Jamaica: General Report
Volume I. Kingston, Jamaica: Statistical Institute of Jamaica.
Steinmo, S. (2001). The New Institutionalism. In B. Clark & J. Foweraker, The
Encyclopedia of Democratic Thought (pp. 560-565). London: Routledge.
Stichcombe, A. (1997). On the Virtues of Old Institutionalism. Annual Review of
Sociology, 23, 1-18
Stone Sweet, A. (2004). The Judicial Construction of Europe. New York: Oxford
University Press, Inc.
Sullivan, M. (1993). Caribbean-U.S. Relations: Issues for Congress. Washington, DC:
Congressional Research Service.
Sutton, P. (1987). Political Aspects. In C. Clarke and T. Payne (Eds), Politics,
Development, and Development in Small States (pp. 8-19). London: Allen and Unwin.
Taylor, C. (1971). Small States and Territories. New York: Arno Press.
Taylor, O. (1999). SY14G-Sociology in the Caribbean lecture held on October 27,
1999 at UWI, Mona.
Teló, M. (2013). European Union and New Regionalism: Regional Actors and Global
Governance in a Post-hegemonic Era, 2nd edition. Burlington, Vermont: Ashgate
Publishing Company.
The Financial Post (Toronto, Canada). (1989, August 2). Caribbean Community uniting
Economies. Retrieved from
http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.fiu.edu/hottopics/lnacademic/?verb=sf&sfi=AC01
NBSimplSrch.
The Globe and Mail (Canada). (1984, July 7). 11 Caribbean Leaders agree to Regional
Plan to aid Ailing Economy. Retrieved from
http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.fiu.edu/hottopics/lnacademic/?verb=sf&sfi=AC01
NBSimplSrch.
The Jamaica Gleaner. (2000 June 14). Hylton says no to Caribbean Court of Justice
referendum. Retrieved from
http://jamaica-gleaner.com/gleaner/20000614/Lead/Lead5.html.
The Jamaica Gleaner. (2000, November 29). Lobby group joins CCJ debate. Retrieved
from http://jamaica-gleaner.com/gleaner/20001129/lead/lead5.html.

265

The Jamaica Gleaner. (2000, December 14). Unions want CCJ for commerce. Retrieved
from http://jamaica-gleaner.com/gleaner/20001214/news/news2.html.
The Jamaica Gleaner. (2003, May 28). Don Anderson Poll - Jamaicans favor
referendum on CCJ. Retrieved from
http://jamaica-gleaner.com/gleaner/20030528/lead/lead3.html.
The Jamaica Gleaner. (2005, November 4). Free trade battle looms. Retrieved from
http://www.jamaica-gleaner.com/gleaner/20051104/business/business7.html.
The Jamaica Gleaner. (2009, April 28). Gas riot in retrospect. Retrieved from
http://jamaica-gleaner.com/latest/article.php?id=8486.
The Jamaica Gleaner. (2012, April 23). Let's leave CARICOM – Mair. Retrieved from
http://jamaica-gleaner.com/gleaner/20120423/lead/lead9.html.
The Jamaica Gleaner. (2013, August 2). CARICOM divide deepens - Tufton fires back
after Nicholson dismisses proposal to withdraw from regional body. Retrieved from
http://jamaica-gleaner.com/gleaner/20130802/lead/lead3.html.
The Jamaica Gleaner. (2013, October 18). St Kitts setting up desk for Guyanese,
Jamaican nationals. Retrieved from
http://www.stabroeknews.com/2013/news/stories/10/18/st-kitts-setting-up-desk-forguyanese-jamaican-nationals/.
The Jamaica Gleaner. (2013, October 28). Let's waste no more time before debating
CCJ. Retrieved from http://jamaica-gleaner.com/gleaner/20131028/news/news1.html.
The World Bank. (2013a). GNI per capita, PPP (current international $). Retrieved from
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.PP.CD.
The World Bank. (2013b). How we Classify Countries. Retrieved from
http://data.worldbank.org/about/country-classifications.
Thorburn, D. & Morris, D. (2007). Jamaica’s Foreign Policy: Making the Economic
Development Link. Retrieved from
http://jamaica-gleaner.com/features/2009/capri/pdf/foreignpolicy-june2007.pdf.
Tilly, C. (1983). Big Structures, Large Processes, Huge Comparisons. New York:
Russell Sage Foundation.
Trinidad Cement Limited Group. (n.d.). TCL Group Subsidiaries. Retrieved from
http://www.tclgroup.com/subsidiaries/default.

266

Trinidad and Tobago Newsday. (2010, November 18). IMF: Reduce State spending.
Retrieved from http://www.newsday.co.tt/businessday/0,131042.html.
United States Census Bureau. (2013). Foreign Trade: Top Trading Partners - Total
Trade, Exports & Imports. Retrieved from
http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/statistics/highlights/top/.
Verney, D. (1959). Parliamentary Government and Presidential Government. In A.
Lijphart (Ed.), Parliamentary versus Presidential Government (pp. 31-47). Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
Viner, J. (1950). The Customs Union Issue. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace.
Vital, D. (1967). The Inequality of States: A Study of Small Power in International
Relations. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Wallace, W. (1994). Regional Integration: The West European Experience. Washington
DC: Brookings Institution Press.
Walt, S. (1987). The Origins of Alliances. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University.
Waltz, K. (1979). Theory of International Politics. Reading, Massachusetts: AddisonWesley Publishing Company.
Weaver, R. & Rockman, B. (1993). Do Institutions Matter?: Government Capabilities in
the United States and abroad. Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institute.
West Indian Commission. (1992). Time for Action: the Report of the West Indian
Commission: A Synopsis. Black Rock, Barbados: West Indian Commission.
Westwood, A. (1966). Foreign Aid in a Foreign Policy Framework. Washington:
The Brookings Institution.
Wheare, K.C. (1963). Federal Government, 4th ed. London: Oxford University Press.
Wickham, P. (1993). Prospects for a United Caribbean: A Historico-Political Analysis of
the Future of the Caribbean Integration Movement (Unpublished Masters Thesis).
University of the West Indies, Mona, Jamaica.
Wickham, P. (1997). Factors in the Integration and Disintegration of the Caribbean. In
C. Barrow-Giles (Eds.), Introduction to Caribbean Politics (pp. 240-253)
Kingston, Jamaica: Ian Randle Publishers.

267

Witter, M. (2004). Civil Society Participation in Governance in Jamaica and Belize.
Retrieved from
http://www.cpdcngo.org/cpdc/attachments/article/107/participation%20writter.pdf.
Witter, M. (2012, July 8). Lessons from the IMF Experiences. The Jamaica Gleaner.
Retrieved from http://jamaica-gleaner.com/gleaner/20120708/focus/focus3.html.
World Trade Organisation. (n.d.). II. Trade Policy Regime: Framework and Objectives.
Retrieved from
http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&ved=0CCk
QFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.wto.org%2Fenglish%2Ftratop_e%2Ftpr_e%2Fs
151-2_e.doc&ei=ZjpMUq4DqKz2QXPqIHwCA&usg=AFQjCNGIrtN3BoyYFnBTZ70Z2Zxuo04Jvw&sig2=U
uNhSDB7wpjmTwkTeYQaKQ.
World Trade Organization. (2008). World Trade Report 2008: Trade in a Globalizing
World. Retrieved from
http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/anrep_e/world_trade_report08_e.pdf.
World Trade Organization. (2011). International Trade Statistics 2011. Retrieved from
http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/statis_e/its2011_e/its11_charts_e.htm.
World Trade Organization. (2013). Regional Trade Agreements. Retrieved from
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/region_e.htm.
World Travel and Tourism Council. (2012). Travel & Tourism Economic Impact 2012:
Trinidad and Tobago. Retrieved from
http://www.wttc.org/site_media/uploads/downloads/trinidad_and_tobago2012.pdf.
Wood, D. & Yeşilada, B. (1996). The Emerging European Union. New York:
Longman Publishers.

268

APPENDIX A

Elite Participant #__________
DEMOGRAPHY
1. What is your occupation?
____ Economic Elite126
____ Political Elite127

____ Socio-Cultural Elite128

CARIBBEAN IDENTITY
2. Is there the existence of a Caribbean Identity?
3. What are the main characteristics of Caribbean Identity?
a. Common culture
b. Common history
c. Geographic location
d. External perception
e. Common social, economic and political features
4. Do you prefer to purchase ______________? Why?
a. Locally made goods
b. Regionally made goods
c. Internationally made goods
5. What is your level of attachment to foreign countries?
6. What type of regional unity do you prefer? (Economic, Political, Cultural, or A
combination of the above). What level of regional integration is best suited for the
Caribbean? What is your attitude towards political integration?
ELITE INVOLVEMENT – ECONOMIC
General background on the main incentive for Caribbean integration – Economic
Development
7. What is the link between regional integration and global integration (fragmentation or
convergence; protection against the effects of neoliberal globalization or adoption of
neoliberalism) in the context of CARICOM?
8. In your opinion, what were/are the drivers that have shaped/shapes the integration
process in the Caribbean?

126

Jump to question 8 after Caribbean Identity questions

127

Jump to question 34 after Caribbean Identity questions

128

Jump to question 61 after Caribbean Identity questions
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9. To what extent is regional integration trade diverting or enhancing?
10. How has regional integration promoted the domestic market?
11. Did regional integration accelerate economic convergence and what were the factors
and obstacles involved?
12. Has the ‘freedom of movement’ a component of Caribbean regional integration? If so
why if not why not?
13. What were the strategies employed by partners in the development of sound regional
economic policies?
Actor and Institution Questions
Since the formation of CARICOM…
14. Please identify the institution/department/person (by job title) in your country that has
had overall responsibility for:
i) National economic policy and
ii) Caribbean regional economic policy
15. What were/are the existing linkages between your national and Caribbean regional
levels in regional policy-making?
16. Who have been the key stakeholders involved in the regional policy process? What
are the formal and informal mechanisms through which they participated in regional
policymaking? What are the constraints affecting this participation? Are they largely
due to CARICOM rules, national rules, or elite organization and will?
17. How involved have you been in Caribbean economic integration? If involved, had
this led to you forming alliances and/or creating competition with national elites from
other member states? Were there negotiations and bargaining within this group of
elites to gain better benefits from regional integration? If so, how did this affect
CARICOM and national economic policies?
18. Have this collaboration gone beyond just economic policy to include other interested
parties (political, socio-cultural, etc.)? If so, do you agree that CARICOM has
evolved beyond a mere economic arrangement to one that is also political, legal and
cultural in nature?
19. As changes were made to CARICOM and national rules due to your participation in
regional integration in the 1980s and/or 1990s, did the new changes conflict and/or
complement each other? Were outdated rules removed or did they
conflict/complement with the new rules? How did these factors continue to constrain
or motivate you in participating in the regional integration process?
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20. Was there greater supranational complexity or greater access to supranational
organizations as a result of the changes in the rules? What regional
organizations/branches arose or became more accessible?
21. List the various local and regional channels that have been used to disseminate
information to regional policy decision-makers. Identify the constraints (institutional
and elite) involved in reaching the various decision-makers. What measures were
planned to overcome these constraints?
22. Identify and describe the information and communication approaches (including
networking) and strategies that have been used to:
a. build awareness about regional economic policies
b. involve different stakeholders in the regional policy-making processes
c. manage changes emanating from regional processes and the wider environment
d. manage different and conflicting views and interests
23. There was and is frustration and disenchantment in various circles with the regional
integration process. This is grounded in the considerable gap between expectations
and achievements. What factors would you highlight to explain this distance in the
1970s and 1980s? Are they largely due to CARICOM rules, national rules, or elite
involvement? Are these views shared by broad sectors of government or are they
merely concerns of very small elites that take an interest in this area? How did these
influence the call for a change in CARICOM in the late 1980s and the early 1990s?
24. Given named factors, what was the discussion like as to types of regional institutional
arrangements that would have proven to best support the integration between
economic, political, and social policy in the Caribbean? What suggestions did you
and your colleagues make?
25. The changes that came resulted in the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas establishing
the CARICOM Single Market and Economy (the economic union which includes the
affirmation of the original jurisdiction of the Caribbean Court of Justice (CCJ)) and
the Agreement for establishing the Caribbean Court of Justice. Tell me what you
know about the Revised Treaty (CSME) and the CCJ? What are their roles in
CARICOM?
26. Did you contribute to the idea that CARICOM should evolve into an economic union
that was supported by regional court with original jurisdiction that would enforce
regional law and address any question regarding the interpretation of the region’s
treaties? Is so, what was your suggestion? If not, what was your counter-proposal?
27. You mentioned earlier the constraints to making CARICOM work well in the 1970s,
1980s, and/or 1990s. Two of the biggest problems seem to be the lack of the
enforcement of policy and a weak arbitration process between states. Could you tell
me more about that in your experience? What were the costs and benefits of
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arbitration within the context of regional integration back then? What were the costs
of a lack of policy enforcement within the context of regional integration back then?
How had the law, whether national or regional, been applied in the context of regional
integration prior to the CCJ?
28. Did you have any involvement in making the CCJ what it is today? Were you
consulted? Did you submit a proposal for a legal arrangement to correct the laws of
arbitration and enforcement, and protect the running of the CSME? If you were
involved by any other means how did you ensure that your voice was heard regarding
the development of a legal arrangement to protect your interests?
29. What were your specific suggestions?
30. What influenced the position you took in how the CCJ should have been structured?
31. Have you seen any of your suggestions come to fruition in the rules and regulations
governing to running of the CCJ regarding its maintenance of original jurisdiction?
32. The primary reasons for the establishment of the CCJ was to correct the weaknesses
found in the original arbitration process among CARICOM member states, to
interpret the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas and enforce judgments and orders in
member states as it relates to the treaty to support the CSME. Do you believe it has
fulfilled this role? Why?
ELITE INVOLVEMENT - POLITICAL
General Questions about Caribbean Integration
33. What is the link between regional integration and global integration (fragmentation or
convergence; protection against the effects of neoliberal globalization or adoption of
neoliberalism) in the context of CARICOM?
34. In your opinion, what were/are the drivers that have shaped/shapes the integration
process in the Caribbean?
35. To what extent is regional integration trade diverting or enhancing?
36. How has regional integration promoted the domestic market?
37. Did regional integration accelerate economic convergence and what were the factors
and obstacles involved?
38. Has the ‘freedom of movement’ a component of Caribbean regional integration? If so
why if not why not?
39. What were the strategies employed by partners in the development of sound regional
policies?
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Actor and Institution Questions
Since the formation of CARICOM…
40. Please identify the institution/department/person (by job title) in your country that has
overall responsibility for:
i) National political/economic/social policy and
ii) Caribbean regional political/economic/social policy
41. What are the existing linkages between your national and Caribbean regional levels in
regional policy-making?
42. Who are the key stakeholders involved in the regional policy process? What are the
formal and informal mechanisms through which they participate in regional
policymaking? What are the constraints affecting this participation?
43. How involved have you been in Caribbean integration? Has it been directly (at the
regional level) and/or indirectly (national level)? If involved, did you compete with or
collaborate with national elites within your state and/or from other member states?
Were there negotiations and bargaining within this group of elites to gain better
benefits from regional integration? If so, how did this affect CARICOM and national
economic/political/social policies and institutions?
44. If involved, what interested you to get involved in regional integration process? Was
it the success/lack of success of regional economic policy, which has been the driving
force of CARICOM from the very beginning? If not, were there other factors? What
were they?
45. As changes were made to CARICOM and national rules due to your/elite
participation in regional integration in the 1980s and/or 1990s, did the new changes
conflict and/or complement each other? Were outdated rules removed or did they
conflict/complement with the new rules? How did these factors continue to constrain
or motivate you in participating further in the regional integration process?
46. As a political representative, has this collaboration (nationally and regionally) gone
beyond just economic policy to include other interested parties? If so, do you agree
that CARICOM has evolved beyond a mere economic arrangement to one that is also
political, legal and cultural in nature? To what degree?
47. Was there greater supranational complexity or greater access to supranational
organizations as a result of the changes in the rules? What regional
organizations/branches arose or became more accessible?
48. List the various channels that have been used to disseminate information to regional
policy decision-makers. Identify the constraints involved in reaching the various
decision-makers. What measures are being planned to overcome these constraints?
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49. Identify and describe the information and communication approaches (including
networking) and strategies that have been used to:
a. build awareness about regional political policies
b. involve different stakeholders in the regional policy-making processes
c. manage changes emanating from regional processes and the wider environment
d. manage different and conflicting views and interests
50. There was and is frustration and disenchantment in various circles with the regional
integration process. This is grounded in the considerable gap between expectations
and achievements. What factors would you highlight to explain this distance in the
1970s and 1980s? Are they largely due to CARICOM rules, national rules, or elite
involvement? Are these views shared by broad sectors of government or are they
merely concerns of very small elites that take an interest in this area? How did these
influence the call for a change in CARICOM in the late 1980s and the early 1990s?
51. Given named factors, what was the discussion like as to types of regional institutional
arrangements that would have proven to best support the integration between
economic, political, and social policy in the Caribbean? What suggestions did you
and your colleagues make?
52. The changes that came resulted in the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas establishing
the CARICOM Single Market and Economy (the economic union which includes the
affirmation of the original jurisdiction of the Caribbean Court of Justice (CCJ)) and
the Agreement for establishing the Caribbean Court of Justice. Tell me what you
know about the Revised Treaty (CSME) and the CCJ? What are their roles in
CARICOM?
53. Did you contribute to the idea that CARICOM should evolve into an economic union
that was supported by regional court with original jurisdiction that would enforce
regional law and address any question regarding the interpretation of the region’s
treaties? Is so, what was your suggestion? If not, what was your counter-proposal?
54. You mentioned earlier the constraints to making CARICOM work well in the 1970s,
1980s, and/or 1990s. Two of the biggest problems seem to be the lack of the
enforcement of policy and a weak arbitration process between states. Could you tell
me more about that in your experience or opinion on these issues if you did not have
direct experiences with them? What were the costs and benefits of arbitration within
the context of regional integration back then? What were the costs of a lack of
enforcement within the context of regional integration back then? How had the law,
whether national or regional, been applied in the context of regional integration prior
to the CCJ?
55. Did you have any involvement in making the CCJ what it is today? Were you
consulted? Did you submit a proposal for a legal arrangement to correct the laws of
arbitration and enforcement? If you were involved by any other means how did you
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ensure that your voice was heard regarding the development of a legal arrangement to
protect your interests? (If the political elite member is a lawyer get them to be as
specific as possible)
56. What were you specific suggestions? (If the political elite is a lawyer get them to be
as specific as possible)
57. What influenced the position you took in how the CCJ should have been structured?
58. Have you seen any of your suggestions come to fruition in the rules and regulations
governing to running of the CCJ regarding its maintenance of original jurisdiction? (If
the political elite member is a lawyer get them to be as specific as possible)
59. The primary reasons for the establishment of the CCJ was to correct the weaknesses
found in the original arbitration process among CARICOM member states, to
interpret the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas and enforce judgments and orders in
member states as it relates to the treaty to support the CSME. Do you believe it has
fulfilled this role? Why?
ELITE INVOLVEMENT – SOCIOCULTURAL
General Questions about Caribbean Integration geared more towards the university
professors
60. What is the link between regional integration and global integration (fragmentation or
convergence; protection against the effects of neoliberal globalization or adoption of
neoliberalism) in the context of CARICOM?
61. In your opinion, what were/are the drivers that have shaped/shapes the integration
process in the Caribbean?
62. To what extent is regional integration trade diverting or enhancing?
63. How has regional integration promoted the domestic market?
64. Did regional integration accelerate economic convergence and what were the factors
and obstacles involved?
65. Has the ‘freedom of movement’ a component of Caribbean regional integration? If so
why if not why not?
66. What were the strategies employed by partners in the development of sound regional
policies?
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Actor and Institution Questions
Since the formation of CARICOM…
67. Please identify the institution/department/person (by job title) in your country that has
overall responsibility for:
i) National economic/political/social policy and
ii) Caribbean regional economic/political/social policy
68. What are the existing linkages between your national and Caribbean regional levels in
regional policy-making?
69. Who are the key stakeholders involved in the regional policy process? What are the
formal and informal mechanisms through which they participate in regional
policymaking? What are the constraints affecting this participation?
70. How involved have you been in the Caribbean integration process? Has it been
directly (at the regional level) and/or indirectly (national level)? If involved, did you
collaborate with national elites within your state and/or from other member states?
Were there negotiations and bargaining within this group of elites to gain better
benefits from regional integration? If so, how did this affect CARICOM and national
economic/political/social policies and institutions?
71. This collaboration (nationally and regionally) has gone beyond just economic policy
to include other interested parties, including you? Do you agree that CARICOM has
evolved beyond a mere economic arrangement to one that is also political, legal and
cultural in nature? To what degree?
72. If involved, what interested you to get involved in regional integration process? Was
it the success/lack of success of regional economic policy, which has been the driving
force of CARICOM from the very beginning? If not, were there other factors? What
were they?
73. As changes were made to CARICOM and national rules due to your/elite
participation in regional integration in the 1980s and/or 1990s, did the new changes
conflict and/or complement each other? Were outdated rules removed or did they
conflict/complement with the new rules? How did these factors continue to constrain
or motivate you in participating further in the regional integration process?
74. Was there greater supranational complexity or greater access to supranational
organizations as a result of the changes in the rules? What regional
organizations/branches arose or became more accessible?
75. List the various channels that have been used to disseminate information to regional
policy decision-makers. Identify the constraints involved in reaching the various
decision-makers. What measures are being planned to overcome these constraints?
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76. Identify and describe the information and communication approaches (including
networking) and strategies that have been used to:
a. build awareness about regional social policies
b. involve different stakeholders in the regional policy-making processes
c. manage changes emanating from regional processes and the wider environment
d. manage different and conflicting views and interests
77. There was and is frustration and disenchantment in various circles with the regional
integration process. This is grounded in the considerable gap between expectations
and achievements. What factors would you highlight to explain this distance in the
1970s and 1980s? Are they largely due to CARICOM rules, national rules, or elite
involvement? Are these views shared by broad sectors of government or are they
merely concerns of very small elites that take an interest in this area? How did these
influence the call for a change in CARICOM in the late 1980s and the early 1990s?
78. Given named factors, what was the discussion like as to types of regional institutional
arrangements that would have proven to best support the integration between
economic, political, and social policy in the Caribbean? What suggestions did you
and your colleagues make? (If speaking to a media representative, ask the
suggestions that were reported on)
79. The changes that came resulted in the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas establishing
the CARICOM Single Market and Economy (the economic union which includes the
affirmation of the original jurisdiction of the Caribbean Court of Justice (CCJ)) and
the Agreement for establishing the Caribbean Court of Justice. Tell me what you
know about the Revised Treaty (CSME) and the CCJ? What are their roles in
CARICOM?
80. Did you contribute to the idea that CARICOM should evolve into an economic union
that was supported by regional court with original jurisdiction that would enforce
regional law and address any question regarding the interpretation of the region’s
treaties? Is so, what was your suggestion? If not, what was your counter-proposal? (If
speaking to a media representative, ask about the proposals that were reported on)
81. You mentioned earlier the constraints to making CARICOM work well in the 1970s,
1980s, and/or 1990s. Two of the biggest problems seem to be the lack of the
enforcement of policy and a weak arbitration process between states. Could you tell
me more about that in your experience or opinion on these issues if you did not have
direct experiences with them? What were the costs and benefits of arbitration within
the context of regional integration back then? What were the costs of a lack of
enforcement within the context of regional integration back then? How had the law,
whether national or regional, been applied in the context of regional integration prior
to the CCJ? (If speaking to a media representative, ask about that which was reported
on)
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82. Did you have any involvement in making the CCJ what it is today? Were you
consulted? Did you submit a proposal for a legal arrangement to correct the laws of
arbitration and enforcement? If you were involved by any other means how did you
ensure that your voice was heard regarding the development of a legal arrangement to
protect your interests? (If speaking to a media representative, ask about that which
was reported on)
83. What were you specific suggestions? (If speaking to a media representative, ask
about that which was reported on)
84. What influenced the position you took in how the CCJ should have been structured?
(If speaking to a media representative, this follow up question should support
responses which was reported on)
85. Have you seen any of your suggestions come to fruition in the rules and regulations
governing to running of the CCJ regarding its maintenance of original jurisdiction? (If
speaking to a media representative, ask about that which was reported on)
86. The primary reasons for the establishment of the CCJ was to correct the weaknesses
found in the original arbitration process among CARICOM member states, to
interpret the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas and enforce judgments and orders in
member states as it relates to the treaty to support the CSME. Do you believe it has
fulfilled this role? Why?
WRAP UP QUESTIONS
87. In your view, has CARICOM been successful? Why?
88. There is no doubt that integration process in the region have taught us several lessons,
some positive, some negative. Which ones would you highlight as the main lessons
learned in either sense?
89. Is there anything else you’d like to share with me?

THANK YOU FOR YOUR TIME AND PARTICIPATION
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